THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
RIVERSIDE
Ex Libris
; C. K. OGDEN
GREECE AND THE ALLIES
1914-1922
BY THE SAME AUTHOR
SONGS OF MODERN GREECE
MACEDONIAN FOLKLORE
THE TALE OF A TOUR IN MACEDONIA
GREECE IN EVOLUTION (ED.)
TURKEY IN TRANSITION
TURKEY, GREECE, AND THE GREAT POWERS
UNDER THE TURK IN CONSTANTINOPLE
GREECE AND THE
ALLIES
1914-1922
BY
G. F. ABBOTT
WITH A PREFACE BY
ADMIRAL MARK KERR, C.B., M.V.O.
LATE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ROYAL HELLENIC NAVY
AND HEAD OF THE BRITISH NAVAL MISSION TO GREECE
METHUEN & CO. LTD.
36 ESSEX STREET W.G.
LONDOiN
\
A -6
First Published in igsa
PREFACE
THE late convulsions in Greece and Turkey, and
the consequent revival of all the mis-statements
which, during the War, flowed from ignorance or
maHce, render the pubhcation of this book particularly
opportune.
Mr. Abbott deals with his subject in all its aspects, and
presents for the first time to the British public a complete
and coherent view of the complicated circumstances that
made Greece, during the War, the battle-ground of rival
interests and intrigues, from which have grown the present
troubles.
In this book we get a clear account of the little-under-
stood relations between the Greek and the Serb ; of the
attitude of Greece towards the Central Powers and the
Entente ; of the dealings between Greece and the Entente
and the compUcations that ensued therefrom. Mr. Abbott
traces the evil to its source — the hidden pull of British
versus French interests in the Eastern Mediterranean,
and the open antagonism between M. Venizelos and King
Constantine.
All these subjects are of acute interest, and not the least
interesting is the last.
The persecution of King Constantine by the Press of
the Allied countries, with some few good exceptions, has
been one of the most tragic affairs since the Dreyfus case.
Its effect on the state of Europe during and since the War
is remarkable. If King Constantine's advice had been
followed, and the Greek plan for the taking of the
Dardanelles had been carried out, the war would
probably have been shortened by a very considerable
period, Bulgaria and Rumania could have been kept out
of the War, and probably the Russian Revolution and
collapse would not have taken place ; for, instead of having
Turkey to assist Bulgaria, the Allied forces would have
been between and separating these two countries.
vi GREECE AND THE ALLIES
In this case King Constantino would not have been
exiled from his country, and consequently he would not
have permitted the Greek Army to be sent to Asia Minor,
which he always stated would ruin Greece, as the country
was not rich enough or strong enough to maintain an
overseas colony next to an hereditary enemy like the Turk.
It is illuminating to remember that the Greek King's
poUcy was fully endorsed by the only competent authorities
who had a full knowledge of the subject, which was a
purely military one. These were the late Field-Marshal
Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, the British Admiral at the
head of the Naval Mission in Greece, and Colonel Sir
Thomas Cuninghame, British Military Attache in Athens ;
but the advice tendered by these three officers was dis-
regarded in favour of that given by the civilians, M.
Venizelos and the AUied Ministers.
Mr. Abbott's book will do much to enlighten a misled
pubUc as to the history of Greece during the last nine j^ears,
and many documents which have not hitherto been before
the public are quoted by him from the official originals,
to prove the case.
For the sake of truth and justice, which used to flourish
in Great Britain, I hope that this book will be read by
everyone who has the welfare of the British Empire at
heart.
Mark Kerr
4 October, 1922
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
AS this work goes to press, the British Empire finds
/\ itself forced to vindicate its position in the East :
a position purchased at the cost of much blood and
treasure during the war, to be jeopardized after the con-
clusion of peace by the defeat of Greece and the defection
of France.
In the following pages the reader will find the sequence
of events which have inevitably led up to this crisis : an
account of transactions hitherto obscured and distorted
by every species of misrepresentation and every known
artifice for manipulating public opinion.
The volume is not a hasty essay produced to exploit
an ephemeral situation. It embodies the fruit of investiga-
tions laboriously carried on through six years. A slight
account of the earUer events appeared as far back as the
winter of 1916 in a book entitled, Turkey, Greece, and the
Great Powers : that was my first effort to place the subject
in its true perspective. The results were interesting. I
was honoured bv the reproaches of several private and by
the reprobation of several public critics ; some corre-
spondents favoured me with their anonymous scurriUty,
and some bigots relieved me of their acquaintance. On
the other hand, there were people who, in the midst of a
maelstrom of passion, retained their respect for facts.
I pursued the subject further in a weekly journal. Two
of my contributions saw the light ; the third was sup-
pressed by the Authorities. Its suppression furnished
material for a debate in ParHament : " This is a cleverly
written article," said Mr. John Dillon, " and I cannot find
in it a single word which justifies suppression. All that
one can find in it is that it states certain facts which the
Government do not like to be known, not that they injure
the military situation in the least, but that they show that
the Government, in the opinion of the writer, made certain
very bad blunders." The Home Secretary's answer was
viii GREECE AND THE ALLIES
typical of departmental dialectics : " It is inconceivable
to me," he declared, " that the Government would venture
to say to the Press, or indicate to it in any way, ' This is
our view. Publish it. If you do not, you will suffer.' "
What the Government did, in effect, say to the Editor of
the Sational Weekly was : " This is not our view. Publish
it not. If you do, you will suffer."
With an innocence perhaps pardonable in one who was
too intent on the evolution of the world drama to follow
the daily development of war-time prohibitions, I next
essayed to present to the public through the medium of a
book the truth which had been banned from the columns
of a magazine. The manuscript of that work, much
fingered by the printer, now lies before me, and together
with it a letter from the pubUsher stating that the Authori-
ties had forbidden its pubHcation on pain of proceedings
" under 27 (b) of the Defence of the Realm Regulations."
And so it came about that not until now has it been
possible for the voice of facts to refute the fables dictated
by interest and accepted by credulity. The delay had
its advantages : it gave the story, through the natural
progress of events, a completeness which otherwise it
would have lacked, and enabled me to test its accuracy
on every point by a fresh visit to Greece and by reference
to sources previously inaccessible, such as the Greek State
Papers and the self-revealing publications of persons
directly concerned in the transactions here related.
I venture to hope that so thorough an inquiry will
convej' some new information respecting these transactions
even to those who are best acquainted with their general
course. If they find nothing attractive in the style of
the book, they may find perhaps something useful, some-
thing that will deserve their serious reflection, in the matter
of it. For let it not be said that a story starting in 1914
is ancient history. Unless one studies the record of
Allied action in Greece from the very beginning, he cannot
approach with any clear understanding the present crisis —
a struggle between Greeks and Turks on the surface, but
at bottom a conflict between French and British policies
affecting the vital interests of the British Empire.
G. F. A.
5 October, 1922
Besides information acquired at first hand, my material
is mainly drawn from the following sources :
Greek State Papers now utilized for the first time.
White Book, published by the Government of M.
Venizelos under the title, " Diplomatika Engrapha, 1913-
1917," 2nd edition, Athens, 1920.
Orations, delivered in the Greek Chamber in August,
1917, by M. Venizelos, his followers, MM. Repoulis, Politis,
and Kafandaris, and his opponents, MM. Stratos and
Rallis. The Greek text (" Agoreuseis, etc.," Athens,
1917) and the English translation (" A Report of Speeches,
etc," London, 1918), give them all, though the speech of
M. Stratos only in summary. The French translation
(" Discours, etc.. Traduction de M. Leon Maccas, autorisee
par le Gouvernement Grec," Paris, 1917) curiously omits
both the Opposition speeches.
Skouloudis's Apantesis, 1917 ; Apologia, 1919 ; Semeio-
seis, 1921. The first of these publications is the ex-
Premier's Reply to statements made in the Greek Chamber
by M. Venizelos and others in August, 1917 ; the second is
his Defence ; the third is a collection of Notes concerning
transactions in which he took part. All three are of the
highest value for the eventful period of the Skouloudis
Administration from November, 1915, to June, 1916.
Journal Officiel, 24-30 October, 1919, containing a full
report of the Secret Committee of the French Chamber
which sat from 16 June to 22 June, 1916.
Next in importance, though not inferior in historic
interest, come some personal narratives, of which I have
also availed myself, by leading French actors in the drama :
Du Fournet : " Souvenirs de Guerre d'un Amiral, 1914-
1916." By Vice-Admiral Dartige du Fournet, Paris, 1920.
Sarrail : " Mon Commandement en Orient, 1916-1918."
By General Sarrail, Paris, 1920.
Regnault : "La Conquete d'Athenes, Juin-Juillet,
1 917." By General Regnault, Paris, 1920.
X GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Dnille : " L'Entente, la Grece et la Bulgarie. Notes
d'histoire et souvenirs." By Gabriel Deville, Paris, 1919.
The author was French Minister at Athens till August,
1915, and the portions of Ins work which deal with his own
experiences are worth consulting.
Jonnart : " M. Jonnart en Gr^ce et I'abdication de
Constantin." By Raymond Recouly, Paris, 1918. Though
not NVTitten by the High Commissioner himself, this account
may be regarded as a semi-official record of his mission.
The only English publications of equal value, though of
much more limited bearing upon the subject of tliis work,
which have appeared so far are :
The Dardanelles Commission Reports (Cd. 8490 ; Cd.
8502 ; Cmd. 371), and the Life of Lord Kitchener, by
Sir George Arthur, Vol. Ill, London, 1920.
Some trustworthy contributions to the study of these
events have also been made by several unofficial narratives,
to which the reader is referred for details on particular
episodes. The absence of reference to certain other
narratives is deliberate.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER
I.
CHAPTER
II.
CHAPTER
Ill,
CHAPTER
IV.
CHAPTER
V.
CHAPTER
VI.
CHAPTER
VII.
CHAPTER
VIII.
CHAPTER
IX.
CHAPTER
X.
CHAPTER
XI.
CHAPTER
XII.
CHAPTER
XIII.
CHAPTER
XIV.
CHAPTER
XV.
CHAPTER
XVI.
CHAPTER
XVII
CHAPTER
XVIII.
CHAPTER
XIX.
CHAPTER
XX.
CHAPTER
XXI.
AFTERWORD -
INDEX
-
I
7
17
21
33
50
65
76
85
95
105
114
123
139
152
162
172
177
186
200
207
217
230
239
GREECE AND THE
ALLIES
1914-1922
INTRODUCTION
INGENIOUS scholars, surveying life from afar, are
apt to interpret historical events as the outcome of
impersonal forces which shape the course of nations
unknown to themselves. This is an impressive theory,
but it will not bear close scrutiny. Human nature every-
where responds to the influence of personaUty. In Greece
this response is more marked than an^^vhere else. No
people in the world has been so completely dominated by
personal figures and suffered so grievously from their feuds,
ever since the day when strife first parted Atreides, king of
men, and god-Hke Achilles.
The outbreak of the European War found Greece under
the sway of King Constantine and his Premier Eleutherios
Venizelos ; and her history during that troubled era
inevitably centres round these two personahties.
By the triumphant conduct of the campaigns of 1912
and 1913, King Constantine had more than effaced the
memory of his defeat in 1S97. His victories ministered
to the national lust for power and formed an earnest of
the glory that was yet to come to Greece. Henceforth a
halo of miUtary romance — a thing especially dear to the
hearts of men — shone about the head of Constantine ;
and his grateful country bestowed upon him the title of
2 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Slralilalds. In town mansions and village huts men's
mouths were filled with liis praise : one dwelt on his daunt-
less courage, another on his strategic genius, a third on his
sjmipathctic recognition of the claims of the common
soldier, whose hardsliips he shared, and for whose life he
evinced a far greater solicitude than for his own.
But it was not onl}^ as a leader of armies that King
Constantine appealed to the hearts of his countrymen.
They loved to explain to strangers the reason of the name
Koumharos or " Gossip," by which they commonly called
him. It was not so much, they would say, that he had
stood godfather to the children born to his soldiers during
the campaigns, but lather that his relations wth the rank
and file of the people at large were marked by the intimate
interest of a personal companion.
In peace, as in war, he seemed a prince born to lead a
democratic people. With his tall, virile figure, and a
handsome face in which strength and dignity were happily
blended with simplicity, he had a manner of address wliich
was very engaging : his words, few, simple, soldier-hke,
produced a wonderful effect ; they were the words of one
who meant and felt what he said : they went straight to
the hearer's heart because they came straight from the
speaker's.
QuaUties of a very different sort had enabled M. Venizelos
to impose himself upon the mind of the Greek nation, and
to make liis name current in the Chancelleries of the world.
Having begun life as an obscure lawyer in Crete, he had
risen through a series of pohtical convulsions to high
notabihty in his native island ; and in 1909 a similar
convulsion in Greece — brought about not without his
collaboration — opened to him a wider sphere of acti\ity.
The moment was singularly opportune.
The discontent of the Greek people at the chronic mis-
management of their affairs had been quickened by the
Turkish Revolution into something Uke despair. Bulgaria
had exploited that upheaval by annexing Eastern Rumeha :
Greece had failed to annex Crete, and ran the risk, if the
Young Turks' experiment succeeded, of seeing the fulfil-
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 3
ment of all her national aspirations frustrated for ever.
A group of military malcontents in touch with the Cretan
leader translated the popular feehng into action : a revolt
against the reign of venaHty and futility which had for so
many years paralyzed every effort, which had sometimes
sacrificed and always subordinated the interests of the
nation to the interests of faction, and now left Greece a
prey to Bulgarian and Ottoman ambition. The old
politicians who were the cause of the ill obviously could not
effect a cure. A new man was needed — a man free from the
deadening influences of a corrupt past — a man daring
enough to initiate a new course and tenacious enough to
push on with inexorable purpose to the goal.
During the first period of his career, M. Venizelos had
been a capable organizer of administrative departments
no less than a clever manipulator of seditious movements.
But he had mainly distinguished himself as a rebel against
authority. And it was in the temper of a rebel that he
came to Athens. Obstacles, however, external as well
as internal, made a subversive enterprise impossible. With
the quick adaptability of his nature, he turned into a
guardian of established institutions : the foe of revolution
and friend of reform. Supported by the CrowTi, he was
able to lift his voice for a " Re\'isionist " above the angry
sea of a multitude clamouring for a " Constituent
Assembly."
All that was healthy in the political world rallied to the
new man ; and the new man did not disappoint the faith
placed in him. Through the next two years he stood in
every eye as the embodiment of constructive statesman-
ship. His Government had strength enough in the country
to dispense with " graft." The result was a thorough
overhauhng of the State machinery. Self-distrust founded
on past failures vanished. Greece seemed like an invahd
healed and ready to face the future. It was a miraculous
change for a nation whose political life hitherto had ex-
hibited two traits seldom found combined : the le\dty of
cMldhood and the indolence of age.
For this miracle the chief credit undoubtedly belonged
4 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
to yi. Venizelos. He had brought to the task a brain
better endowed than an}'- associated with it. His initiative
was indefatigable ; his decision quick. UnUke most of
liis countrymen, he did not content himself with ideas
without works. His subtlety in thinking did not serve
him as a substitute for action. To these talents he added
an eloquence of the kind which, to a Greek multitude, is
irresistible, and a certain gift which does not always go
with high intelhgence, but, when it does, is worth all the
arts of the most profound politician and accomphshed
orator put together. He understood, as it were instinc-
tively, the character of every man he met, and dealt with
him accordingly. This tact, coupled with a smile full of
sweetness and apparent frankness, gave to liis ^avid
personality a charm which only those could appraise who
experienced it.
Abroad the progress of ]\I. Venizelos excited almost as
much interest as it did in Greece. The Greeks are ex-
traordinarily sensitive to foreign opinion : a single good word
in a Western newspaper raises a politician in public esteem
more than a whole volume of home-made panegyric.
M. Venizelos had not neglected this branch of his business ;
and from the outset every foreign journalist and diplo-
matist who came his way was made to feel his fascination :
so that, even before leaving his native shores, the Cretan
had become in the European firmament a star of the third
or fourth magnitude. Reasons other than personal con-
tributed to enlist Western opinion in Ms favour. Owing
to her geographical situation, Greece depends for the
fulfilment of her national aspirations and for her very
existence on the Powers which command the Mediter-
ranean. A fact so patent had never escaped the per-
ception of any Greek pohtician. But no Greek poHtician
had ever kept this fact more steadily in view, or put this
obvious truth into more vehement language than M.
Venizelos : "To tie Greece to the apron-strings of the Sea
Powers," was his maxim. And the times were such that
those Powers needed a Greek statesman whom they could
trust to apply that maxim unflinchingly.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 5
With the recovery of Greece synchronized, not by chance,
the doom of Turkey : a sentence in which all the members
of the Entente, starting from different points and pursuing
different objects, concurred. The executioners were,
naturally, the Balkan States. Russia began the work by
bringing about an agi-eement between Bulgaria and
Servia ; England completed it by bringing Greece into
the League. There ensued a local, which, in accordance
with the old diplomatic prophecy, was soon to lead to the
universal conflagration. Organized as she was, Greece
succeeded better than anyone expected ; and the national
gratitude — the exuberant gratitude of a Southern people —
went out to the two men directly responsible for that
success : to King Constant! ne, whose brilliant generalship
beat the enemy hosts ; and to M. Venizelos, whose able
statesmanship had prepared the field. Poets and pam-
phleteers vied with each other in expatiating on the wonders
they had performed, to the honour and advantage of their
country. In this ecstasy of popular adoration the spirit
of the soldier and the spirit of the lawj-er seemed to have
met.
But the union was illusive and transient. Between
these two men, so strangely flung together by destiny,
there existed no link of sympathy ; and propinquity onty
forced the growth of their mutual antagonism. The seeds
of discord had alreacty borne fruit upon the common ground
of their Balkan exploits. Immediately after the defeat of
Turkey a quarrel over the spoils arose among the victors.
King Constantine, bearing in mind Bulgaria's long-
cherished dream of hegemony, and persuaded that no
sacrifices made by Greece and Servia could do more than
defer a rupture, urged a Grasco-Servian alliance against
their truculent partner. He looked at the matter from a
purely Greek standpoint and was anxious to secure the
maximum of profit for his country. M. Venizelos, on the
other hand, aware that the Western Powers, and par-
ticularly England, wanted a permanent Balkan coalition
as a barrier against Germany in the East, and anxious to
retain those Powers' favour, was prepared to concede
6 CREFXE AND THE ALLIES
much for the sake of averting a rupture. Not until the
Bulbars lx>trayed their intentions by actual aggressions
in Macedonia did he withdraw his opposition to the alhance
with Servia, wiiich ushered in the Second Balkan W'ar
and led to the Peace of Bucharest. He yielded to the
pressure of the circumstances brought to bear upon him ;
but the encounter represented no more than the preHminary
crossing of swords between two strong antagonists.
CHAPTER I
FROI\I the moment when the rupture between Austria
and Scrvia, in July, 1914, came to disturb the
peace, Greece deUbcrately adopted an attitude of
neutraUt}^ with the proviso that she would go to Servia's
assistance in case of a Bulgarian attack upon the latter.
Such an attitude was considered to be in accordance ^\^th
the Grasco-Scrvian Alliance. For, although the Military
Convention accompanjdng the Treaty contained a vague
stipulation for mutual support in case of war between one
of the allied States and "a third Power," the Treaty itself
had as its sole object mutual defence against Bulgaria. ^
In the opinion of I\I. Venizelos, her pact did not obhge
Greece to go to Servia's assistance against Austria, but at
most to mobiUze 40,000 men.^ Treaty obligations apart,
neutrality was also imposed by practical considerations.
It was to the interest of Greece — a matter of self-preserva-
tion — ^not to tolerate a Bulgarian attack on Servia calcu-
lated to upset the Balkan balance of power estabUshed by
the Peace of Bucharest, and she was firmly determined,
in concert with Rumania, to oppose such an attack v/ith
all her might. But as to Austria, M. Venizelos had to
consider whether Greece could or could not offer her ally
effective aid, and after consideration he decided that she
1 See Art. i of the Military Convention. As this article originally-
stood, the promise of mutual support was expressly limited to the
" case of war between Greece and Bulgaria or between Servia and
Bulgaria." It was altered at the eleventh hour at Servia's request,
and not without objections on the part of Greek military men, into
a " case of war between one of the allied States and a third Powder
breaking out under the circumstances foreseen by the Graeco-
Servian Treaty of Alliance." But the only circumstances foreseen
and provided for by that Treaty relate to war with Bulgaria, and
it is a question whether any other interpretation would stand before
a court of International Law, despite the " third Power " phrase
in the Military Convention. All the documents are to be found in
the White Book, Nos. 2, 3, 4, G.
2 See Art. 5 of the Military Convention.
7
8 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
should not proceed even to the mobilization of 40,000 men,
for such a measure might provoke a Bulgarian mobihzation
and precipitate compUcations. For the rest, the attitude
of Greece in face of Servia's war \\'ith Austria, "M. Venizelos
pointed out, corresponded absolutely with the attitude
which Servia had taken up in face of Greece's recent
crisis with Turkey. ^ On that occasion Greece had obtained
from her ally merely moral support, the view taken being
that the casus foederis would arise only in the event of
Bulgarian intervention. ^
Accordingly, when the Servian Go^■crnment asked if it
could count on armed assistance from Greece, M. Streit,
Minister for Foreign Affairs rmder M. Venizelos, answered
that the Greek Government was convinced that it fully
performed its duty as a friend and ally by adopting, until
Bulgaria moved, a policy of most benevolent neutrahty.
The co-operation of Greece in the war A\ith Austria, far
from helping, would harm Servia ; by becoming a bel-
ligerent Greece could only offer her ally forces negligible
compared \\ith the enemy's, while she would inevitably
e.xpose Salonica, the only port through which Servia could
obtain war material, to an Austrian attack ; and, moreover,
she would weaken her amiy which, in the common interest,
ought to be kept intact as a check on Bulgaria. ^
A similar communication, emphasizing the decision to
keep out of the conflict, and to intervene in concert %\ith
Rumania only should Bulgaria by intervening against
Servia jeopardize the status quo estabUshed by the
Bucharest Treaty — in which case the action of Greece
would have a purely Balkan character — was made to the
Greek ]\Iinisters abroad after a Coimcil held in the Royal
Palace under the presidency of the King. *
This policy brought King Constantine into sharp
collision with one of the Central Powers, whose conceptions
in regard to the Balkans had not yet been hamionized.
Vienna readily acquiesced in the Greek Government's
declaration that it could not permit Bulgaria to compromise
1 White Book, Nos. 19, 20, 22.
2 White Book, Nos. 11, 13, 14.
3 White Book, No. 23.
■* Streit to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petersburg, Berlin,
Vienna, Rome, Constantinople, Bucharest, Sofia, Nish. (No.
23,800.)
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 9
the Bucharest Treaty, and since by an eventual action
against Bulgaria Greece would not quarrel with Austria,
the Austrian Government, on its part, promised to abstain
from manifesting any solidarity with Bulgaria in the event
of a Graico-Bulgarian war.^ Not so Berlin.
The German Emperor egotistically presumed to dictate
the course which Greece should pursue, and on 31 July he
invited King Constantinc to join Germany, backing the
invitation with every appeal to sentiment and interest
he could think of. The memory of his father, who had been
assassinated, made it impossible for Constantine to favour
the Servian assassins ; never would Greece have a better
opportimity of emancipating herself, under the protection
of the Central Powers, from the tutelage which Russia
aimed at exercising over the Balkan Peninsula ; if, con-
trary to the Kaiser's expectations, Greece took the other
side, she would be exposed to a simultaneous attack from
Italy, Bulgaria and Turkey, and by the same token all
personal relations between him and Constantine would
be broken for ever. He ended with the words : "I have
spoken frankly, and I beg you to let me know your decision
without delay and with the same absolute frankness."
He had nothing to complain of on that score. King
Constantine on 2 August rephed that, while it was not the
policy of Greece to take an active part in the Austro-
Servian conflict, it was equally impossible for her "to
make common cause with the enemies of the Serbs and to
fall upon them, since they are our alUes. It seems to me
that the interests of Greece demand an absolute neutrality
and the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans such
as it has been created by the Treaty of Bucharest." He
went on to add that Greece was determined, in concert
with Rumania, to prevent Bulgaria from aggrandizing
herself at the expense of Servia ; if that happened, the
balance in the Balkans would be upset and it would bring
about the very Russian tutelage which the Kaiser feared.
" This way of thinking," he concluded, " is shared by the
whole of my people."
What the Kaiser thought of these opinions was summed
up in one word on the margin, " Rubbish." This, however,
was not meant for his brother-in-law's ears. To him he
1 Ibid.
10 GHEECK AND THE ALLIES
used loss terse langiiage. On 4 August he informed King
Constantinc through the Greek ]\Hiiister in Bcrhn that
an aliiance had that day been conchidcd between Germany
and Turke}', that Bulgaria and Rumania were similarly
ranging themselves on Germany's side, and that the German
men-of-war in the Mediterranean were going to join the
Turkish fleet in order to act together. Thus all the Balkan
States were siding with Germany in the struggle against
Slavism. Would Greece alone stand out ? His Imperial
Majest}' appealed to King Constantinc as a comrade, as a
German Field Marshal of M^hom the German Army was
proud, as a brother-in-law ; he reminded him that it was
thanks to his support that Greece was allowed to retain
Cavalla ; he begged him to mobilize his army, place
himself b}^ the Kaiser's side and march hand in hand
against the common enemy — Slavism. He made this
urgent appeal for the last time, convinced that the King
of Greece w^ould respond to it. If not, all would be over
between the two countries — this being a slightly
attenuated version of another marginal note : "I will
treat Greece as an enemy if she does not adhere at once."
King Constantine's answer was tactful but final : His
personal sjmipathies and his political opinions, he said,
were on the Kaiser's side. But alas ! that which the
Kaiser asked him to do was completely out of the question.
Greece could not under any conceivable circumstances
side against the Entente : the Mediterranean was at the
mercy of the united French and British fleets, which could
destroy the Greek marine, both royal and mercantile,
take the Greek islands, and wipe Greece off the map.
Things being so, neutrality, he declared, was the only
poHcy for Greece, and he ended up by meeting the Kaiser's
threat with a counter-threat, none the less pointed for
being veiled under the guise of an " assurance not to touch
his friends among my neighbours (i.e. Bulgaria and Turkey)
as long as they do not touch our local Balkan interests."^
1 Part of the correspondence is to be found in Die deutschen
Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, by Count Mongelas and Prof. Walter
Schliking ; part in the White Book, Nos. 24 and 26. As much
acrimonious discussion has arisen over King Constantine's last
dispatch, it is worth while noting the circumstances under which
it was sent. Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, Chief of the British Naval
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 11
Germany did not immediately resign lierself to this
rebuff. The Kaiser's Government thought King Con-
stantine's attachment to neutrality reasonable — for the
present ; but at the same time urged Greece to enter as
soon as possible into a secret understanding with Bulgaria
and Turkey for eventual action against Servia, describing
the latter country as the bear's skin of which it would be
a good stroke of business for Greece to secure a share.
The German ]\Iinister at Athens, better acquainted with
Greek views and feeUngs, took a less naive hue. He did
not want Greece to attack her ally, but was content to
advise that she should free herself from the ties that
bound her to Servia, and in the event of Bulgarian aggression
just leave her ally in the Imxh. But, if he went less far
than his chief in one direction, he went farther in another,
threatening, should Greece move on Servaa's behalf, to
ask for his passport. This threat, Hke all the others,
failed to move the Athens Government ;^ and, unable to
gain Greece as an ally, Germany was henceforth glad
enough not to have her as an enem3^
So far all those responsible for the policy of Greece
appeared to be unanimous in the decision not to be drawn
prematurely into the European cataclysm, but to reserve
her forces for the defence of the Balkan equihbrium.
Under this apparent unanimity, however, lay divergent
tendencies.
King Constantine, a practical soldier, estimated that the
European War would be of long duration and doubtful
issue : in tliis battle of giants he saw no profit for pygmies,
but only perils. At the same time, he did not forget that
Greece had in Bulgaria and Turkey two embittered enemies
Mission in Greece, relates how the King brought the Kaiser's
telegram and read it to him : " He was indignant at the inter-
ference in his country's affairs. However, to stop such telegrams
coming in daily, he determined to send on this occasion a sjaiipa-
thetic answer." (See The Times, g Dec, 1920.) The communica-
tion, therefore, was no secret from the British Government. Nor
was it from M. Venizelos ; for the King's dispatch is but a summary
of an identical declaration made by M. Vcnizelos's Government
itself to the German Government : Streit to Greek Legation,
Berlin, 26 July/8 Aug., 1914. Though omitted from the White
Book, this document may now bo read in the Balkan Review, Dec,
1920, pp. 381-3.
1 White Booh, Nos. 28, 29, 30.
IJ c;REE( E AND THE ALLIES
who would nK\st probvibly try to tUh in the troubled Wviters.
H thoy did so. he w.is i^re^virod to tight ; but to tii^lit with
a dotiiuto objoctivo and on a dotinite military plan which
tov^k into accoimt tho olotncnts of tinu\ pUioo. and
n.^oiu-cos.
The Kings standpoint was shared by ini>st Greek
statesmen and soldiers of note : they all. in varying
degrees. stoo<.l for neutrality, with jxissible intervention
on the side of the Entente at some favourable mon\ont.
But It did not commend itself to his Premier. Caution
was foreign to M. Veni/elos's ambitious and adventiuous
temixnament. Military consideratioi\s had little meaning
for Ixis ci\ili;m mind. Taking the s^xvdy victory of the
Entente as a foregone conclusion, and imbued with a sort
of niN-stical f.iith in his own prophetic insight and star, he
kx-»ked upon the Em^o^x-an War as an c>ccasion for Im-
jx^rialist aggrandizement which he felt that Greece ought
to grasp without an instvint's delay.
It w.\s not long before the underlying diwTgence came to
the surface.
In the morning of iS August, at a full Cabitiet Meeting.
M. Streit mentioned that the Russian Mituster had privately
referred to the pxv>sibility of Gavce sending 150.000 men
to tight with SerWa ag-ainst the Austrians on the Danulx^
— far away from the Greek Army's natural base in
Macedonia. C>ti hearing this M. Venizelos impulsively
declared that he was ready to place all the Greek fonres
at the disp«.">sal of the Entente Powers in accordance with
their invitation. M. Streit remonstrated that there had
been no " invitation." but at most a soimding from one
of the Entente Ministers, which Greece should meet with a
coimter-somrding, in onler to learn to what extent the
suggestion was serious. Further, he objected that, before
Greece committed herself, it was necessary to find out
where she would be expected to hght, the conditions imder
which she would fight, and the comjx'nsatioi\s which she
would receive in the event of victory. As a last resort
he proposed to adjomn the ciiscussion until the afternoon.
But M. Venizelos answered that there was no time to lose :
the War would be over in three weeks. ^ Whereupon M.
^ My authority for this glimpse behind the scenes is M. Streit
himself.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES IH
Streit resigned, and M. Venizclos offered to the Jmtentc
Ministers the adhesion of Greece forthwith.
The terms in which this offer was couched have never
been divulged ; but from the French Minister's descrip-
tions of it as made " a tilre gracicux " and " sans con-
ditions,"^ it seems to liave been unconditional and vm-
qnalified. On the otJier liand, M. Vcnizelos at a later jjcriod
exjjlained that he had oWcri'A to ])lace Greece at the disjjosal
of the Entente flowers, if Turkey went to war with them.'-*
And it is not improbable that the primary objective in
his mind was Turkey, who still refused to relinquish her
claims to tlie islands conquered by the Greeks in 1912,
and had just strengthened her navy with two German
units, the Goehen and the Breslan. However that may be,
King Constantine seconded the offer, expressing himself
quite willing to join the Entente there and then with the
whole of his army, but stipulating, on the advice of the
General Staff, tliat the Greek forces should not be moved
to any place where they could not, if need arose, operate
against Bulgaria.
The King of England telegraphed to the King of Greece,
thanking him for the proposal, which, he said, his
Government would consider. The French and Russian
Governments expressed lively satisfaction, France, how-
ever, adding : " For the moment we judge that Greece
must vise all her efforts to make Turkey observe her
promised neutrahty, and to avoid anything that might
lead the Turkish Government to abandon its neutrality."
The British answer, when it came at last, was to the same
effect : England wished by all means to avoid a collision
with Turkey and advised that Greece also should avoid a
coUision. She only suggested for the present an under-
standing between the Staffs with a view to eventual
action.
This suggestion was apparently a concession to Mr.
Winston Churchill, who just then had formed tfie opinion
that Turkey would join the Central Powers, and had arranged
with Lord Kitchener that two officers of the Admiralty
should meet two officers of the War Office to work out a
plan for the seizure, by meaas of a Greek arrny, of the
1 Deville, pp. 119, 128.
2 Orations, pp. 93-4.
1 \. OREKrE AN13 TTIE ATJJES
Gallipoli Peninsula, wiiii a sicw lu admitting a British
fleet to the Sea of Maiinara.^ But it no way affected the
British Government's policy. The utmost that JCngland
and France were prepared to do in order to meet tlie offer
of Greece, and that only if she were attacked, was to
prevent tlie Turkish fleet from coming out of the Dar-
danelles ; France also holding out some hope of financial
assistance, but none of war material on an adequate
scale.*
Such a reception of his advances was not very flattering
to M. Venizelos — it made him look foolish in the eyes of
those who had pleaded against precipitancy ; and he took
the earliest opportunity to vent his ill-humour. King
Constantine, in a reply to the British Admiralty drafted
with Vice- Admiral Mark Kerr, stated that he would not
hght Turkey unless attacked by her — a statement in strict
consonance with the wishes of the Entente Powers at the
time. But M. Venizelos objected. After his own de-
clarations to the Entente Ministers, and after the exchange
of telegrams with the King of England, he told his
sovereign he did not consider this reply possible. Turkey
was their enemy, and was it wise for them to reject a
chance of fighting her with many and powerful allies, so
that they might eventually have to fight her single-
handed ? ^
Thus M. Venizelos argued, in the face of express evidence
that those aUies did not desire the immediate participation
of Greece in a war against Tiukey — because, anxious
above all things to establish close contact with them, he
wanted the offer to remain open : "a promise that, should
at any time the Powers consider us useful in a war against
Turkey ... we would be at their disposal."* And he
professed himself unable to understand how a course which
appeared so clear to him could possibly be obscure to
others. But he had a theory — a theory which served him
henceforward as a stock explanation of every difference of
opinion, and in which the political was skilfully mixed
^ Dardanelles Commissio)?. Supplement to First Report, par. 45.
2 Gennadius, London, 20 Aug./2 Sept.; 21 Aug./3 Sept.; 23
Aug./5 Sept. • Romanos, Paris, 16/29 Aug., 1914.
'■* While Book. No. 31.
* See Orations, p. 103.
GREECE AND THE AXLIES 15
with the personal factor. According to this theory, when
face to face with M. Venizelos, the King peldom failed to
be convinced ; but as soon as M. Venizelos withdrew, he
changed his mind. This happened not once, but many
times. ^ We have here a question of psychology which
cannot be casually dismissed. M. Venizelos's persuasive
powers are notorious, and it is highly probable that King
Constantine underwent the fascination which this man
had for others. But behind it all, according to the Veni-
zehst theory, lurked another clement :
" What, I think, confuses things and begets in the mind
of your Majesty and of M. Streit tendencies opposed to
those supported by me, is the wish not to displease Germany
by undertaking a war against Turkey in co-operation with
Powers hostile to her." Although M. Streit had laid down
his portfolio, he continued to be consulted by the King,
with the result, M. Venizelos complained, that the difference
of opinions between the ex-Minis ter for Foreign Affairs
and himself was fast de^'eloping into a di\'ergence of courses
betw'een the Crown and the Cabinet : such a state of
things was obviousl^^ undesiral^le, and M. Venizelos, " in
order to facilitate the restoration of full harmony between
the Crown and its responsible advisers," offered his
resignation.^
M. Venizelos did not resign after all. But liis letter
marks an epoch none the less. At first, as we have seen,
the avowed policy of the Premier, of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, and of the King w^as the same. The difference
which now emerges is that M. Venizelos desired to throw
Greece into the War immediatel5^ without conditions and
Avithout any invitation from the Entente, while the King
and M. Streit were more circumspect. M. Venizelos chose
to interpret their circumspection as prompted by regard
for Germany, and did not hesitate to convey this view to
Entente quarters. It was, perhaps, a plausible insinuation,
since the King had a German wife and M. Streit was of
German descent. But, as a matter of fact, at the moment
when it w^as made. King Constantine voluntarily presented
to the British Admiralty through Admiral Kerr the plans
for the taking of the Dardanelles which his Staff had
^ Ibid, pp. 41-2, 98.
2 White Book, No. 31
IC GREECE AND THE ALLIES
elaborated, and for a long time afterwards continued to
supply the British Government, through the same channel,
with information from his secret service.^
' See the Admiral's statements hi the Weekly Dispatch, 21 No\'.,
and in The Times, 9 Dec, 1920. Though the plans in question were
not used, they were among the very few sources of reliable informa-
tion with which Sir Ian Hamilton left England to take up the com-
mand of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. — Dardanelles
Commission, Final Report, par. 17.
CHAPTER II
BEFORE proceeding any further with the develop-
ment of the position in Greece, it will be well to
cast a glance on the attitudes maintained by the
other Balkan States and the views entertained towards
them by the Entente Powers. One must know all the
possible combinations on the Balkan chess-board before
one can profitably study or estimate the real place of the
Greek pawn.
Bulgaria proclaimed her firm intention to remain
neutral ; but, to judge from the Greek diplomatic repre-
sentatives' reports, there was every indication that she
only awaited a favourable opportunity, such as some
brilliant military success of the Central Powers, in order to
invade Servia without risk. Meanwhile, well-armed
iiTegular bands, equipped by the Bulgarian Government
and commanded by Bulgarian officers " on furlough,"
made their appearance on the Servian frontier, and the
Bulgarian Press daily grew more hostile in its tone.^
Alarmed by these symptoms, the Greek General Staff
renewed the efforts which it had been making since the
beginning of 1914, to concert plans with the Servian
military authorities for common action in accordance
with their alliance, and asked the Servian Minister of War
if, in case Bulgaria ordered a general mobilization, Servia
would be disposed to bring part of her forces against her,
so as to prevent the concentration of the Bulgarian army
and give the Greek army time to mobilize. The reply
was that, if Bulgaria did order mobilization, the Serbs
were obUged to turn against her with all their available
forces. Only, as Austria had just started an offensive,
nobody could know how many forces they would have
available — perhaps they could face the situation with
the 25,000 or 30,000 men in the new provinces ; but, in
^ Naoum, Sofia, 11, 20 Aug. (O. S.) ; Alexandropoulos, Nish,
19 July, 19 Aug. (O. S.), 1914-
2 17
18 GREECEJAND THE ALLIES
any case, it did not seem that Bulgaria meant to mobilize,
or, if she did, it would be against Turkey. A little later,
in answer to another Greek step, M. Passitch, the Servian
Premier, after a conference with the mihtary chiefs, stated
that, as long as there was no imminent danger from
Bulgaria, Servia could not draw troops from the Austrian
frontier, because of her engagements towards the Entente,
and that, should the danger become imminent, Servia
would have to consult first the Entente.^ By Entente,
he meant especially Russia, for M. Sazonow had already
told the Greek Minister at Petrograd that it was all-im-
portant that the Servian army should be left free to devote
its whole strength against the Austrians.*
Rumania, on whose co-operation Greece counted for
restraining Bulgaria and preserving the balance estabhshed
by the Treaty of Bucharest, maintained an equivocal
attitude : both belligerent groups courted her, and it was
as yet uncertain wliich would prevail.* For the present
Rumanian diplomacy was directed to the formation of a
Balkan hloc of neutraUty — between Rmnania, Bulgaria,
Turkey, and Greece — which might enable those four States
to remain at peace with each other and the whole world,
exempt from outside interference. The first step to the
reahzation of this idea, the Rumanian Government con-
sidered, was a settlement of the differences between Greece
and Turkey ; and, in compUance with its invitation, both
States sent their plenipotentiaries to Bucharest.
The only result of this mission was to enhghten the
Hellenic Government on Turkey's real attitude. At the
very first sitting, the Turkish delegate, Talaat Bey, in
answer to a remark that the best thing for the Balkan
States would be to keep out of the general conflagration,
blurted out : " But Turkey is no longer free as to her
movements " — an avowal of the Germano-Tiurkish alUance
which the Greeks already knew from the Kaiser's own
indiscretions. After that meeting, in a conversation wth
the Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which that
gentleman reported to the Greeks, Talaat said that, in
his opinion, Greece could ignore her Servian alliance, for,
* Alexandropoulos, Nish, 31 July, 19, 26 Aug. (O.S.) 1914.
* Dragoumis, Petersburg, 20 Aug. (O.S,), 1914.
3 Politis, Bucharest, 27 Aug. (O.S.), 1914.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 19
as things stood, she might find herself at war, not only
with Bulgaria, but also with Turkey — a contingency not
foreseen when that alliance was made. From these
utterances the Greeks derived a clear impression that
Talaat acted on a plan drawn up in BerUn.^ For the rest,
the despatch of the Goeben and the Breslau to Constanti-
nople, followed by the continued arrival of German officers
and sailors for the Ottoman Navy, spoke for themselves.
M. Sazonow shared the Greek conviction that Turkey had
made up her mind, and that no amount of concessions
would avail : " It is," he said to the Greek Minister at
Petrograd, " an abscess which must burst."* The Greeks
had even reason to suspect that Turkey was secretly
negotiating an agreement with Bulgaria, and on this point
also the information of the Russian Government confirmed
theirs.'
It was his intimate knowledge of the Balkan situation
that had inspired King Constantine's proposal to the
Entente Powers in August for common action against
Turkey, quahfied with the stipulation of holding Bulgaria
in check. The proposal took cognizance of Balkan diffi-
culties and might perhaps have solved them, had it been
accepted : an advance of the Greek army on Thrace,
combined with a naval attack by the British Fleet, early
in September, might have settled Turkey, secured
Bulgaria's neutraUty, if not indeed her co-operation, or
forced her into a premature declaration of hostihty, and
decided Rumania to throw in her lot with us.
But the Entente Powers were not yet ripe for action
against Turkey : they were still playing — ^with what
degree of seriousness is a delicate question — for the
neutraUty of Turkey, and for that Greek neutrahty was
necessary. As to Bulgaria, our diplomacy harboured a
different project : the reconstruction of the Balkan
League of 1912 in our favour, on the basis of territorial
concessions to be made to Bulgaria by Ser^da and Greece,
who were to be compensated by dividing Albania between
them. Greece also had from England an alternative
suggestion — expansion in Asia Minor : a vague and
^ Politis, Bucharest, 15 Aug. (OS.), 1914.
2 Dragoumis, Petersburg, 17 Aug. (O.S.), 1914-
^ Dragoumis, ibid.
20 grp:fxe and the allies
unofftcial hint, destined to assume imposing dimensions
later on. At this stage, however, the whole project
lacked precise outhne. One plan of the reconstructed
League included Rumania — who also was to make con-
cessions to Bulgaria and to receive compensations at the
expense of Austria ; and the League was to be brought
into the field on the side of the Entente. Another plan
had less ambitious aims : Servia and Greece by conciliating
Bulgaria were to prevent a combination of Rumania,
Bulgaria, and Turkey, or of Bulgaria and Turkey, on the
side of the Central Powers. The more sanguine plan was
especially cherished by Great Britain ; the other by
Russia, who feared a Rumano-Bulgaro-Turkish com-
bination against her. But the key-stone in both was
Bulgaria, whose co-operation, or at least neutrality, was
to be purchased at the cost of Servia and Greece.^ Mean-
while, the less serious the Entente Powers' hopes for
Turkey's neutrahty, the more hvely their anxiety must
have been about 13ulgaria's attitude ; and it is not im-
probable that in repelhng King Constantine s offer, they
were actuated not so much by the ^^ish to avoid Turkish
hostiht}^ — the reason given — as b}' the fear lest the stipula-
tion which accompanied his offer, if accepted, should
provoke Bulgaria.
Higlily speculative as this project was, it might have
materiahzed if Serbs and Greeks were willing to pay the
price. But neither Serbs nor Greeks would think of such
a thing. At the mere report that they were about to be
asked to cede Cavalla, the Greeks went mad, and ]\I.
Venizelos himself, though he favoured the reconstruction
of the Balkan League, loudl}^ threatened, if the demand
was formulated, to resign. Whereupon, his consternation
having been transmitted to the Entente capitals, he
received an assurance that no demand of the sort would
be made- — for the present.
1 Gennadius, London, 8, lo, 15, 23 Aug. ; Romanos, Paris, 31 July,
16 Aug. ; Dragoumis, Petersburg, 31 July, 12, 20 Aug. ; Naoum,
Sofia, 31 July, 11, 20, 23 Aug. ; Alexand'ropoulos, Nish, 18 Aug. ;
Papadiamantopoulos, Bucharest, 25 July (O.S.), 1914.
2 Venizelos to Greek Legations, Petersburg, Bordeaux, London,
2 Sept. (O.S.), 1914.
CIIArTER III
TWO tasks now lay before the Allies in the East :
to help Servia, and to attack Turkey, who had
entered the War on 31 October. Both enterprises
were " under consideration " — which means that the
Entente Cabinets were busy discussing both and unable
to decide on either. Distracted by conflicting aims and
hampered by inadequate resources, they could not act
except tentatively and in an experimental fashion.
At the beginning of November the representatives of
France, England, and Russia at Athens collectively
seconded a Servian appeal for assistance to M. Venizelos,
wliich the Greek Premier met with a flat refusal. He gave
his reasons : such action, he said, would infallibly expose
Greece to aggression from Bulgaria, and it was more than
probable that an automatic agreement between Bulgaria
and Turkey might engage the Greek army in a struggle
with the forces of three Powers at once. Even if the
attack came from Bulgaria alone, he added, the Greek
army needed three weeks to concentrate at Salonica and
another month to reach the theatre of the Austro-Servian
conflict, and in that interval the Bulgarian army, invading
Servia, would render impossible all contact between the
Greek and Servian armies. The Entente Ministers en-
deavoured to overcome these objections by assuring M.
Venizelos that Bulgaria could not possibly range herself
against Russia, France, and England ; and besides, they
said, their Governments could ask Rumania to guarantee
Bulgarian neutrality. M. Venizelos replied that, if the
co-operation of Bulgaria with Rumania and Greece were
secured, then the Greeks could safely assist Servia in an
effective manner ; or the next best thing might be an
undertaking by Rumania to guarantee the neutrality of
Bulgaria ; and he proceeded to ascertain the Rumanian
Government's views on the subject. He learnt that, in
22 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
answer to a question put to the Rumanian Premier by the
Entente Ministers at Bucharest, " whether he would
undertake to guarantee the neutraHty of Bulgaria towards
Greece if the latter .Power sent succour to the Serbs," M.
Bratiano, while professing the greatest goodwill towards
Greece and the Entente, declined to give any such under-
taking.^ Add another important fact to which the Greek
Government had its attention very earnestly drawn about
this time — that not only Servia, but even Belgium, ex-
perienced the greatest difficulty in procuring from France
the munitions and money necessary for continuing the
struggle. '^
In the circumstances, there was no alternative for M.
Venizelos but to adopt the prudent attitude which on other
occasions he was pleased to stigmatize as " pro-German."
True, his refusal to move in November was hardly con-
sistent with his eagerness to do so in August ; but, taking
into account liis temperament, we must assume that he
had made that rash d litre gracieux offer bhndfold. Events
had not borne out his predictions of a speedy victory, and,
though liis faith in the idtimate triumph of the Entente
remained unshaken, he had come to reahze that, for the
present at any rate, it behoved Hellas to walk warily.^
Some ten weeks passed, and then (23 January, 1915)
Sir Edward Grey again asked M. Venizelos for assistance to
Servia in the common interest ; as Austria and Germany
seemed bent on crushing her, it w-as essential that all who
could should lend her their support. If Greece ranged
herself by Servia's side as her ally, the Entente Powers
would willingly accord her very important territorial
concessions on the Asia Minor Coast. The matter was
^ Psycha to Venizelos, Bucharest, 23 Oct./6 Nov. ; Venizelos
to Greek Legations, London, Bordeaux, Petersburg, 24 Oct./
7 Nov., 1914.
^ Romanes, Bordeaux, 19 Nov., 1914.
^ He explained, three years afterwards, that at the time of making
his offer of 18 Aug., 191 4, he bore in mind " the impossibility of going
to Servia's assistance on account of the danger from Bulgaria."
— Orations, p. 93. But precisely similar was the objection to going
against Turkey without a guarantee of Bulgarian neutrality : only
the Bulgars, in the one case, would have been on Greece's left flank
and in the other on the right. The truth seems to be that the
vision of M. Venizelos lacked the penetration which, in matters of
this sort, can only some from long study and reflection.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 23
urgent, for, were Servia crushed, though the ultimate
defeat of Austria and Germany would not be thereby
affected, there would during the War come about in the
Balkans accomplished facts which would make it difficult
or even impossible for either Servia or Greece to obtain
afterwards arrangements as favourable as those actually
in view. Conversely, the immediate participation of Greece
and Rumania in the War would, by bringing about the
defeat of Austria, secure the reahzation of Greek, Rumanian
and Servian aspirations. To render such participation
effective, it was desirable that Bulgaria should be assured
that, if Servian and Greek aspirations elsewhere were
realized, she would obtain satisfactory compensations in
Macedonia, on condition that she came in or at least
maintained a not malevolent neutraUty. But the question
of compensations affected chiefly Servia : all he asked of
M. Venizelos on that point was not to oppose any conces-
sions that Servia might be inchned to make to Bulgaria.
Whether this semi-official request amounted to a proposal
or was merely in the nature of a suggestion is hard to
determine. But M. Venizelos seems to have understood
it in the latter sense, for in spealdng of it he made use of
the very informal adjective " absurd." No one, indeed,
could seriously beUevc that Bulgaria would be induced to
co-operate, or even to remain neutral, by the hypothetical
and partial promises which Sir Edward Grey indicated ;
and with a potentially hostile Bulgaria in her flank Greece
could not march to Servia's aid. So M. Venizelos, under
the impulse of ambition, set his energetic brain to work,
and within a few hours produced a scheme calculated to
correct the " absurdity " of the British notion, to earn the
gratitude of the Entente to himself, and an Asiatic Empire
for his country. It was nothing less than a complete
reversal of his former attitude : that Greece should not
only withdraw her opposition to concessions on the part
of Servia, but should voluntarily sacrifice Cavalla to the
Bulgars, provided they joined the Alhes forthwith. This
scheme he embodied in a lengthy memorandum which he
submitted to the King.
M. Venizelos recognized how painful a sacrifice the
cession of Cavalla would be, and therefore he had to use very
strong arguments to commend it to his Majesty. In the
24 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
first place, he emphasized the imperative need of helping
Ser\ia, since, should SerNia be crushed, the Austro-German
armies might be tempted to advance on Salonica, or
Bulgaria might be invited to take possession of Servian
Macedonia, in which case Greece would have either to let
the Balkan balance of power go by the board, or, in ac-
cordance with her Treaty, go to Servia's assistance under
much more disadvantageous conditions. In the second
place, he argued that the sacrifice of Ca\-alla was well worth
maldng, since Greece would eventually receive in Asia
Minor compensations which would render her greater and
more powerful than the most sanguine Greek could ewn
have dreamt a few years before ; and in Macedonia itself
the loss of Cavalla could be partially compensated for by
a rectification of frontiers involving the acquisition from
Servia of the Doiran-Ghevgheli district.
In the event of Bulgaria accepting Cavalla and the
Servian concessions as the price of her alUance, I\I. Veni-
zelos argued that the outcome would be a reconstructed
League of the Balkan States which would not only ensure
them against defeat, but would materially contribute to
the \ictory of the Entente Powers : even the ideal of a
lasting Balkan Federation might be reahzed by a racial
readjustment through an interchange of populations.
Should Bulgarian greed prove impervious, Greece must
secure the co-operation of Rumania, without wliich it
would be too risky for her to niove.^
Sacrifices of territorj^ in King Constantine's opinion,
were out of the question ; but he thought that, if Rumania
agreed to co-operate, it might be possible for Greece to go
to Servia's assistance, as in that case Bulgaria could per-
haps be held in check by Rumanian and Greek forces left
along her northern and southern frontiers. The Bucharest
Government was accordingl}^ sounded, and returned an
answer too evasive to justify rehance on its co-operation.
So ^l. Venizelos fell back on the scheme of buying Bul-
garian co-operation by the cession of Cavalla, and submitted
a second memorandum to the King.
If the first of these documents was remarkable for its
optimism, the second might justly be described as a
^ First Memorandum, 11/24 Jan., in the Nea Hellas, 21 March
(O.S.), 1915.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 25
masterpiece of faith pure and undefiled by any contact
with sordid facts. Its theme is the magnitude of the
compensations which Greece might expect in return for
her entry into the War : "I have a feeling," says the
author, " that the concessions in Asia Minor suggested
by Sir Edward Grey can, especially if we submit to saciifices
to the Bulgars, assume such dimensions as to double the
size of Greece. I behove that if we demanded " — he
specifies in detail a vast portion of Western Asia Minor —
" our demand would probably be granted." He calcu-
lated that the surface of this territory exceeds 125,000
(the figure was soon raised to 140,000) square kilometres,
while the area to be ceded in Macedonia did not exceed
2,000 square kilometres, and that loss would be further
halved by the acquisition from Servia of the Doiran-
Ghevgheli district, which covered some 1,000 square
kilometres. Thus, in point of territory, Greece would be
giving up a hundred and fortieth part of what she would
be getting. In point of population also Greece would be
receiving twenty-five times as much as she would be
sacrificing — an accretion of 800,000 as against a loss of
30,000 souls ; and that loss could be obviated by obUging
Bulgaria to bu3^ up the property of the Cavalla Greeks,
who, he had no doubt, would gladly emigrate en masse to
Asia Minor, to reinforce the Greek element there. How
was it possible to hesitate about seizing such an opportu-
nity — an opportunity for the creation of a Greece powerful
on land and supreme in the iEgean Sea — " an opportunity^
verily presented to us b}/ Divine Providence for the realiza-
tion of our most audacious national ideals " — presented
to-day and never hkely to occur again ?
M. Venizelos did not doubt but that a transaction
which appeared so desirable and feasible to him must
appear equally desirable and feasible to others : and great
was his surprise to find that such was by no means the case.
The General Staff, he complained, " seem, strangely, not
attracted strongly by these views." And the same might
be said of everyone who judged, not by the glow of pro-
phetic insight, but by a cold examination of facts. When
Asia Minor was first mentioned to the Greek Minister in
London, that shrewd diplomat answered : " Greece
would not commit such a folly, for the day she set foot in
26 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Asia Minor she would find herself up against Great Powers
as well as against Turkey."^ At Athens to this objection
wore added others not less weighty. The General Staff
pointed out that Greece had neither the men nor the money
required for the permanent occupation and eflicient
administration of that distant region. They feared both
the difficulties of defending those Turkish territories in
Asia and the danger of future attack from Bulgaria in
Europe. In short, they held that Greece by embarking
on what they aptly termed a Colonial policy would be
undertaking responsibilities wholly incommensurate with
her resources.*
Dangers and difficulties ! cried M. Venizelos : can you
allow such things to stand in the way of national ideals ?
And he proceeded to demolish the obstructions : the
administrative success achieved in Macedonia proved that
the resources of Greece were equal to fresh responsibilities ;
the Turks of Asia Minor — after the total disappearance
of the Ottoman Empire, which he deemed inevitable —
w'ould become contented and law-abiding Greek subjects,
and at all events the local Greek population would in a very
short space of time supply all the forces needed to main-
tain order in Asia, lea\dng the main Greek arm}^ free for
the defence of the European frontiers. During that brief
period of transition, he thought it easy to form an agree-
ment \vith the Entente Powers for military assistance
against a Bulgarian attack, or, even without the Entente,
" should the Bulgars be so demented by the Lord as to
attempt aggression, I have not the slightest doubt that
Servia, moved by her treaty obligations, her interests,
and her gratitude for our present aid, would again co-
operate with us to humble Bulgarian insolence."'
Thus at a moment's notice M. Venizelos became an
impassioned advocate of the poUcy of which he had liitherto
been an impassioned opponent, and he would have us
believe that the King, persuaded by liis eloquence, autho-
rised him to carry out his new plan. Be that as it may,
M. Venizelos did not avail himself of this permission.
^ Gennadius, London, lo Aug. (O.S.), 1914.
^ Orations, p. 43.
' Second Memorandum, 17/30 Jan., in the Nea Hellas, 22 March
(O.S.), 1915.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 27
For almost simultaneously came the news of a Bulgarian
loan contracted in the Austro-Gemian market — an event
which made him abandon all hopes of conciliating Bulgaria
and profiting by the British overture. During the months
when the revival of the Balkan League was perhaps still
practicable, he had combated the only expedient wliich
might have given it a chance of realization : by the time
he became a convert, it was too late.
The Balkan situation remained as it was before Sir
Edward Grey's suggestion : so much so that, when a few
days later the Entente Powers again asked Greece to go
to Servia's rehef, offering her as security against the
Bulgarian danger to transport to Macedonia a French and
a British division, M. Venizelos, considering such security
insufficient, again refused;^ a refusal which, justified
though it was, gave great umbrage.'^
While the Greek Premier was going through these mental
evolutions, the scene of Entente activity shifted : and his
flexible mind perforce veered in a new direction.
As far back as 3 November, the outer forts of the
Dardanelles had been subjected to a brief bombardment
\vith the object of testing the range of their guns ; and by
25 November the idea of a serious attack on the Straits
had engaged the attention of the British War Council.
But no decision was arrived at until January, when Russia,
hard pressed by the Turks on the Caucasus, begged for a
demonstration against them in some other quarter. In
compliance \\ith this appeal, the British War Council then
decided to attempt to force the Dardanelles by means of
the Navy alone. After the failure of the naval attack
of 19 February, hov/ever, it was reahzed that the opera-
tions would have to be supplemented by military action ;^
and as the magnitude of the enterprise became clearer
and the troops at the disposal of England and France
were very hmited, the need of securing Balkan alhes
became more obvious.
From the first greater importance was attached to
Bulgarian co-operation than to Greek. Even the grant of
1 See his own statement in the Nea Hellas, 22 March (O.S.), 1915.
- Dragoumis, Petrograd, 16 Feb., 191 5.
8 Dardanelles Commisiion, First Report, pp. 14-5, 31-3; Final
Report, pp. 6-8.
28 GREFXE AND THE ALLIES
a loan to Sofia by the Central Powers appears to have
produced little or no impression upon those concerned.
Long afterwards it was admitted as a self-evident proposi-
tion that belligerents do not lend to neutrals without Ix^ing
satisfied that their money will not be used against tliem-
selves. But at the time, after a momentary shock, the
Entente Governments were deluded, either by Bulganan
diplomacy or by their own wishes, into the belief that
" Bulgaria would not conmiit the stupidity to refuse the
advantages offered."^ Nor, in thus reckoning on en-
lightened bad faith, were thej' alone. M. Venizelos, who
a moment before had declared that the loan had opened
his eyes to the fact " that Bulgaria was definitely com-
mitted to the Central Powers," now felt quite sure that,
" notwithstanding the loan, Bulgaria was capable of
betraying her then friends and turning towards those who
promised her greater profits."^ Anxious, therefore, to
forestall the Bulgars, and concerned by the thought that
he had been obliged on three occasions to dechne requests
from the Entente, he spontaneously proposed, on i Alarch,
to offer three Greek di\'isions for the Dardanelles ex-
pedition, stating that this proposal was made with King
Constantine's assent.^
As a matter of fact, neither the King nor his General
Staff approved of M. Venizelos's strategy'. Having made a
systematic study of the Dardanelles problem, they judged
that the Allies' enterpri.se, even under the most skilful
handling, presented but few chances, and those chances
had been discounted in advance by utter want of skilful
handling : the bombardment of the Straits in the pre\dous
November had given the Turks warning of the blow and
ample time to prepare against it — and the Turks were no
longer the happy-go-lucky fellows upon whose inefficiency
one might formerly have counted ; they now mounted
guard over the gates of their capital equipped with German
guns and commanded by German oflicers. The enterprise
was likely to become more hazardous still by arousing the
jealousy of the Bulgars. If, therefore, Greece did join in,
besides all the other risks, she v/ould expose herself to a
' Deville, pp. 163, 215.
^ Orations, pp. 103, 104.
2 Dardanelles Commission, Supplement to First Report, p. 3.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 29
Bulgarian assault ; and with a considerable portion of her
forces engaged in Gallipoli, and no prospect either of
Servian or of Rumanian assistance, how was she to face that
assault ?
The King's disapproval was known to no one better than
to M. Venizelos himself. But, for all that, he felt entitled
to tell the British Minister at Athens that he had the King's
assent. Here is his own explanation : " The King was
opposed to the enterprise. I sought another interview in
order to speak to him again on the subject, and took with
me a third memorandum " — which has never been published,
and cannot yet be pubhshed. " I asked him to let me read
it to him, for in it were set forth fully all the arguments
which, in my opinion, imposed co-operation. I read it.
I saw that the King became agitated. For — I must do him
that justice — he rarely remained unconvinced when face
to face with me. So profound was the emotion with which
I spoke, so powerful were the arguments which I used that
the King, greatly moved, said to me : ' Well, then, in the
name of God.' That is, he assented."^
However, the General Staff remained unconvinced ; and
Colonel Metaxas, a brilliant soldier, then Acting-Chief of
the Staff, resigned as a protest against military proposals
being made by a Greek minister to other countries A\ithout
previous consultation with the military experts of his own.
M. Venizelos, on his part, was indignant that mere soldiers
should presmne to meddle with the plans of statesmen ;
his view being that the Staff's business was simply to carry
out the poHcy of the Government. Nevertheless, im-
pressed by this resignation, he suggested the meeting of a
Crown Council composed of all the ex-Premiers, that their
opinions might be heard. The Council met on 3 March
and again on 5 March. At the first sitting M. Venizelos
admitted that the objections of the miUtary experts, with-
out altering his own convictions, might still inspire doubt
as to which pohcy was preferable : neutrality or inter-
vention. Should the poUcy of neutraHty be adopted, it
must be carried on by a new Cabinet, to which he would
accord his parhamentary support. At the second sitting
he endeavoured to remove the objections of the miUtary
experts by reducing his proposed contribution to the
^ Orations, pp. 105-6.
30 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Gallipoli expedition from tliree divisions to one, which
should be replaced in the existing cadres by a division of
reserves, so as to leave the Greek Army practically intact
against a possible attack from Bulgaria. And having
thus modified the conditions of intervention, he refused
to entertain any other poUcy or to support a Cabinet
pledged to neutrality.^
Momentarily infected by the Cretan's enthusiasm,
nearly all present urged upon the King the acceptance of
his proposal ; one of them, M. Rallis, even going so far as
to say : " Sire, pray consider that you have a Government
clothed with the full confidence of the nation. Let it
carry out its policy. Else, you will incur undue responsi-
bihty." The King's answer was : " If you wish it, I will
abdicate."^ He would rather give up his crown than
assume the responsibility of sanctioning a poHcy wliich his
whole mihtary training and experience told him was
insane and suicidal : how justly, the event soon showed.
The losses of men and ships which Gallipoli cost far ex-
ceeded the whole of Greece's mihtary and naval resources ;
and if that cost proved more than embarrassing to England
and France, it would have Uterally ruined Greece. M.
RalUs and the other ex-Premiers in less than a fortnight
gratefully recognised the justness of the King's opposition
to their views,' and thenceforth parted company with M.
Venizelos.
Meanwhile M. Venizelos hastened from the Palace
to the British Legation, and, " in order to save time till he
could make an otficial demarche," he made to the Entente
Ministers there assembled a semi-official communication
to this effect : " Following the natural evolution of its
pohcy of solidarity with the Entente Powers, the Royal
Government has judged that the Dardanelles operations
afford it a favourable occasion to translate its sentiments
into deeds by abandoning its neutraUty and offering its
co-operation in that enterprise with the whole of its Fleet
and one division of its army." All this, " though the King
^ See Extracts from the Crown Council Minutes, in the Balkan
Review, Dec, 1920, pp. 384-5, which supplement M. Venizelos's
very meagre account of these proceedings in Grati»ns, pp. 107-8.
'^ Oralions, pp. 266-7.
^ Ibid. pp. 267-8.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 31
has not yet given his adhesion."^ His hurry arose from the
beUefthatthcAUieswouldreachConstantinopleinafewdays.
But the General Staff still remained unconvinced. Yes,
they said, one division to begin with ; but what if the AlUes
get stuck in the Straits, as we believe they will be, and call
upon us for more ? And, once we join them, how can we
refuse to supply their needs ? We shall be incurring
imlimited liabilities. So the King, who had full confidence
in his miUtary advisers, and who could not bring himself
to look upon the Gallipoli adventure as a " serious enter-
prise,"* dechned his adhesion to M. Venizelos's plan ; and
M. Venizelos resigned in wrath (6 March).
Then came the Entente replies to his communication ;
from wluch it appeared that, as in August, 1914, so now
the impetuous Cretan ran ahead of the Powers : that,
whilst he was inveighing against everyone who would
not let Greece co-operate with them, they had not yet even
agreed as to whether they desired her co-operation.
England regarded the communication as a merely
prehminary and preparatory step, and waited for a definite
proposal after the King's decision, when she would consult
with her alhes. France and Russia insisted on the impos-
sibility of Greece hmiting her participation to a war
against Turkey alone : to be an effective partner of the
Entente, Greece must be prepared to fight Austria and
Germany also. France added that the question of the
participation of Greece in the Dardanelles enterprise could
not be a useful subject of discussion between the AlHes
until a definite decision by the Greek Government was
taken. Russia did not even envisage the usefulness of
such a discussion. M. Sazonow pointedly declared that
he did not consider Greek co-operation in the Dardanelles
at all necessary, that the question of the Straits and of
Constantinople ought to be settled by the Entente Powers
alone without the intervention of third parties, and that
Russia did not desire the entry of a Greek army into
Constantinople, though she had no objection to its operat-
ing against Smyrna or elsewhere.*
^ Venizelos to Greek Legations, London, Paris, Petrograd, 20
Feb./5 March, 1915.
' Orations, p. 267.
* Gennadius, London, 21 Feb. ; Sicilianos, Paris, 22 Feb. ; Drag-
ommis, Petrograd, 22 Feb. (O.S.), 1915.
82 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Some days later, it is true, M. Delcass6 affirmed that he
had overcome Russia's repugnance;^ but, though it is
probable that Russia, yielding to pressure, would liave
accepted the participation of Greek troops, she made no
secret of her satisfaction at not ha\ing had to do so :
" We heartily consent to your receiving large compensa-
tions in Asia ]\Iinor," said the Russian Minister at Athens,
in the presence of his British colleague, to a high official
of the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs. " I3ut as to
Constantinople, we prefer that you should not come there ;
it would afterwards be painful for you and disagreeable
for everybody to turn you out."^
M. Venizelos knew these views perfectly well, and did
not covet Constantinople : what he coveted, so far as
material gains went, w-ere the large compensations in Asia
Minor. ^ There lay the chief objective of his strategy,
and its net outcome was to widen the breach between him
and those elements in the country which still bcheved that
the pohcy of Greece must be governed by the solid neces-
sities of the Balkan situation, not by nebulous visions of
Imperiahst expansion.
^ White Book, No. 37.
" " Conversation with M. Demidoff," Polilia, Athens, 25 Feb./
10 March, 1915.
' Orations, pp. 108, 1 13-14.
CHAPTER IV
IMMEDIATELY after the resignation of M. Venizelos
it was decided to dissolve tlie Chamber and to have
General Elections, in which for the first time the
territories conquered in 1912-13 would participate. Mean-
while, the King called upon M. Gounaris, a statesman of
considerable abihty, though with none of the versatiUty
of mind and audacity of character which distinguished his
predecessor, to carry on the Government and to preside
over the elections. Under ordinary circumstances these
would have taken place at once. But owing to the need
of preparing electoral hsts for the new provinces, they were
delayed till 13 June, and owing to a serious illness of King
Constantine which supervened — causing intense anxiety
throughout the nation and bringing poHtical Hfe to a
standstill — two more months passed before the new
Parliament met. The interval proved fruitful in develop-
ments of far-reaching importance.
On its accession to power, the new Government issued
a communique, announcing that it would pursue the policy
adopted at the beginning of the War : a policy of neutrality
qualified by a recognition of the obhgations imposed by the
Servian Alliance, and a determination to serve the interests
of Greece without endangering her territorial integrity.'-
And as the Entente representatives at Athens expressed
a certain disappointment at not finding in the communique
any allusion to the Entente Powers,^ M. Zographos, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, in order to remove all uneasiness on
that score, instructed the Greek representatives in London,
Paris, and Petrograd to assure the respective Governments
categorically that the new Ministry did not intend to
depart in any way from the pro-Entente attitude dictated
by hereditary sentiments and interests ahke. The only
1 White Book, No. 34.
2 " Conversation with M. Demidoff," Politis, 25 Feb./io March,
1915-
3 33
84 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
difference between the Venizelos and the Gounaris Cabinets
— the difference which brought about the recent crisis and
the change of Government — was one regarding the danger
of immediate action, but did not affect the basis of Greek
pohcy. '
That, by all the evidence available, was the truth. M.
Gounaris thought as M. Venizelos thought, as King
Constantine thought, as, indeed, every Greek capable of
forming an opinion on international affairs thought —
namely that, if Greece were to fight at all, interest and senti-
ment alike impelled her to fight on the side of the Entente. -
The only question was whether she should enter the field
then, and if so, on what conditions.
M. Venizelos persisted in declaring that the Dardanelles
expedition presented " a great, a unique opportunity,"
which he prayed, " God grant that Greece may not miss."^
His successors had no wish to miss the opportunity— if
such it was. But neither had they any wish to leap in
the dark. M. Gounaris and his colleagues lacked the
Cretan's infinite capacity for taking chances. Even in
war, where chance plays so great a part, little is gained
except by calculation : the enterprise which is not care-
fully meditated upon in all its details is rarely crowned
with success.
And so when, on 12 April, the representatives of the
Entente signified to M. Gounaris their readiness to give
Greece, in return for her co-operation against Turkey, the
" territorial acquisitions in the vilayet of Aidin," suggested
1 White Book, No. 35.
2 The best proof is to be found in the Venizelist White Book,
No. 36, — an exhaustive memorandum by M. Streit on the proba-
biUties of the War, dated 13/26 March, 1915. It is both striking
and illuminating that, while in dealing with the attitude of Bulgaria,
the author considers three alternatives: (i) Bulgaria in alliance
with the Entente. (2) Bulgaria as neutral. (3) Bulgaria as an
enemy of the Entente. In dealing with the attitude of Greece he
does not for a single moment contemplate more than two alterna-
tives : (i) Greece as an ally of the Entente. (2) Greece as neutral.
Further, in the course of the argument which follows, M. Streit
discusses a possible understanding between Greece on the one part
and Rumania and Bulgaria on the other, with the object either of a
common neutrality or, failing that, of a simultaneous entry into
war in favour of the Entente, " on whose side alone we can range
ourselves."
^ See the Nea Hellas, 22 March (O.S.), 1915.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 35
to his predecessor, M. Gounaris tried to ascertain exactly
the form of the co-operation demanded and the extent of
the " territorial acquisitions in the vilayet of Aidin "
offered. The British Minister replied as to the first point
that, having no instructions, he was unable to give any
details ; and as for the second, that it referred to the
" very important concessions on the Asia Minor coast "
mentioned in Sir Edward Grey's communication of
January. On being further pressed, he said it meant
" Smyrna and a substantial portion of the hinterland " —
a definition with which his Russian and French colleagues
were inchned to concur, though both said that they had no
instructions on the subject. Then M. Gounaris asked
whether their Excellencies had transmitted to their
respective Governments M. Venizelos's interpretation of
Sir Edward Grey's offer regarding its geographical limits.
The British Minister repHed that he had no official know-
ledge of that interpretation ; he had only heard of it semi-
officially and had transmitted it to his Government, but
had received no answer. The Russian Minister replied
that he had transmitted nothing on the subject to his
Government, as he had been informed of it in but a vague
way by the late Cabinet. The French Minister stated that
the subject had never been mentioned to him, and conse-
quently he had not been in a position to make any com-
munication to his Government.^ Thus the grandiose
Asiatic dominion of which M. Venizelos spoke so eloquently
dwindled to " Smyrna and a substantial portion of the
hinterland."
However, the King, the General Staff, and the Cabinet
went on with their work, and were joined by Prince George,
King Constantine's brother, who had come from Paris to
Athens for the express purpose of discussing with the
Government the question of entering the war against
Turkey on the basis of guarantees to be determined by
negotiations of which Paris might be the centre. In that
order of ideas, they had already indicated as the best
guarantee the simultaneous entry of Bulgaria, who,
according to news from the Entente capitals, was on the
point of joining. But this condition having proved
^ Conversation entre le President du Conseil et les Ministres des
Puissances de la Triple Entente, 30 7nars/i2 avril, 1915.
8(5 CHKKCK AND TIIK ALLIES
unrealisablc — Bulgaria refusing to be bought except, if
at all, at a price of Greek territory which Greece would on
no account pay — they dropped it and set about consider-
ing by what other combinations they could come in with-
out comproniising their country's vital interests. The
upshot of their deliberations was a proposal, dated
14 April, to the following efi'ect :
If the Allies would give a formal undertaking to
guarantee during the War, and for a certain y)criod after
its termination, the integrity of her tenitories, Greece
would join them with all her miUtary and naval forces in a
war against Turkey, the defmite objective of which would
be the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire ; for, unless the
Ottonjan Empire disappeared, the Greek hold on Smyrna
would not be very firm. It was further stipulated that the
Allies should define the territorial compensations as well
as the facilities regarding money and war material which
they would accord Greece in order to enable her to do her
part of belligerent efficiently. On these conditions Greece
would assume the obhgation to enter the field as soon as
the Allies were ready to combine their forces with hers.
All mihtary details were to be settled between the respec-
tive Staffs and embodied in a joint Military Convention,
with this sole reservation that, if Bulgaria continued to
stand out, the Greek Army's sphere of action could not be
placed outside European Turkey. In an explanatory
Note added a few da3's later, at the instance of the General
Staff, stress was laid upon the ambiguous attitude of
Bulgaria, on account of which the opinion was expressed
that the Alhes should be prepared to contribute forces
which, combined with the Greek, would equal the united
Turkish and Bulgarian forces, and that the sphere of
Greek action should be limited to the west of the Gallipoli
Peninsula ; but it was agreed that, if the AHies wished it,
they should have the mihtary assistance of Greece on the
Gallipoli Peninsula too, provided that they landed their
own troops first. ^
Of these proposals, which were not put forward as final,
but rather as a basis of discussion, the Entente Powers
did not condescend to take any notice. Only unofficially
^ Zographos to Greek Minister, Paris, 1/14 April, with the
Proposal of same date ; Orations, pp. 67-9.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 37
the Greek Minister in Paris, on approaching M. Delcasse,
was told that, since the Hellenic Government viewed the
Dardanelles enterprise in a different hght from them, an
understanding seemed impossible and discussion useless ;
for the rest, that enterprise, for which England had desired
the co-operation of the Greeks, was now carried on without
them, and the situation was no longer the same as it was
some days before. Alarmed by this snub, and anxious
to dissipate any misunderstandings and doubts as to its
dispositions towards the Entente, the Hellenic Government
assured M. Delcasse that it continued always animated by
the same desire to co-operate and would like to make new
proposals, but before doing so it wished to know what
proposals would be acceptable. M. Delcasse rephed that
he could not even semii-officially say what proposals would
be acceptable.^ But M. Guillemin, his former collaborator
and later French Minister at Athens, then on a flying visit
there, advised M. Zographos to abandon all conditions and
take pot luck with the Ahies.
This notion succeeded to the extent that Greece proposed
to offer to enter the war against Turkey with her naval
forces only, reserving her army for her own protection
against Bulgaria. - The Entente Powers intimated through
M. Delcass^ that they would accept such an offer, provided
it was made without any conditions. '^ Before deciding,
Greece wanted to be assured that the integrity of her
territory during the War and in the treaty of peace would
be respected, that all the necessary money and material
would be forthcoming, and that the compensations in Asia
Minor allotted to her would represent approximately the
area indicated by M. Venizelos. If it was found that on
these three points the Hellenic Government interpreted the
intentions of the Entente Powers correctly, it would im-
mediately submit a Note in which the three points would
be mentioned as going of their own accord, so that the
official reply of the Entente might cover, not only the
offer, but also its interpretation thus formulated.' M.
^ Romanes, Paris, 17/30 April, 191 5.
2 Zographos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petrograd,
18 April/i May, 1915.
^ Romanos, Paris, 4 May (N.S.), 1915.
* Zographos to Greek Legation, Paris, 22 April/5 May, 191 5.
88 CiHEECK AND THE AIJJES
Delcass6 refused to listen to any points : (iieece, he insisted
irritably, should enter the alliance without conditions,
coupling her otter simply with " hopes to have the benefit
of full solidarity with her allies, whence results a guarantee
of her territorial integrity," and " entrusting the full
protection of her vital interests to the three Entente
Powers." The formula was not incompatible with the
best construction which one chose to put upon it ; and
Prince George — who had returned to Paris directly after
the first offer and acted as a personal representative of
King Constantine, together with the official representative
of the Hellenic Government — warmly advocated its
adoption, pleading that, if Greece did come in M-ithout
delay and without conditions, she might safely trust the
Allies. 1
WTiether Prince George's plea sprang from blind faith
or from far-sighted fear, is a question upon which the
sequel may throw some light ; for the present enough to
state that it produced no effect. In a matter concerning
the integrity of national territory acquired so dearly,
King Constantine felt that he could not afford to allow any
ambiguity or uncertainty : he was willing to waive the
other two points, but not that. He therefore begged his
brother to see M. Poincare and soHcit in his name the
President's help to secure that indispensable assurance.
" The essential thing," he said, "is that the Entente
Powers should give us a solemn promise that they \v\\l
respect and make others respect, until the re-estabhshment
of peace, our territorial integrity, and that they will not
permit any damage to it by the future Peace Treat}'.
Remark to him that Greece has the right to be astonished
that friendly Powers ready to accept her as an ally
dechne to explain themselves clearly with her."' WTiat
was in the King's mind may be seen from the President's
answer : The Powers did not wish to give a formal pledge
in as many w'ords lest the Bulgars should be stirred to
^ Prince George to Zographos, Paris, 24 April/7 May, 1915.
2 King Constantine to Prince George, 27 April/io May, 1915.
From this document we also learn that on 7/20 April, M. Poincare
had assured the Prince that such a guarantee would certainly be
given to Greece, " pour la penode de la guerre et durant la periode
des negociations de la paix."
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 39
hostile action on realizing that Cavalla was lost to
them. ^
Prince George, in reporting M. Poincare's reply, added
that the fear of any damage being inflicted on Greek
territorial integrity by the future Peace Treaty was com-
pletely devoid of foundation ; that, having himself expressed
this fear, he had been answered : " How can you imagine
that we could dispose of any part whatever of the territory
of an aUied State without its consent ? "'
These fair words failed to reassiu-e the Hellenic Govern-
ment, which, after mature reflection, concluded that the
formula suggested by M. Delcasse did not sufficiently safe-
guard Greece against combinations likely to affect her
territorial integrity. Its misgivings, which sprang in the
first instance from the refusal of an explicit promise,
were strengthened by the reason given by M. Poincare
for that refusal. Consequently, it regretted that the
Entente Powers did not see their way to come to an
understanding for a collaboration which both sides desired,
and repeated the assurance of a most benevolent neutrahty
towards them.^
The Greek position was plain : Greece made proposals
which constituted a break with the policy pursued
dehberately since the beginning of the War — proposals
for an active partnership, and in return put forward con-
ditions which ultimately narrowed down to a mere pledge
that she should not, as the end of it all, find herself robbed
of Cavalla. There were certain things she could do and,
therefore, \vished to do. There were certain things she
could not do, and must be assured that she would not be
made to do them. The Entente Powers, on the other hand,
would bind themselves to nothing : which is preferable,
they said in effect, the elaborate letter of a bargaining bond,
or the spirit of spontaneous co-operation ; a legal obhga-
tion or the natural union of hearts ? What Greece needs,
rather than rigid clauses with a seal and a signature, is the
steady, unwavering sympathy of her friends. If you
come with us in a courageous forward campaign for the
1 Prince George to King Constantine, 28 April/ii May, 1915.
2 Ihid.
^ Zographos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petrograd,
30 April/ 1 3 May, 1915.
40 CIUIECE AND THE ALLIES
liberation of the world and righteousness, how could we
fail to Ix^ with you in every single question affecting com-
pensations or the integrity of 3'our territories ? That's
all very fine, said the Greeks. But
The mistrust of the Greeks was only too well founded.
Although Bulgaria received arms from Austria and allowed
the free passage of German munitions which enabled
Turkey to carry on the defence of Gallipoh, tlie Entente
Powers, satisfied with her Premier's explanations and
professions of sympathy, would not give up the hope of
seeing her on their side. Indeed, they were more hopeful
than ever ; M. Poincare told Prince George he would not
be surprised to see that happen " in two or three days,"^
and tlie British ]\Iinister at Sofia, being less hopeful and
giving proofs of perspicacity, was replaced.
About the same time it came to the knowledge of the
Entente Governments that the Greek General Staff had
resumed its efforts to induce the Ser\-ian mihtary
authorities to concert measures for their mutual safety,
pointing out that, the moment Bulgarian troops crossed
the Servian frontier, it would be too late. Whereupon
both Servia and Greece were sternly warned against
wounding Bulgarian susceptibilities — and threatened with
the displeasure of the Powers, who wanted to maintain
between the Balkan States good fellowship — by the
imhappy project which was once more to the fore. And ere
the end of May both States learnt that their territories
were actually on offer to Bulgaria.
They received the intelhgence as might have been
expected. The Ser\aan Premier, after consulting with the
King, the Crown Prince, the Cabinet, and all prominent
statesmen, informed the representatives of the Entente
that Servia, in spite of her desire to meet the wishes of
her friends and aUies, could not agree to put herself in their
hands : the Constitution forbade the cession of territory
without the sanction of the National Assembly. He asked
them to imderstand that this decision was final, and that
no future Servian Government could be counted upon to
1 Prince George to King Constantine, Paris, 28 April/ii May,
1915. M. Delcasse, then and for months afterwards, strove to gain
over Bulgaria coiite que coiite, deploring the possession of Cavalla
by Greece. See Deville, pp. 163, 218.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 41
give a different answer, seeing that the present Government
embraced every poUtical party. ^
Not less uncompromismg was the attitude of Greece.
When the news reached Athens from Paris, the Hellenic
Government could hardly beheve it : " It is so contrary
to the principles of justice and liberty proclaimed by the
Entente Powers — it seems to us absolutely impossible to
despoil a neutral State, and one, too, whose friendly
neutrality has been so consistently useful to the AUies, in
order to buy with its territories the help of a people wliich
has hitherto done all it could to help the enemies of the
Entente. By what right, and on what ground could they
mutilate our country ? The opinions once expressed by
M. Venizclos, and since abandoned even by their author,
do not constitute a sufficient ground for spohation. The
whole thing is an unthinkable outrage : it shows that our
fears were justified and our demand for a guarantee was
absolutely indispensable . " ^
France, through M. Delcasse, and England, through
Lord Crewe, sought to dispel these fears by formally
disclaiming any intention to press upon Greece a mutila-
tion to which she objected, and explaining that the eventual
cession of Cavalla was only envisaged on condition that she
should consent of her own accord. M. Zographos, however,
who had done his best to bring Greece in on reasonable
terms, convinced of his failure, resigned ; and after his
departure the Gounaris Government would permit itself
no further discussion upon the subject of intervention.
During the lull that ensued, the Greek General Staff
once more, in June, approached the Serxdan Government
with detailed suggestions for a common plan against
Bulgaria, dwelling on the necessity of a preliminary con-
centration of sufficient Servian troops along the Graeco-
Serbo-Bulgarian frontier to counterbalance the Bulgarian
advantage in rapidity of mobihzation. These steps
proved as ban^en as all the preceding : while Servia would
not try to conjure the Bulgarian peril by the sacrifices
which the Entente recommended, she could not provide
against it by entering into arrangements with Greece
which the Entente disapproved.
^ Alexandropoulos, Nish, 15/28 May, 1915.
* Zographos to Greek Legation, Paris, 15/28 May, 1915.
42 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Matters came to a head on 3 August, when the British
Minister at Sofia made to the Bulgarian Go\-ernment a
formal offer of Cavalla and an undefined portion of its
hinterland, as well as of Servian territory in Macedonia,
stating that Great Britain would bring pressure to bear on
those countries, and make the cession to them of any
compensations elsewhere conditional on their consent to this
transaction.
The shock lost nothing of its intensity by being long
anticipated. ]\I. Passitch, the Servian Premier, in an
interview with the Greek iMinister at Nish, expressed his
profound dismay at the corner into which Servia was
driven ; much as she resented this proposal, the fact that
she was entirely dependent on the Entente — whose high-
handed methods he did not fail to criticize — forced her to
give it consideration.
If Servia had been dismayed, Greece was enraged. M.
Gounaris addressed a strongly-worded remonstrance to
the British ^Minister at Athens, reminding him that in May
his Government had protested against the offer of Greek
territory to Bulgaria, and that both Lord Crewe and M.
Delcasse had disavowed any intention to bring the least
pressure to bear upon Greece, who had thus the right to
count on her independence being respected. The Entente
Powers, he went on, thought they could promise Bulgaria
an agreement in which their own will took the place of
Greece's consent, with the idea of exacting her acceptance
afterwards. But they were greatly mistaken. The Hel-
lenic Government, voicing the unanimous sentiments of
the people as well as its o\\'n judgment, repelled with
indignation the idea of making the national heritage an
object of a bargain ; and while thanking the Entente
Powers for the courtesy which inspired their notification,
it protested in the most energetic and solemn manner
against the injury which they proposed to inflict upon the
independence and integrity of Greece in defiance of inter-
national law.
In reply, the British Government quietly informed the
Hellenic Government that the Entente Powers still hoped
that Greece would come into line with their policy, and
that, as soon as Bulgaria had accepted their offer, they
would submit a concrete proposal dealing in detail with
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 43
the surrender of Cavalla and defining precisely the Asiatic
concessions which Greece would receive in exchange.^
This brings the relations of the Entente Powers with
M. Gounaris's Government to an end. It is a strange
record. We have, to begin with, the curious reception
of his first offer — the whole Greek Army, the intervention
of which might have turned the Gallipoli tragedy into a
victory. Doubtless, there were reasons for declining
so considerable a reinforcement. We know that, although
Russia had modified her objection to Greek participation,
she still regarded the presence of a large Greek force in
European Turkey with disfavour ; that the dismember-
ment of the Ottoman Empire was not agreeable to France ;
that the AlUes could not at that time afford the miUtary
contingents stipulated by the Greek General Staff. There
will be no disposition to underrate the complexities of the
situation, or want of sympathy for those upon whom fell
the task of finding a solution satisfactory to all the Powers
concerned. But, though these complexities might be good
reasons for not accepting the Gounaris offer, they were
hardly reasons for not acknowledging it, even in the
interest of ordinary courtesy.
Then came the sterile pourparlers through Paris. Here,
again, political difficulties explain without justifying the
attitude of the Entente Powers. Their refusal of the
guarantee demanded by Greece as an essential condition
of her entry into the war was, of course, a natural result
of their Bulgarian policy — a policy for which very little
could be said. Time perhaps was, at the beginning of
the War, when Bulgaria might have been won ; for it is
not necessary to adopt the Graeco-Servian view that she
had from the first decided to join the enemies of the Entente
and that no amount of reasonable concessions would have
satisfied her ambition ; the Bulgars are a practical people,
and there was at Sofia a pro-Entente party which might
have prevailed, if the Entente Powers had, without delay,
defined the proposed concessions and proceeded to press
Greece and Servia to make them — to expect from either
^ Communication of Entente Powers to Greek Premier, 21 July/
3 Aug.; Greek Premier's reply (No. 81 18); Alexandropoulos,
Nish, 23 July/5 Aug. ; 25 July/7 Aug. ; Communication by
British Minister at Athens, 23 July/5 Aug., 1915.
44 GREFXE AND THE ALLIES
State a voluntary self-mutilation was to expect a miracle.
By not doing so, by shilly-shallying at Athens, Nish, and
Sofia, they only lost the confidence of Greeks and Serbs
without gaining the confidence of the Bulgars, who could
hardly take seriously proposals so vague in their formula-
tion and so imcertain of their fulfilment. If, on the other
hand, the Alhes were unable to define the concessions or
afraid to shock public opinion by forcing them upon
Greece and Servia, then they ought to have dropped their
hopeless scheme, without wasting valuable time, and
worked on the lines of Graeco-Servian co-operation against
Bulgaria. Instead, they squashed, as we saw, every
attempt which the Greek General Staff made to that end.
But it is not the only aberration with which history will
charge our statesmen and diplomats.
Greece was going through an internal crisis ; and tho.se
who know Greece will know what that means. In private
life no people is more temperate, more moderate, than the
Greek : a sense of measure always seasons its pleasures,
and even the warmest passions of the heart seem to obey
the cool reflections of the brain. In pubUc Hfe, by way of
compensation, the opposite quahtics prevail ; and as
citizens the Greeks display an astonishing lack of the very
virtues which distinguish them as men. The spirit of
party bums so hot in them that it needs but a breath to
kindle a conflagration. That spirit, whose excesses had,
several times in the past, brought the fundamental prin-
ciples of the Constitution into question, and the country
itself to the brink of ruin, was once again at work. Former
friends had become deadly enemies : the community was
rent with dissensions and poisoned with suspicions. Pre-
posterous falsehoods were freely scattered and readily
snatched at on both sides : the side of M. Venizelos and the
side of M. Gounaris. Pohticians who had been echpsed
by the Cretan's brilhance, came forth now to regain their
lustre at his expense. For hke all men who have played
leading parts on the world's stage, M. Venizelos had
gathered about him as much animosity as admiration ;
and hate is more enterprising than love.
M. Venizelos and his partisans were at least as resource-
ful as their opponents. The Cretan had never been able
to bear contradiction. If his greatness had created him
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 45
many enemies, his pettiness had created him more. His
tone of prophetic and impeccable omniscience was vexa-
tious at all times, but particularly galling at this agitated
period. It was now his constant cry that the situation
called for the work of a statesman and not of an inter-
national lawyer or strategist. There were times when he
declaimed this thesis in so violent a fashion that no self-
respecting man could work with him. He had lost all the
able collaborators of the great Reconstruction era, and
nothing could make him forgive these " apostates."
Everybody who could not see eye to eye with him was to
M. Venizelos a traitor. It was impossible for M. Venizelos
to admit that others besides himself might be actuated
by patriotic as well as by personal motives ; that he did
not possess an exclusive patent of sincerity any more than
of vanity. He found it easier to believe that the alpha
and the omega of their policy was to undo him. He would
undo them — even at the cost of the cause he had at heart :
to see Greece openly on the side of the Entente. It is not
that he thought less of the cause, but he thought more of
himself. His egoism was of that heroic stature which
shrinks from nothing. His nature impelled him to this
labour ; his privileged position as the particular friend of
the Entente suppUed him with the means.
M. Venizelos had taken a long stride towards that end
when he insinuated that King Constantine's disagreement
with him was due to German influence. Henceforth this
calumny became the cardinal article of his creed, and
the " Court Clique " a society for the promotion of the
Kaiser's interests abroad and the adoption of the Kaiser's
methods of government at home. M. Streit, though no
longer a member of the Cabinet, was represented as its
mainspring : a secret counsellor who wielded the power,
while he avoided the title, of Minister ; M. Gounaris, though
in name a Prime Minister, was in reality a mere instrument
of the sovereign's personal policy — so were the members
of the General Staff — so was, in fact, everyone who held
opinions at variance with his own : they all were creatures
of the Crown who tried to hide their pro-Germanism under
the mask of anti-Venizelism. Their objections to his
short-sighted and wrong-headed Asiatic aspirations —
objections the soundness of which has been amply
40 GEEECE AND THE ALLIES
demonstrated by experience — were dictated by regard for
Germany, the patron of Turkey. Their offers to fight
for the dissolution of Germany's protege were not genuine :
the conditions which accompanied them were only designed
to make them unacceptable. The Entente should beware
of their bad faith and learn that M. Venizelos was the only
Greek statesman that could be trusted.^
The Powers who had long since adopted M. Venizelos
foimd it convenient to adopt all his theories. M. Delcasse,
when called upon to explain why the Greek offer met with
such scant ceremony, did so by saying that it came from
M. Gounaris, who was the instrument of the personal
policy of the sovereign, and who combated among the
electors M. Venizelos, the champion of rapprochement
with the Entente ; that the proposal for the dispatch
of large contingents to the East, involving as it did a
depletion of the Western Front, was calculated to please
the imperial brother-in-law of King Constantine ; that the
territorial guarantee demanded by Greece would have
become known to Bulgaria, thrown her into the arms of
Germany, and precipitated her against Servia, whom King
Constantine intended to leave to her fate ; the trick was too
gross to deceive the Allies, and they gave it the reception
it deserved. Likewise in squashing the Greek efforts to
concert with Servia measures for mutual safety against
Bulgaria, while there was yet time, the Alhes, said M.
Delcasse, acted on the advice of M. Venizelos, who told
them that the Gra2co-Ser\dan Treaty was purely defensive :
that it did not provide for action unless Bulgaria attacked ;
and what a misfortune if Servia, by such measures, should
appear to take an initiative which would give Bulgaria an
excuse for the aggression she meditated. Therefore, they
bade Servia devote her whole attention to the security
of her Austrian frontier and not play Bulgaria's game by
furnishing her with a pretext for attack. ^
1 See the Nea Hellas, 20, 21 March (O.S.), 1915 ; Orations, passim.
2 Journal Official, p. 76. To appreciate the community of senti-
ments between M. Venizelos and M. Delcasse fully, one must com-
pare the above statement with that in Orations, pp. 68-9. The
differences are equally instructive. The Venizelist orator, prudently
suppresses from a Greek audience the fact that his Chief frustrated
the General Staff's efforts to co-operate with Servia ; he boldly
surmises, on the other hand, that behind the General StsifiE's stipula-
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 47
On this side of the Channel the inventions of M. Veni-
zelos, it would seem, were accepted as discoveries with
equal solemnity. During the Paris pourparlers, according
to the French Ambassador in London at all events, England
was much annoyed by the Greek Government's hesitations,
which she attributed to King Constantine's opposition, and
asked herself whether she could either then or in the future
treat with a country governed autocratically. She was
persuaded that Greece lay under the influence of Germany,
and asked herself whether she could in future support a
country which let itself be guided by Powers whose interests
were absolutely contrary to her own.^
The Entente Ministers at Athens, as was natural, had
greater opportunities of displaying their soUdarity with
M. Venizelos. They would perhaps have been better
advised had they followed the example of their colleagues
at Rome. It can hardly be questioned that the discreet
and decorous aloofness of the Entente diplomats from the
long-protracted struggle between the Italian advocates
of war and neutrahty, assisted by Prince von Billow's
indiscreet and indecorous participation in that struggle,
faciUtated a decision in our favour : nothing does so much
to alienate a high-spirited nation as an attempt on the
part of outsiders to direct its internal affairs. In Greece
the need for discretion was even more imperative. All
controversy at such a juncture was injudicious. But if
preference had to be shown, it would have been better to
have taken the King's side, for all that was valuable to us
from the military point of view rallied round him ; and,
in any case, since the hopes of the VenizeUsts for oversea
expansion depended on the goodwill of the Sea Powers,
tions as to the sphere of Greek miUtary action lurked the arriere
pensee to confront the AlUes with the risk of provoking Bulgaria,
whom they still regarded as a potential friend : so the stipulations
were, as they were intended to be, unacceptable. Again, while
M. Delcasse, addressing a French audience nervous about the
Western Front, reckoned that the Entente contingents demanded
by the Greek General Staff would amount to at least 600,000 or
800,000 men, M. Politis, less fantastically, estimates them at 450,000
men : this force, which Greece deemed necessary for success, it
will be seen, was not far removed from that which France and
England eventually wasted in failure.
1 Prince George to King Constantine, Paris, 28 April/ii May,
18 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
they were tied to us securely enough : so if the land school
represented by the General Staff could have been satisfied,
the country would have remained united and on our side.
Instead of adopting this sane attitude, the local agents of
the Entente ostentatiously associated themselves with the
Venizehsts and boycotted the others, thus gratuitously
contributing to a cleavage from which only our enemies
could profit.
And that was not all. Having begun by endeavouring
to influence the Greeks, they ended by being entirely
influenced by them. Forgetting that no correct percep-
tion of facts or estimate of motives is possible without a
certain mental detachment, they allowed themselves to be
swallowed up, as it were, in the atmosphere of suspicion
and slander genei'ated by party friction : they ceased to
have any eyes, ears, or minds of their owm ; they saw and
heard just what I\I. Venizelos willed them to see and hear,
and thought just as M. Venizelos willed them to think.
If the King refused to enter the War, his refusal was
inspired by the desire to serve the Kaiser ; if he offered to
do so, his offers were prompted by the desire to dish M.
Venizelos.^
Hence, every proposal made to the Entente by ]\I.
Venizelos 's successors was rejected. Greece was kept
out of the AUies' camp, and Servia was sacrificed. For
it should be clearly understood that the fate of Servia was
decided in the months of June and July, 1915, not only
by the development of the Germano-Bulgarian plan, but
also by the failure of all co-operative counter-measures
on the part of the Serbs, Greeks, and Entente Powers while
time was still available. If only there had been anyone
of sufficient authority and independence of view to cor-
relate and compose the clashing interests of the moment, a
gallant ally might have been saved from destruction. But
those best quahfied to judge of what was coming, and in a
position to frame the corresponding poficy, had been driven
into reserve by the storm of calumny, whereby their
motives were misconstrued, their counsels derided, and
their authority undermined ; so that in the general uproar
their voices were scarcely heard. And there were none —
1 See M. Poincare's statement to the Matin, reproduced in the
Balkan Review, Dec, 1920, p. 386 ; Deville, pp. 161, 168-9.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 49
or very few — to act as intermediaries ; for the personnel
of the Entente Legations, " wholly beUeving a lie," had
withdrawn in a body from all intercovirse with them, had
nicknamed them " Bodies," and were accustomed to
assess as concocted in Berhn every notion that emanated
from them. Even the few members of those Legations
who had the moral courage to walk the streets without
blinkers were subjected to every form of odious insinuation
and attack. Venizelos in office, out of ofhce, on matters
technical or lay, to him and to him only would anyone
listen, and as he knew rather less about the rudiments of
the mihtary art than most people, and refrained from
consulting those that did, the results were not difficult to
predict.
Yet, as late as June, the elements of a good plan were
ready to hand in abundance. The General Staff was, as
stated, continuing its efforts for co-operation with the
Serbs. The King, though too ill to conduct business, would
have assented to any military proposal put forward by
the General Staff. The people would have followed the
King as one man. And the enemy were not ready. All
that was necessary was to study with attention and sym-
pathy the advice of the experts : to call the soldiers of the
countries concerned to council, and to inaugurate a joint
campaign. It was not done — and it is difficult to say now
to whom the failure proved most disastrous — to Servia,
to Greece, or to the Entente Powers. But for this failure
a proportionate share of blame must be laid upon those
who, instead of striving to heal divisions in Greece, did
everything they could to foment them.
CHAPTER V
ON 23 August, M. Venizelos returned to power as a
result of the General Elections held on June 13.
The outcome of those elections proved how great his
popularity still was. True, in igio he had obtained
146 seats out of 182, and now only 185 out of 314. But
the majority, though diminished, remained substantial
enough to show that he still was, for most people, the man
who had cleansed Greece. Nor did M. Venizelos imperil
his popularity by reveaUng his differences with the King.
On the contrary, in his own country, his attacks were
carefully confined to the statesmen and soldiers opposed
to him : the King, M. Venizelos proclaimed, far from
sharing their narrow, unpatriotic, pro-German views,
" did not exclude exit from neutrality under given con-
ditions, but accepted it in principle as imposed for the
serving of the national rights." ^ By his organs, too, the
King was described as " a worthy successor of the Con-
stantines who created the mighty Byzantine Empire —
imbued with a sense of his great national mission — Greek
in heart and mind." ^ So anxious, indeed, was M. Venizelos
not to lose votes by any display of ill-feeling against the
popular sovereign that he even took some pains to have
himself photographed calling at the Palace to inquire after
the King's health.
As to policy, it is difficult to determine the part which it
played in the contest. M. Venizelos refrained from pub-
lishing any sort of programme. His opponents asserted
that a vote for Venizelos meant a vote for war. But his
most prominent supporters declared that such was by no
means the case : although, at a certain moment, he was
ready to participate in the Gallipoli enterprise, circum-
stances had changed, and his future course would depend
on the situation which he would find on returning to
1 M. Venizelos in the Nea Hellas, 22 March (O.S.), 1915.
2 Ibid.
50
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 51
power. This vagueness, though not very helpful to the
voters, doubtless helped the voting ; for there was hardly
any pro-war feeling among the masses. The noble ideals
emblazoned upon the Entente banners produced little
impression on their minds. The experience of two thou-
sand years has taught the Greeks that Governments never
fight for noble ideals, and, if they relieve a small nation
from a foreign yoke, it is, as often as not, in order to impose
a new one. To them the War was a struggle for power and
plunder between two European groups. It was matter of
common knowledge that Constantinople had been allotted
to the Russians, and the Greeks were not particularly keen
on shedding their blood in order to place a Tsar on the
Byzantine throne. Nor did the Smyrna bait attract them
greatly, since it involved parting with Cavalla. At the
same time, the lurid accounts of German frightfulness
disseminated by the Entente propaganda, instead of
inflaming, damped still further their enthusiasm.^ The
Venizelist candidates were, therefore, wise in repudiating
the allegation that their victory would inevitably mean
intervention in the conflict ; and, on the whole, the people
who voted for the Cretan statesman seem to have paid a
tribute to his personality rather than to his policy.
Meanwhile, Servia, under pressure from the Entente,
had decided to promise Bulgaria territorial concessions,
and the communication of this decision to the Hellenic
Government formed the occasion of M. Venizelos's first
official act. Greece, he wrote in reply, not wishing to
embarrass her friend and ally at a moment when imperative
necessity forced the latter to submit to painful sacrifices,
abandoned her objections. But she would be lacking in
sincerity if she failed to tell Servia straightway that
" the raison d'etre of the Alliance — namely, the territorial
equiUbrium and the mutual guarantee of their respective
possessions — being profoundly affected by the contem-
plated changes, the reciprocal obUgations of the AlHance
could not survive except by virtue of a renewal." M.
Passitch repHed verbally that he thought like M. Venizelos.
But, as it happened, the question did not arise ; Servia's
promise was coupled with so many stipulations and
reservations, that, in the opinion of the Entente Powers,
^ Deville, p. 174.
52 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
it amounted almost to a refusal ;i and the thread of the
negotiations was very soon broken by events. Destiny
moved too fast for diplomacy.
Hardly had these dispatches been exchanged, when
Colonel Vlachopoulos, the emissary of the Greek General
Staff to Servia, arrived in Athens, bringing a report of the
gravest nature. After twelve months' evasions, the
Servian Minister of War had at last mentioned to him the
need for an understanding between the two Staffs, and the
Servian Director of i\Iihtary Operations stated that Servia,
far from being able to contribute to a common struggle
against Bulgaria the 150,000 combatants stipulated by
the Grasco-Servian Convention, could not at the moment
transport to the northern parts of the Bulgarian frontier
more than one or two divisions, while as to the southern
parts, which most immediately concerned Greece, they
would have to be left with the eight regiments of 1915
conscripts — that is, raw recruits. Simultaneously, the
fear which the Greek miUtary authorities had expressed
to their Servian colleagues in the pievious spring — that
delay might prove fatal — was being realized ; from all
sides came intelligence of the concentration of large
Austro-German forces towards the Danube.
In the circumstances, after studying Colonel Vlacho-
poulos's report, the Greek General Staff submitted to the
Government (14 September) the opinion that for Greece
to embark on a war against Bulgaria, so long as she was
not assured of the co-operation of adequate Servian
forces, was tantamount to courting annihilation ; and of
such co-operation there was no prospect : the moment the
Serbs found themselves faced by a superior Austro-German
army, the Greeks would have to fight the Bulgars as well
as, in all probability, the Turks alone.
As if in confirmation of this forecast, a week later
(21 September), the Hellenic Government received from
Sofia the official announcement of the conclusion of a
Turco-Bulgarian agreement and of Bulgarian mobiliza-
tion ; the latter measure being, according to the Bulgarian
Premier, purely precautionary : as the Austro-German
1 Venizelos to Greek Legation, Nish, 18/31 Aug. ; Alexandro-
poulos, Nish, 19 Aug./i Sept. ; 20 Aug./2 Sept. ; 22 Aug./
4 Sept., 1915.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 53
armies had just begun an attack on Servia, and the theatre
of war approached the Bulgarian frontiers, his country
was obUged to take up an attitude of armed neutraUty.^
The news threw M. Venizelos into a fever of excitement.
He had, meanwhile, become most soHcitous about Gr?eco-
Servian co-operation, and had not permitted his mind to
be impressed by Colonel Vlachopoulos's report. When
Austria and Germany had their hands full elsewhere,
Servia's peril had left him cold ; it set him on fire now
when they were ready to hurl their legions into the Balkan
Peninsula— when it was no longer for Greece a question
of fighting Bulgaria only, but Bulgaria and Turkey and the
Central Empires. M. Venizelos was a statesman of broad
ideas, a hater of dry facts, and an impenitent believer in
his own star. For the matter of time he cared very little ;
considerations of odds did not weigh with him unduly ;
and he cherished a sovereign contempt for the cautious
attitude of professional soldiers and other uninspired
persons. Never did these qualities appear more \avidly
than on this 21st of September.
At 5 p.m. M. Venizelos went to Tatoi, the King's country
residence, to confer with him, having previously arranged
that a mobilization Order should be drawn up and presented
to his Majesty for signature at 6.30 p.m., by which time he
expected to have finished his conversation. The following
is a s^mopsis of that memorable interview based on a
report from M. Venizelos's own lips.^
The King readil}' agreed to mobilize, but firmly resisted
the proposal to enter the war, on the ground that the odds
were too heavy. M. Venizelos argued that, even if
Germany had five million men available on other fronts,
she could not biing them to the Balkans, and consequently
there was no cause for fear : he spoke learnedly and at
enormous length of geographical conditions and means of
transport, of victualling, of guns and bayonets, of morale —
he had allowed himself an hour and a half. How the
King must have felt under this harangue, any expert who
has had to listen to an amateur laying down the lav/ to
him on his own subject may imagine. On finding his
military arguments fruitless, M. Venizelos shifted his
ground ; though, the military habit being too strong, he
' White Book, l^io. /^i. ^Orations, pp. 131-8.
54 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
coiilJ not get away from miliiary phraseology : " I was then
obliged," he tells us, " to bring forward my heav}' artillery."
" Majesty," I said, " I have not succeeded in persuading
you. I am very sorry ; but it is my duty, as representing
at this moment the Sovereignty of the People, to tell you
that you have no right to disagree with me this time.
The people by the last elections has approved my policy
and given me its confidence. It knew that the basis of
my policy was not to let Bulgaria, by crushing Servia,
become too big and crush us to-morrow. You cannot
therefore at this moment depart from this policy — unless
you decide to set aside the Constitution ; in which case
you must say so clearly, abrogating the Constitution by a
Decree and assuming the responsibility."
The King replied : " You know I recognize that I am
bound to obey the popular verdict when it is a question
of the internal affairs of the country ; but when it is a
question of foreign affairs— the great national questions —
my view is that, so long as I consider a thing right or wrong,
I must insist that it shall or shall not be done, because I
feel responsible before God."
At this utterance, M. Venizelos narrates, " I remember
that a feeling of distress came over me, and with clasped
hands, I shook my head in a melancholj' manner, saving :
' Alas ! we are before the theory of kingship by the grace
of God : poor Greece ! ' "^ After a httle, he told the King
that, in the actual circumstances, he could not undertake
a struggle for the Constitution ; he could only tender his
resignation.
The King expostulated : " How can you resign in the
face of a Bulgarian mobihzation ? In these circumstances,
cis you know, we must not delay even twentj^-four hours.
After all, who assures us that Bulgaria will attack Servia ?
It is possible that she may maintain an armed neutrality' ;
in which case our disagreement vanishes, and you can
stay in power and carry on your policy." Wliereupon
]\I. Venizelos withdrew his resignation.
Of course, he was not deluded by the Sofia Government's
^ This utterance, for the exactness of wliicli we have to rely
entirely on M. \''enizelos's memory, was the origin of the charge
henceforth brought against King Constantine that he claimed to
reign by Divine Right.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 55
announcement of " armed neutrality," and he was deter-
mined to go for Bulgaria at once. But how ? In his own
mind, as he had already demonstrated to the King, no
doubt existed that, if the Greeks attacked the Bulgars,
they had every chance of crushing them and even of taking
their capital. But there was that General Staff by whose
opinions the King set such store. They objected Servia's
inabihty to contribute, as she was bound by her Military
Convention to do, 150,000 combatants. Therefore, in
order to meet this objection, he said : " Don't you think
we might ask the English and the French whether they
could not furnish 150,000 combatants of their own ? "
" Certainly," replied the King ; " but they must send
Metropolitan (European) troops, not Colonials."
By his own account, M. Venizelos did not take this as
meaning that the King had agreed, if the English and the
French supplied these reinforcements, to depart from
neutraUty. He left Tatoi with a clear perception of the
divergence between their respective points of view : while
they both concurred in the need of instant mobilization,
one was for a defensive and the other for an offensive
policy ; but, as soon appeared, not without hopes of
converting his sovereign by some means or other.
A busy, ambitious child of fortune never lets the grass
grow under his feet :
" I returned to the Ministry at 7 p.m.," goes on the
curious record, " and telephoned to the Entente Ministers
to come and see me quickly, \^^hen they came, I informed
them that a mobilization Order was being signed at that
very moment and would be published that evening ; but
for our further course I needed to know if the Powers
were disposed to make good the 150,000 combatants whom
Servia was obliged by our Treaty to contribute for joint
action against Bulgaria. They promised to telegraph,
and immediately dispatched an extra urgent telegram,
adding that they would let me know the answer. This
happened at about 8 p.m., and at 8.15 there arrived M.
]\Iercati (the Marshal of the Court) with a message from the
King, asldng me not to make this demarche to the Entente.
I rephed that the demarche had already been made."^
^ According to another and ampler version of these events, it
had been agreed between the King and M. Venizelos that, while
56 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Forty-eight hours later arrived the Entente Powers'
answer, that they would send to Salonica the 150,000 men
asked for. M. Venizelos, on comnumicating this answer
to the King, was requested by him to tell the Entente
IMinisters that, so long as Bulgaria did not attack Servia,
and consequently the question of Greece going to Servia's
assistance did not arise, no troops should be sent, as their
landing on Greek soil would constitute a violation of Greek
neutrality. M. Venizelos tells us that he communicated
the King's wish to the Entente Ministers, who telegraphed
it to their Governments.
King Constantine, it would seem, was left under the
impression that the affair had ended ; and the general
behef was that the pohcy of neutrality still held good ;
when suddenly the report came that Allied troops were
on their way to Salonica and that Greece was expected to
assist in their landing.
The news would ha\T astoni.shcd the Greeks in any
circumstances ; but the circumstances in which it reached
them were of a nature to heighten astonishment into alarm.
Just then (28 September) Sir Edward Grey stated in the
House of Commons, amid loud applause, " Not only is
there no hostility in this countrj^ to Bulgaria, but there
is traditionally a warm feeling of sympathy ; " and he
reiterated the Balkan policy of the Entente— a Balkan
the latter opened conversations with the British and French
Ministers about the possibiUty of sending 150,000 combatants, the
former should simultaneously open conversations with the German
Emperor relating the steps taken in regard to the Entente, and
asking what Germany would give for Greek neutrality. But when
M. Venizelos returned to Athens, he sent a letter to the King in-
forming him that he had changed his mind and that, as a responsible
Minister, he could not sanction the projected negotiations with
Germany. Whereupon the King forwarded by M. Mercati a reply
that, in such a case, he retracted the permission to approach the
Entente with regard to reinforcements. See the Balkan Review,
Dec, 1920, pp. 387-8. Yet another version supplies some ad-
ditional details : M. Venizelos assured M. Mercati that his d-marche
was of a strictly personal character and did not commit the State
in the least ; next day he repeated this assurance to the King
himself and, at the King's instance, promised to cancel the d-marche ;
and two days afterwards the French Minister, M. Guillemin, formally
declared to the King that M. Venizelos's d-marche was considered
as null and void — nulle et von avenue. — See S. Cosmin's Diplomatic
et Pyesse dans V Affaire Grecqiie (Paris, 192 1), pp. 123-4.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 57
agreement on the basis of territorial concessions. The
inference which the Greeks drew from this coincidence was
that the Entente Powers were sending troops to despoil
them on behalf of the Bulgars — that they intended to bid
for Bulgaria's friendship at the twelfth hour by forcibly
seizing the parts of Macedonia which they had endeavoured
in vain to persuade Greece to yield. ^
M. Venizelos himself carried the report to the King,
inveighing, it is said, intemperately against the AlUes :
" I will protest with the greatest energy," he cried,
trembling with anger. " I will protest against this un-
qualifiable violation of our soil."
" Certainly," repUed the King, " you must protest very
energetically."^
^ The Greek Ministers abroad had for some time been informing
their Government of a contemplated occupation by Allied troops
of the territories which were to be ceded to Bulgaria ; and the
suspicion that a dispatch of Entente Forces to Salonica might have
for its object " really to occupy for Bulgaria, until the conclusion
of peace, the territories coveted by her," has been expressed even
by a French diplomat. — See Deville, p. 129, n. i.
^ I venture to borrow this little scene from S. Cosmin, p. 125.
M. Venizelos at this stage of the proceedings is more eloquent than
coherent. He tells us (Orations, p. 139), that on informing the King
that the Allied troops were on their way to Salonica, his Majesty
said : " That's all right. Only please let your protest be in any case,
emphatic," and that he replied : " Emphatic — yes, but only up
to a certain point, considering what lies beneath." Now, as on M.
Venizelos's own showing, the King was no party to the Allies' step,
it is not very easy to see how he could have spoken to him as if the
King had a secret understanding with them. The episode is one
on which more light could be shed with advantage. The same may
be said of an allegation that King Constantine secretly informed
Bulgaria that, even in the event of an attack on Servia, she would
meet with no opposition from Greece. This allegation is supported
chiefly by a telegraphic dispatch from the Bulgarian Minister at
Athens to Sofia (White Book, No. 43), which somehow (it is not
stated how) fell into the hands of M. Venizelos's friends and was
produced by them in the Skouloudis Inquiry. The authenticity
of this document was publicly denied by its alleged author, and its
portentous length (three large pages of close print), as well as its
unusual style render it very suspicious : it begins : " To-day, 9th
instant," and it is dated "23 " — as if the author did not know that
the difference between the Old and New Calendar was 13 days.
In face of these difficulties, strong evidence would be required to
establish its genuineness : the more because that Inquiry witnessed
a number of similar curiosities — among them an alleged dispatch
from the Turkish Minister at Athens to the Grand Vizier, regarding
58 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
And M. Venizelos hurried off to his office and drew up
the following telegram, which, now printed for the first
time, reveals many things :
" A grave misunderstanding threatens to develop
between Greece and the Entente Powers on the subject
of the despatch of international troops through Salonica
to Servia. When I suggested the dispatch of 150,000 men
destined to complete the Servian contingents in case of a
common struggle against Bulgaria, I did not ask this
succour for Greece, but for Servia in order to remove the
objection raised against our Alliance, said to have become
nuJl by Servia's inability to fulfil her engagement. By
accepting in principle to proceed to such dispatch the
Powers rendered above all a service to Servia and to their
own cause in the East. Likewise, I had clearly specified
that, so long as Greece was neutral, the landing of inter-
national troops at Salonica could not have our official
adhesion. Our neutrality imposed upon us to protest for
form's sake ; after which matters would go on as at
^loudros.^
the conclusion of a secret Graeco-Turkish treaty. When challenged,
M. Skouloudis declared that such treaty never was even thought
of and denounced the dispatch as " from beginning to end a forgery,"
whereupon nothing more was said. (See Skouloudis's Apologia, pp.
85-8). These matters are of interest as illustrating the atmosphere
of mistrust that poisoned Greek politics at this period, and par-
ticularly the relations between the King of Greece and her leading
politician.
1 In pursuance of a decision taken by the War Council on 16
Feb., a British force was sent to Lemnos to support the naval
attack on the Dardanelles, landing at Moudros on 6 March. Greece
told the British Government that she considered the action irrecon-
cilable with her position as a neutral. The British Government
justified it by saying that, as Turkey had not accepted the verdict
of the Powers whereby Lemnos and the other islands conquered
in 1912 were assigned to Greece, England had the right to treat
them as Turldsh territory : at the same time declaring that this
did not entail any diminution of Greek sovereignty. Thus, whilst
Turkey was a friend, the British Government had decided that
these islands did not belong to her ; it recognized her claim to them
when she became an enemy ; but not altogether — only for the
duration of the War : it was merely a temporary expedient to meet
a temporary exigency. By the same line of reasoning, England
in the following July justified the occupation of Mytilene. The
Greek answer was that " Avithout consenting to the occupation of
part of her territory or admitting the arguments put forward by
the British Government to justify its action from the standpoint
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 59
" It remained for us to take all the necessary measures
for facilitating the landing and the direct passage to Servia
of the international troops, combining these operations
with the needs of our own mobilization. The Minister
of Communications was to go at once to Salonica with a
number of engineers to arrange on the spot these technical
matters, very complicated from the paucity of means of
transport in Macedonia. It was understood that, before
any dispatch of troops to Salonica, we should have twenty-
four hours' notice.
" Things were at this point, when the Military Governor
of Salonica — on Wednesday — received a visit from the
French Consul, the Commander of a French man-of-war,
and two French officers from the Dardanelles, who told
him that, in pursuance of a pretended understanding
between the Premier and the French Minister, they were
going to start reconnaissance work for the landing of
French troops and the defence of Salonica against enemy
submarines. Furthermore, on Thursday there arrived at
Salonica General Hamilton Math his Staff and notified the
Governor that the Allies were going to occupy part of the
town and port, and put them in a state of defence with a
view to a landing of troops. General Moschopoulos, very
firmly though very politely, declared to them that, without
orders from his Government, it would be his painful duty
to oppose any seizure of national territory.
" Such a misimderstanding inspires us with the liveliest
alarm, for the contemplated landing has not yet been
definitely accepted, and after being accepted it cannot
be carried out, (i) without a prehminary protest for form's
sake, which the British Government has informed us it
does not want ;^ (2) without the absolute maintenance of
the powers of our authorities, who alone would decide the
measures for the use of the port and railways in such a
manner as not to compromise the transport and concentra-
tion of our own armies.
of International Law, Greece had to bow before an accomplished
fact." — Elliot to Greek Premier, Athens, 9 March, 25 July ; Minister
for Foreign Affairs to Greek Legations, London and Paris, 16/29
July, 1915.
^ Sir Edward Grey objected to a protest because it would enable
Germany to say that we had violated Greek neutrality. — Gennadius,
London, 29 Sept., 1915.
60 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
" Moreover, the great emotion caused in tlie public by
the recent speech of Sir Edward Grey compels the Ro^'al
Government to demand from the Entente Powers certain
preliminary assurances. While people here expected to
see the Powers, after the Bulgarian mobilization, proceed
to decisive acts, and at the very least to a declaration that
the territorial promises made to Bulgaria in August would
be cancelled if within a very short time she did not agree
to co-operate with the Entente, they were stupefied to see
that to the most e\ident proof of Bulgarian dupHcity and
disloyalty they repUed by redoubling their solicitude and
goodwill. Sir Edward Grey's speech, followed closely
by the visits made without notice at Salonica by the
representatives of the French and British Staffs, gives
birth to the fear that certain Entente Powers may harbour
the design of using the troops which would be sent to
Servia as the fittest instrument for giving practical effect
to the territorial ambitions of the Bulgars in Macedonia.
Well or ill founded, this fear exercises over people in
Greece, and we have reason to believe in Servia also, a
demorahzing effect and threatens to compromise the
success of our mobilization.
" The Royal Government finds itself confronted with a
situation created much against its will, which imposes
upon it the dut3^ in order to calm as soon as possible the
alarms of the people now in arms, of asking the Powers to
dispel the fears inspired by their attitude towards Bulgaria
by declaring, if possible, that the offers made to her are
henceforth null, and that the eventual dispatch of inter-
national troops to Servia would in no case be turned to the
detriment of the territorial integrity of Greece and Servia.
Only formal assurances in this sense could justify in the
eyes of Greek public opinion the Government which,
while protesting for form's sake, would agree to facilitate
the landing at Salonica and the passage across its territory
of international troops destined for Servia.
" Please speak to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in
the sense of this telegram."*
From the tenor of this interesting document we gather
that, while fully aware of the King's attitude, M. Venizelos
* Venizelos to Greek Legations, London, Paris, Petrograd, Rome,
i8 Sept./i Oct., 1915. (Confidential.)
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 61
went on negotiating with the AUies for immediate action ;
and that the AlHes proceeded to act before any agreement
had been reached. To judge by its tone, M. Venizelos
seems to have been annoyed at the AlHes' haste as at an
miwarrantable attempt to commit him irretrievably with-
out heeding his conditions or waiting for his definite
consent : so grave a breach of propriety could not but
pain him. But, however annoyed he might be on the
surface, at bottom he was doubtless pleased : the move
supplied the best means for the conversion of his Sovereign
— no argument is so persuasive as an accomplished fact.
That was what really mattered — the manner was a detail ;
and it is impossible to suppose that he meant to let his
annoyance stand in the way of his high purpose.^ Themi-
stocles, to whom the Cretan statesman bears some affinity,
it will be remembered, forced the Greeks to fight at Salamis
by a similar stratagem.
This, of course, does not exculpate the Allies. Their
conduct merits at least the appellation of irregular. But
when foreign diplomats and native politicians become
fused into a happy family, it would be strange, indeed, if
irregularities did not occur. The whole of the Greek story
is so thoroughly permeated with the spirit of old-fashioned
melodrama that no incident, however starthng, seems
out of place.
What follov/s is something of an anticlimax. Next daj'-,
the French ]\Iinister — from this point onwards France
takes the lead and England recedes into the second place —
had the honour to announce to his Excellency the Greek
Premier the arrival at Salonica of a first detachment of
troops, declaring at the same time that the Entente Powers
sent it to assist their ally Servia, and that they counted on
Greece, who had already given them so many proofs of
friendship, not to oppose measures taken in the interest
of a country to which she also was allied. ^
^ " For my policy the arrival of the Anglo-French was a most
material asset. I went for war against Bulgaria and had made up
my mind, if Bulgaria attacked Servia, to fight. It was in my
interest, besides the 1 50,000 Greek and the 200,000 Servian bayonets,
to have 150,000 Anglo-French, consequently it was a political
move absolutely necessary for the prosecution of my own policy."
— Orations, p. 140.
2 Guillemin to Venizelos, Athens, 19 Sept./2 Oct., 1915.
62 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
In reply, the Greek Premier had the honour to declare
to his Excellency the French ^Minister that, being neutral,
Greece could not authorize measures which violated her
neutrality. The Hellenic Government was therefore
obliged to protest against the passage of foreign troops
through Greek territory. The circumstance that those
troops were destined solely to the assistance of Servia,
who was Greece's ally, nowise altered the case ; for, before
the casus foederis was realized, the neutrality of Greece
could not be affected by the danger which menaced Servia. *
To return from formalities to reaUties. On the same day
(2 Oct.), the Bulgarian forces began to mass on the Servian
frontier, while the Austro-German battalions were fighting
their way across the Danube ; and on the 4th Russia
launched her ultimatum on Bulgaria. This rapid fulfil-
ment of their own prognostications roused the Greeks to
the highest pitch of excitement. But all faith in the
Entente had not 3^et been extinguished. On the very day
on which the Petrograd Government dehvered its tardy
and ineffectual ultimatum at Sofia, at Athens the Chamber
held a historic debate, in which M. Venizelos for the first
time proclaimed that the Grseco-Servian Treaty imposed
an absolute obhgation upon Greece to make war on Bulgaria
and Turkey ; adding — in answer to a question, what he
would do if on going to Servia's assistance he met the
German and Austrian armies — that Germany and Austria
must be fought as well, if necessary, and backing his
thesis with those appeals to honour which, whether per-
tinent or not, seldom fail to move a popular audience.
The debate lasted till four o'clock in the morning and
ended with a vote of confidence in M. Venizelos's mihtary
poHcy — a policy which M. Venizelos, a civihan, expounded
to an assembly of civilians as a settled plan, without
waiting for the consent of the King and in defiance of
the technical advice of the General Staff. In fairness
to the Chamber, it should be added that the motion was
carried on the assumption that the King was in agreement. *
^ Venizelos to Guillemin, Athens, 19 Sept. /a Oct., 1915- This
merely formal protest — quite distinct from the confidential dispatch
given above — is the only one of which the world has hitherto been
allowed to hear.
* M. Venizelos had insisted that the reports spread through the
Press concerning the divergence of views between him and the
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 63
But we know King Constantine's attitude ; and if M.
Venizelos hoped by these tactics to force his hand, he was
speedily undeceived. No sooner was the debate over
than the King summoned his Prime Minister and asked him
to modify his pohcy or to resign. Faced by such a
dilemma, M. Venizelos did the only thing he could do — he
resigned ; and his country shrank back on to the solid
ground of neutrality.
It was a narrow escape — how narrow became evident
a few hours later. The Allies had promised to send 150,000
combatants. Even if this promise had been kept, the
Allied force would not have been, in any strategical sense,
an adequate substitute for the Servian contingent. For
it was not in place for covering purposes or subsequent
offensive action ; it was not trained to Balkan fighting ;
it was not equipped for mountain warfare ; and, coming
to the same ports as the Greeks, it would have delayed the
process of concentration. But, be that as it may, the
promise was not kept. What is more, it could not possibly
have been kept. Politicians casting about for arguments
wherewith to back their views may leave their hearers to
imagine that Great Powers keep armies ready to be planked
down at any point at a moment's notice ; but the fact is
that an army, even if it can be spared from other tasks,
is a cumbrous affair to move about, requiring all sorts of
tiresome things — food, arms, ammunition — the provision
of which requires, in its turn, complicated processes,
before the army is potentially effective for the role assigned
to it in the creative mind of an excited orator. Something
of the sort had, indeed, been intimated to the Hellenic
Government by the Entente Powers themselves when they
wished both Greeks and Serbs to avert Bulgarian hostility
by territorial concessions — namely, that, as after the
commitment of troops to Gallipoli, none remained to
rescue Servia, there was nothing for it but to conciHate
Bulgaria. Of course, it may be asked, such being the
facts, what value had the promise of 150,000 men ? This
Crown should be contradicted, and, by telling the King that other-
wise the mobilization would have no effect on Bulgaria, had obtained
the King's permission to publish a communique in which he stated
that " the Crown is in accord with the responsible Government not
only as regards mobilization but also as regards future policy."
Orations, p. 136.
64 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
is a question which M. Venizelos would have done well to
ponder, as King Constantine and his miUtary advisers
pondered it. As it was, when that afternoon the Allied
forces turned up at Salonica, the Greek people had the
mortification to find that they amounted to 20,000. Nor
did they approach the stipulated figure for months after.
The arguments which had prevailed with many some
hours before were suddenly exploded, and to the feehng
of confidence which had prompted the Chamber's vote
immediatel)^ succeeded a feeling of panic. What ! cried
everybody at Athens, are we to stake our hberty — our
national existence — on such a chance : 150,000 Greeks,
plus 200,000 half-exhausted Serbs, plus 20,000 Alhes,
against 200,000 Austro- Germans, plus 300,000 Bulgars,
plus 100,000 Turks ? Nay, if the French and the English
love gambling, we don't : we cannot afford the luxury.
Venizelos has allowed himself to be duped, said some ;
others, Venizelos has tried to dupe us.
Such were the circumstances under which the AlHes
landed at Salonica. Their action has been pronounced
immoral and perfidious by some English and even by some
French critics ; and as it was attended with ill success, it
brought double shame upon the contrivers. ^ Certainly, it
will not bear investigation from the standpoint of pohtical
tact : it was the first of the many performances which
little by little alienated a friendly nation from them and
discredited M. Venizelos with his countrymen.
1 See House of Commons Debate, in The Times, 19 April, 1916 ;
Chambre des Deputes, secret debate of 20 June, igi6, in the Journal
Officiel, p. 77.
CHAPTER VI
MZAIMIS formed a Government pledged to
the policy which Greece had pursued since
• the beginning of the European War : her
future course would be guided by the course of events :
meanwhile, she would seek to safeguard her vital interests
by remaining armed. ^
As regards Servia, the new Premier had an opportunity
of expressing his views at length soon after his accession
to office. The Servian Government, judging that the
imminent attack from Bulgaria reahzed the casus foederis,
asked him if, in conformity with her alliance, Greece
would be ready to take the field. M. Zaimis answered
that the Hellenic Government was very sorry not to be
able to comply with the Servian demand so formulated.
It did not judge that in the present conjuncture the casus
foederis came into play. The Alliance, concluded in 1913,
for the pvirpose of establishing an equihbrium of forces
between the Balkan States, had a purely Balkan character
and nowise appHed to a general conflagration. Both the
Treaty and the MiUtary Convention accompanying it
showed that the contracting parties had in view only the
case of an isolated attack by Bulgaria against one of them.
Nowhere was there any allusion to a concerted attack by
two or more Powers. Nor could it be otherwise : it would
have been an act of mad presumption for either of the
contracting parties to offer the other the manifestly power-
less and ridiculous assistance of its armed forces in the case
of a war ^vith several States at once. And such was the
present case. If the Bulgarian attack apprehended by
the Servian Government took place, it would be in concert
with Germany, Austria, and Turkey : it would be combined
with the attack already carried on by the two Central
Empires : it would be an episode of the European War.
1 White Book, No. 45.
5 65
66 GREECE AND TIIE ALLIES
The Servian Government itself had recognized this in
advance by breaking off diplomatic relations Nvith Bulgaria
in imitation of the Entente Powers, her European Allies,
wthout a pre\'ious understanding with Greece, her Balkan
ally. In these circumstances, the Hellenic Government
was convinced that no obhgation weighed upon it.
Further, Greece was persuaded that her armed assistance
freely offered at such a moment would ill serve the common
interest of the two countries. Greece had remained
neutral in the European War, judging that the best service
she could render Ser\da was to hold in check Bulgaria by
keeping her forces intact and her communications open.
The common interest demanded that the Greek forces
should continue in reserve for better use later on : that
Greece should remain neutral and armed, watching the
course of events carefully with the resolution to guard in
the best possible wa}", not only her own \ntal interests,
but also those which she had in common \\'ith Servia.
The Hellenic Government, while deeply and sincerely
regretting that it was materiallj' impossible for it to do at
present more for Servia, wished to assure her that, faithful
to their friendship, it would continue to accord her every
assistance and faciht}^ consistent with its international
position.^
The Entente Powers took no exception to this attitude ;
which is not to be wondered at, seeing that the}^ had
hitherto uniformly ignored the Graeco-Ser\ian Treaty, and,
by their project of territorial concessions to Bulgaria, had
laboured, as much as in them lay, to annul a pact made
for the defence of the territorial status quo against Bulgaria :
not until Bulgaria had been at open war with Servia for
some daj's (14 Oct.), could they bring themselves to declare
that the promises of Servian and Greek territory wliich
they had made to her no longer held. Unable, therefore,
to tell Greece that she was under any obhgation to enter
the War on Servia's behalf, Sir Edward Grey attempted
to induce her to do so for her own benefit by offering her
the island of Cyprus. This offer, made on 17 October,
Greece felt compelled to dechne : what would it have
profited her to gain Cyprus and lose Athens ? And what
could an acceptance have profited Ser\ia either ? As M.
1 White Book, No. 46.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 67
Zaimis said, by intervening at that moment Greece would
perish without saving Servia.
Servia could have been saved had an Anglo-French
expedition on an adequate scale taken place at any of the
times which the Greek General Staff proposed for Grseco-
Servian co-operation — indeed, at any time except only
the particular time chosen by the Entente. When their
troops arrived at Salonica, the Servian army — what had
been left of it after fourteen months' fighting and typhus
— was already falling back before the Austro-Germans,
who swarmed across the Drina, the Save, and the Danube,
occupied Belgrade and pushed south (6-10 Oct.), while
the Bulgars pressed towards Nish (11-12 Oct.). On the
day on which the EngUsh offer was made (17 Oct.), the
Austro-Germans were fifteen miles south of Belgrade, and
by the 2nd of November there was no longer any Servia
to save, the Bulgars having on that day entered Monastir.
The co-operation of Greece might still have been
obtained if the Allies could even then have sent to Salonica
forces large enough to assure her that the struggle would
be waged on more equal terms. ^ There had always been
an influential group among the principal mihtary leaders
at Athens who held that it was to the vital interest of
their country that Bulgaria should be attacked, and who,
to secure the help of the Entente Powers against Bulgarian
pretensions in the future, were prepared to run gi^eat
immediate risks. As it was, the dilatoriness of the AlHes
imposed upon M. Zaimis a pohcy of inaction.
This pohcy, besides being imposed by circumstances,
also accorded with the new Premier's character.
M. Zaimis stands out in the poUtical world of Greece as
a singular anomaly : a politician who never made speeches
and never gave interviews : a silent man in a country
where every citizen is a born orator : an unambitious man
in a country where ambition is an endemic disease. To
find a parallel to his position, one must go back to the days
when nations, in need of wise guidance, implored reluctant
sages to undertake the task of guiding them. This thank-
less task ]\I. Zaimis performed several times to everybod3^'s
temporary satisfaction. On the present, as on other
occasions, he enjoyed the confidence of the Entente Powers,
^ See 2'he Times, i Nov., 191 5.
68 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
as well as the contidence of the King and the people of
Greece. Even the journals of M. Venizelos, and the Anglo-
French Press which M. Venizelos inspired, paid the cus-
tomary tribute to M. Zaimis's integrity and sagacity.
The homage was due to the fact that ]\I. Zaimis was neither
a Venizelist nor an anti-VenizeUst, but simply a Zaimist.
In domestic affairs lie belonged to no party ; in foreign
affairs to no school : he neither sought nor shunned a
change of course.
That explains why he succeeded in ruling Greece for
four weeks, and also why he failed to rule her longer.
M. Venizelos had not abandoned liis standpoint. Of
M. Zaimis's person he spoke with much respect ; but of
his policy' he spoke just as one might have expected M.
Venizelos to speak : M. Zaimis had broken the Ser\nan
Treaty and would go down to history as a man who had
dishonoured the signature of Greece. With regard to
the Entente Powers, M. Venizelos thought that M. Zaimis
meant honestly — the fact that he was as well known to
them as M. Venizelos himself, ha\-ing served as their High
Commissioner in Crete for two years (1906-0S), exempted
him from the imputation of duplicity — and since the
Entente Powers tolerated him, he would do likewise. He
only taunted the Zaimis Government in Parliament for
not obtaining for its policy a price from those whom that
policy unintentionally helped : Greece, to be sure, did not
remain neutral to serve Germanj^'s but her own interests,
nevertheless, as Germany benefited by that neutraUty,
she should be asked to give a quid pro guo^
It was not the first time that M. Venizelos expressed
this idea. At the Crown Council of 3 IMarch he had
suggested, if his own policy of intervention was not adopted,
to ask from Germany compensations for the continuance
of neutraUty ; and he urged that the King should per-
sonally bargain with the Kaiser's ^Minister. Again on 21
September, when sounding the Entente Powers on the
^ Orations, pp. 143-50. It would hardly be credited, did it not
come out of his own mouth, that the compensations and guarantees
which M. Venizelos thought, or at least said, that Greece could
obtain from Germany in return for her neutraUty (a neutrality
always benevolent towards Germany's enemies) exceeded those
which the Entente had refused to grant Greece for her active
alliance !
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 69
possibility of sending troops to Salonica, he advised the
King simultaneously to sound the German Emperor on
the price of neutraUty.^ King Constantine had always
shrunk from entering into any understanding whatever
with Germany. And, although the advice may have been
given in good faith, it is easy to guess the use to which its
acceptance might be turned by M. Venizelos, who, even as
it was, did not hesitate to whisper of " pledges " given to
Germany. So M. Zaimis endured the taunt and avoided
the trap.
This state of truce lasted for a month. Then strife
broke out afresh. Early in November a member of the
Government insulted the Opposition. The Opposition
demanded his dismissal. This was refused and matters
were pushed to a crisis — whether by the adversaries of
M. Venizelos, anxious to get rid of a Chamber with a
hostile majority, or by M. Venizelos himself, anxious to
get rid of a Cabinet that had succeeded in establishing
friendly relations with the Entente, it is impossible to say.
Both conjectiires found favour at the time, and both seem
probable. - In any case, M. Venizelos made of that incident
an occasion for an attack on the Government's foreign
pohcy, which, ending in an adverse vote, led to the resigna-
tion of M. Zaimis and the formation of a new Ministry
under M. Skouloudis (7 November).
There ensued a dissolution of the Chamber (11 November)
and a fresh appeal to the people ; the King, on the advice
of M. Skouloudis, inviting M. Venizelos to the polls, as
who should say : When you got your majority in June,
the nation was with j^ou ; many things of the gravest
national concern have happened since ; let us see if the
nation is with you now. M. Venizelos declined the in-
vitation : " The elections," he said, " will be a farce.
All my supporters are detained voteless under arms, and
the only votes cast will be those of the older and more
timid men." How many supporters he had under arms
the near future was to show. Meanwhile, he and his
partizans reinforced this reason for abstention from the
polls with other arguments.
* Th» Balkan Revitw, Dec, 1920, pp. 384, 387 ; Orations, p. 266.
2 It may not be irrelevant to note that the end of the truce
70 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
King Constantine, they alleged, was guilty of uncon-
stitutional beha\'iour. He had twice disagreed wtli a
Government supported by a majority of the representatives
of the people, and twice within a few months had dissolved
a Parliament duly chosen by the people. Was such a
thing ever heard in a constitutional State ? The Con-
stitution had been violated : openly, insolently violated.
In Greece this cry has always been among the Oppo-
sition's common stock-in-trade : it is enough for a Minister
to misapply iifty drachmas to acquire the title of a violator
of the Constitution, and nobody ever is the wiser or the
worse for it. M. Venizelos himself had often been accused
by his opponents of aiming at the subversion of Parliamen-
tary Government. But in this instance the cry was
destined to have, as we shall see, epoch-making results,
and for this reason it merits serious examination.
The King's supporters denied that any \nolation of the
Constitution had taken place. The Constitution of
Greece, they pointed out, gives the Crown expUcitly the
right to dismiss Ministers and to dissolve Chambers.^
M. Venizelos himself had, no longer ago than 5 March, at
the second sitting of the Crown Council, declared liimself
an adversary of the doctrine that the Parliamentary
majority is absolute, and recognized the right of the
Crown to choose another Government ; " On the other
hand," he said, " the necessary consequence of the forma-
tion of a Cabinet not enjoying a majority in the Chamber
is the dissolution of the Chamber."^ It w^as in pursuance
coincided with the end of the Allies' uncertainty aa to whether
they would persist in the Salonica enterprise or give it up.
1 Art. 31, 37.
" Extracts from Minutes in The Balkan Review, Dec, 1920, p. 385.
Not for the first time had M. Venizelos expounded that thesis.
Here is a speech of his on 2/15 May, 191 1.
" We are accused of .seeking the destruction of Parliamentary
Government, because we conceive that one of the foundations of
the Government is that those who represent the majority do every-
thing, that it is enough for them that they represent the majority
to impose their will. But we, the Liberal Party, entertain an
entirely opposite conception both of the State and the Laws and of
the powers of majorities, because modern progress has proved
that humanity cannot prosper so long as the action of those in
authority is not subjected to rules and restrictions preventing
every transgression or violation of justice. We shall make the
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 71
of this advice that the King, who, as M. Venizelos on that
occasion emphatically stated, " has always absolutely
respected the Constitution," ^ dissolved the Chamber.
The only question, therefore, is about the dissolution
of the Chamber elected on 13 June, 1915, which gave M.
Venizelos a majority of 56. This action, it was alleged,
violated the spirit, though not the letter, of Constitutional
Law, because the dissolved Chamber represented the will
of the people. But, the other side retorted, it was pre-
cisely because there was ground for beheving that the
Parliamentary majority had ceased to represent the will
of the people that the King proceeded to a dissolution ;
and in so doing he had excellent precedent. His father
had dissolved several Chambers (specifically in 1902 and
1910) on the same ground, not only without incurring any
censure, but earning much applause from the Venizehst
Party.* In fact, the last of those dissolutions had been
carried out by M. Venizelos himself under the following
circumstances : The General Elections of August, 1910,
had given a majority to the old parties : King George,
however, in the belief that public opinion really favoured
M. Venizelos, called him to power, though he was only
the leader of a Parliamentary minority. M. Venizelos
formed a Government, but, as the majority in Parhament
obstructed his policy, he persuaded the Sovereign to
dissolve it,' declaring in the House (11/24 October, 1910) :
that " it is impossible to limit the prerogative of the
Crown to dissolve any Chamber." Obviously, what was
Greeks truly free citizens, enjoying not only the rights which
emanate from the Constitutional ordinances, but also those which
emanate from all the laws. We shall defend them against every
tyrannical exercise of Government power derived from a majority."
This report is taken from a panegyric on the speaker : Eleiitherios
Venizelos, by K. K. Kosmides, D.Ph., Athens, 1915, pp. 56-7. On
p. 58 of the same work, occurs another reply by M. Venizelos to
a charge of anti-Parliamentarism, dated 14/27 Nov., 1913.
^ The Balkan Revieiv, loc. cit. Cp. The New Europe, 29 March,
1917, where M. Venizelos expressly admits that " in February, 1915,
the King's action might be regarded as constitutional."
^ Orations, pp. 17-8. Cp. p. 217.
^ His opponents then acted as he did now : to avoid exposing
their weakness, they pronounced the dissolution unconstitutional
and boycotted the new elections. For a full account of these
events see another panegyric : E. Venizelos : his life — his work.
By Costa Kairophyla, Athens, 1915, pp. 75-82.
72 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
lawful for King George could not be unlawful for King
Constantino ; and the fact that M. Venizelos's majority
of 56 had since the recent elections dwindled to 16, was
reason sufficient for the belief that he no longer represented
the will of the people, even if it were conceded that the
issue of war had been clearly put before the electors who
had voted for him in June, and that, at best, a majority
of 56 in an assembly of 314 was an adequate expression
of the will of the people on so grave an issue. Events had
moved so fast in those months and the situation changed
so abruptly that King Constantine would have been
guilty of a dereliction of duty had he not, by exercising
his indisputable prerogative, given the nation an oppor-
tunit}^ to reconsider its opinion.
Sophisms suited to the fury of the times apart, the whole
case of M. Venizelos against his Sovereign rested, avov.edly,
on the theory, improvised for the nonce, that the Greek
Constitution is a replica of the British — a monarchical
democracy in which the monarch is nothing more than a
passive instrument in the hands of a Government with a
Parhamentary majority.^ It is not so, and it was never
meant to be so. The Greek Constitution does invest the
monarch with rights which our Constitution, or rather
the manner in wliich we have for a long time chosen to
interpret it, does not. Among these is the right to make,
or to refrain from making war. That was why i\I. Veni-
zelos in March, 1915, could not offer the co-operation of
Greece in the Dardanelles enterprise officially without the
King's approval, and why the British Government de-
clined to consider his semi-official communication until
after the King's decision. Similarly M. Venizelos's
proposals for the dispatch of Entente troops to Salonica
in September, so far as that transaction was carried on
above-board, were made subject to the King's consent.
Of course, if the King exercised this right without advice,
he would be placing the part of an autocrat ; but King
Constantine always acted by the advice of the competent
authority — namely, the Chief of the General Staff. In
truth, if anyone tried to play the part of an autocrat, it
was not the King, but M. Venizelos. His argument
seemed to be that the King should acquiesce in the view
^ Orations, pp. 12-15.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 73
which a lay Minister took of matters miHtary and in
decisions which he arrived at without or in defiance of
technical advice.
In this again, M. Venizelos appears to have been inspired
by British example. We saw during the War the responsi-
biUty for its conduct scattered over twenty-three civil and
semi-civil individuals who consulted the naval and military
staffs more or less as and when they choose, and the result
of it in the Gallipoli tragedj^ We saw, too, as a by-
product of this system, experts holding back advice of
immense importance because they knew it would not be
well received. The Reports of the Dardanelles Commission
condemned this method. But it is to a precisely similar
method that the Greek General Staff objected with such
determination. " Venizelos," they said, " does not know
anything about war. He approaches the King with
proposals containing in them the seeds of national disaster
without consulting us, or in defiance of our advice. Greece
cannot afford to run the risk of military annihilation ;
her resources are small, and, once exhausted, cannot be
replaced." The King, relying on the right unquestionably
given to him under the terms of the Constitution, demanded
from his chief military adviser such information as would
enable him to judge wisely from the miUtary point of view
any proposal involving hostilities made by his Premier.
It was this attitude that saved Greece from the Gallipoli
grave in March, and it was the same attitude that saved
her a second time at the present juncture.
But, in fact, at the present juncture the King acted not
so much on his prerogative of deciding about war as on
the extreme democratic principle that such decision
belongs to the people, and, finding that the Party which
pushed the country towards war had only a weak majority,
he preferred to place the question before the electorate,
to test beyond the possibility of doubt the attitude of
public opinion towards this new departure.
From whatever point of view we may examine Con-
stantine's behaviour, we find that nothing could be more
unfair than the charge of unconstitutionalism brought
against it. M. Venizelos himself a little later, by declaring
that he aimed at the " definite elucidation of the obhgations
and rights of the royal authority," through a " new
74 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Constitution,"* unwittingly confessed that the actual
Constitution could not bear his interpretation. As things
stood, the charge might with a better show of justice be
brought against M. Venizelos, who, it was pointed out,
had violated the Constitution by inviting foreign troops
into Greek territory without the necessary Act of
Parliament. -
Nor should it be forgotten that King Constantine had
suffered grievously both as a Greek and as a general from
too punctihous an observance of parUamentary etiquette
by his father in 1897. At that date the poHcy of M.
Delj-annis was supported by the whole Chamber. It was
a policy which the late Lord Sahsbury very aptl^^ summed
up at the time in the one word, " strait-waistcoat." But,
for lack of a man at the top strong enough and courageous
enough to take the responsibihty of opposing it, it was
carried out : Greece rushed headlong into war with a
superior power and was smashed. Upon King Constantine,
then Crown Prince, had devolved the tragic duty of leading
the Greek army to self-destruction, and it was upon his
devoted head that afterwards the nation visited the
criminal levity of M. Delyannis. Was he to suffer calmly a
repetition of the same catastrophe on an infinitely larger
scale — to see his country trampled under German and
Bulgarian heels — for M. Venizelos 's sake ?
The practical wisdom and patriotism of the King's
conduct cannot be questioned ; but we should guard
ourselves against exaggerating its moral courage. King
Constantine, in turning an inattentive ear to the warlike
outpourings of the People's Chosen, knew perfectly w^ell
that he ran no risk of wounding the people's conscience —
^ Eleutheros Typos, 23 Oct./5 Nov., igi6 ; Orations, p. 102.
* See Art. 99 of the Constitution.
It was in order to defend himself against this grave charge that
M. Venizelos denied in the Chamber and out of it, that he had
" invited " the Allies to Salonica. Just as it was in order to avoid
the charge of violating International Law that Sir Edward Grey in
the House of Commons (18 April, 1916) and M. Briand in the
Chamber of Deputies (20 June, 1916), affirmed that the Alhes haid
been " invited." From the account of that affair already given,
the reader will easily see that, for forensic purposes, both the denial
and the affirmation rest on sufficient grounds. The discrepancy
might be removed by the substitution of " instigated " for " in-
vited."
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 75
just as in offering to lay the question before the tribunal
of public opinion he knew that he ran no risk of finding
it at variance with his own. He could afford to act as he
did, because the country trusted him impHcitly. Writing
about the middle of November, an EngHsh observer de-
scribed the situation as follows : " The people generally
are afraid, waiting and leaving everything to the King. . . .
No one now counts in Greece but the King."^ And the
absence of any popular murmur at the rejection of the
offer of Cyprus, to anyone who knows how deeply popular
feeling is committed to the ultimate union of that Greek
island with the mother country, speaks for itself.
This does not mean that M. Venizelos had as yet lost
caste altogether. On that fateful 5th of October his repu-
tation as a serious statesman among his coimtrymen had
received a severe blow. The idolatrous admiration with
which he had been surrounded until then gave way to
disenchantment, disenchantment to bewilderment, and
bewilderment to dismay : the national prophet from whom
fresh miracles had been expected, was no prophet at all,
but a mere mortal — and an uncommonly fallible mortal
at that. Nevertheless, while many Greeks found it hard
to pardon the Cretan politician for the ruin into wliich
he had so very nearly precipitated them, there were many
others who still remained under the spell of his personality.
Yet it may well be doubted whether, had a plebiscite been
taken at that moment, he would have got anything more
than a substantial minority. Fully conscious of the
position, M. Venizelos, in spite of ad\dce from his Entente
friends to stand his ground, boycotted the polls, and the
new Parliament, returned by the elections of ig December,
was a ParHament without an Opposition. M. Skou-
loudis remained at the helm.
^ J. M. N. Jefferies, in the Daily Mail, 23 Nov., 1915. The
testimony is all the more notable because it comes from an avowed
partisan of M. Venizelos : " the only man in Greece with a policy."
CHAPTER VII
A MOMENTOUS question — upon the answer to
which depended, among other things, the fate of
Greece during the War — confronted the AlHes as
soon as they reaUzed that their Balkan campaign had
come to an imtimely beginning.
The dispatch of troops to Macedonia originall}^ was
based on the agreement that M. Venizelos would get
Greece to join. Once M. Venizelos failed to do so, the
plan fell to the ground. Again, the object of the expedi-
tion was to rescue Servia ; and Servia being alread\'
conquered, the expedition had no longer any purpose.
Such were the views of the British Government, and
similar \aews were held in France by many, including
M. Delcasse, who resigned when Bulgaria's " defection "
sounded the knell of his Balkan pohcy. But other
French statesmen, with M. Briand at their head, saw in
Macedonia a field which promised great glory and gain,
if only the noble British nation could be brought to under-
stand that there were interests and sentiments at stake
higher than agreements.^
The process involved some talking : " I have had my
inter\dew with Briand and Gallieni," wrote Lord Kitchener
to the Prime Minister. " As regards Salonica it is very
difficult to get in a word ; they were both full of the neces-
sity of pushing in troops, and would not think of coming
out. They simply sweep all mihtar}' difficulties and
dangers aside, and go on political lines — such as sa\-ing a
remnant of Serbs, bringing Greece in, and inducing
Rumania to join.""^
Other conferences followed, at all of which the French
spoke so loudh' that the noble British nation could not
possibly help hearing — la noble nation britanniqiie n'est pas
restee sourde. The truth is, France was set on what M.
1 Journal Officiel. pp. 6i, 70, 75-8.
- Sir George Arthur's Life 0/ Lord Kitchener, Vol. Ill, p. 261.
76
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 77
Delcass^ now called the mirage balkanique, partly from
considerations of a domestic nature, chiefly for reasons
connected with the future balance of power in the Near
East — and England could not leave her there alone. So
the " nous r ester ons " pohcy prevailed ; and the con-
tinued presence of Franco-British forces on Greek soil led,
as it was bound to do, to abnormal relations with the
Greek Government.
The wish of the Allies was to obtain from Greece full
licence for the safe accommodation and the operations of
their troops ; while it was the earnest endeavour of Greece
not to let her complaisance towards one group of bel-
ligerents compromise her in the eyes of the other. The
little kingdom found itself between two clashing forces :
the one triumphant on land, the other dominating the sea.
But of the two the German peril was the more imminent.
The Kaiser's legions were at Monastir — any act that
might be construed as a breach of neutraUty would bring
them in a month to Athens.
M. Skouloudis — a stately octogenarian who, after
refusing three times the Premiership, had assumed power
in this crisis at the King's insistent desire because, as he
said, he considered it his duty so to do — took up the only
attitude that could have been expected in the circum-
stances : the attitude that was dictated by the instinct of
self-preservation.
Unlike M. Venizelos, whose mind revolved constantly
about war at all hazards : unlike other statesmen who
regarded war as an eventuality to be accepted or declined
according as conditions might be favourable or unfavour-
able, M. Skouloudis seemed resolutely to ehminate war
from his thoughts.
On taking ofhce he gave the Entente Powers " most
categorical assurances of a steady determination to carry
on the pohcy of neutrality in the form of most sincere
benevolence towards them. The new Ministry," he added,
" adopts M. Zaimis's repeated declarations of Greece's
friendly attitude towards the Alhed armies at Salonica,
and is sufficiently sensible of her true interests and of her
debt to them not to deviate for the whole world from
this course, and hopes that the friendly sentiments of those
Powers towards Greece will never be influenced by false
78 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
and malicious rumours deliberately put into circulation
with the object of cooling the good relations between
them." To Servia also he expressed " in the most cate-
gorical terms sentiments of sincere friendship and a steady
determination to continue affording her ever}'' facility and
support consistent with our vital interests."^
But at the same time, when told by the Servian Minister
that a Ser\aan arm}^ might probably, pressed bj' the enemy,
enter Greek territory, he replied that he A\dshed and hoped
such a thing would not happen — that Greece might not
find herself under the very unpleasant necessity of. appl^-nng
the Hague Rules regarding the chsarmament of a belligerent
taking refuge in neutral territory. And he repeated this
statement to the French Minister, adding, in answer to a
question, What would Greece do if the Allied forces retired
into Greek territory ? that it would be necessary to apply
the Hague Rules, but that he hoped verj^ much the con-
tingency would not present itself. On being reminded of
the assurances given by his predecessor that no material
pressure would ever be exerted on the Allied forces, he
repHed that the Hellenic Government no\nse proposed to
go back on those assurances, and hoped that the Powers,
taking into consideration the irreproachable attitude of
Greece, would be pleased to reheve her of compUcations
and find a solution safeguarding all interests concerned.^
The solution he hinted at was that the Allies should
re-embark ; in which case Greece was prepared to protect
the parting guests " even by her own forces, so as to afford
them the most absolute security."*
But, as nothing was farther from their thoughts, his
explanation did not satisfy the Allies. M. Skouloudis
was therefore obliged to give their representatives again
and again to understand that in no case would the Hellenic
Government think of exerting the least pressure, and that,
if he had alluded to the Rules regarding neutrahty, he had
done so because such ought to be the official language of a
State which was and wished to remain neutral. But
from the very first he had clearly indicated that Greece
did not mean to apply those Rules : she would confine
^ White Book, Nos. 47, 48, 49.
^ Skouloudis's Apantesis, pp. 43-5.
^ White Book, No. 52.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 79
herself to a mere reminder of international principles
without in any way seeking to enforce respect for them.
Greece being and wishing to remain neutral, could not
speak officially as if she were not, nor trumpet abroad the
assurances which she had not ceased giving the Entente
Powers. Surely they must perceive the most delicate
position in which Greece stood between the two belHgerent
groups, and, given that they did not dispute, nor could
dispute, her right to remain neutral, it was reasonable
and just that they should accept the natural consequences
and not demand from her impossibihties.^
The Entente Powers could not, of course, deny the
reasonableness of this plea ; but neither could they
ignore the inconveniences to themselves that would arise
from its frank recognition. Between their base at Salonica
and the troops which had advanced to Krivolak interposed
several Greek army corps ; at Salonica also Greek camps
lay among the Franco-British camps scattered round the
town : these conditions impeded organized operations.
General Sarrail, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allies, had
nothing but praise for the courtesy of the Greek authorities,
both civil and military. Yet not a day passed without
incidents. He complained that obstacles were placed in
his action through a multitude of secondary details : the
Municipality claimed duties ; the Railway Service did not
assist as liberally as could be wished in the work of getting
off the stores which arrived at the port. It was necessary
that the Greek troops should be moved out of the Allies'
way and leave them in full control : privileges which no
State could voluntarily grant and remain neutral ; which
no army could forgo and work efficiently. So the General,
while confessing that " we often place them in a difiicult
position by demanding permissions which their virtual
neutraUty cannot allow them to give," impressed on the
Entente Governments the need of taking strong measures
with the Greeks."
Germany would have proceeded to deeds without wasting
words— beyond a casual " Necessity knows no law." But
nations fighting for noble ideals could not imitate
Germany's cynicism. A case had to be made out to
1 White Book, No. 51.
^ Sarrail, pp. 311-12 ; Life of Kitchener, Vol. Ill, p. 198.
80 GREECE AND TIIE ALLIES
justify coercion. It w£L3. Greece did not really wish to
remain neutral. Misled by a Germanophile Court, she
only waited for a chance of joining the enemy — of stabbing
the Allies in the back. When tliis amazing theory —
widely popularized b}' the French and Enghsh Press —
was hinted to M. RalUs by " Our Special Correspondent,"
on i8 November, the Greek Minister could hardly credit
his collocutor's sanity : " It is mad ! " he cried out. " It
is senseless to imagine such a thing — ^when you could have
the guns of your fleet levelled on our cities ! " The
answer, however — an answer the conclusiveness of which
a glance at the map is enough to demonstrate to the
dimmest intelhgence — fell upon deliberately deaf ears.
The very journal which in one page recorded it, in another
wrote : " Bulgaria has gone ; Greece is trembling in the
balance. Only a display of overwhelming force on our
part can hold her stead}^ and prevent the accession of
another 500,000 men to the enemy's strength."
That the pubhcists who argued thus and who, to give to
their argument greater cogenc}^, generously added to the
Greek army some 200,000 men, were persuaded by their
own reasoning, it is hard to beheve without libelhng
human sense. Apart from the ocular refutation supplied
by the map, what had Greece to gain by siding with the
enemies of the Entente ? That she would lose all her
islands, have her coast towms pulverized and her population
starved, was certain. What she could get in return, it
needed a very robust imagination to suggest. The only
countries at whose cost the Hellenic Kingdom could
possibly compensate itself for these ine\dtable sacrifices
were Turkey and Bulgaria ; and those countries were
Germany's alUes. A moment's reflection raises a number
of equally unanswerable questions : If the Greeks wanted
to j oin Germany, why did they not do so when the Kaiser
invited them at the very beginning of the \\'ar ? Why
did they not resist the landing of the Alhes ? Why did
they not attack them when they had them at their mercy :
60,000 French and British, with the Germans and the
Bulgars in front of them, and 150,000 Greeks between them
and Salonica ? ^
^ Those were the figures on 17 Nov. — Life of Kitchener, Vol. Ill,
p. 199. I have only seen an answer to the second of the above
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 81
In tliis connexion the evidence of an eminent English
soldier and an eminent French statesman who visited
Athens at that time to study the situation on the spot
may be cited. To each King Constantine and M. Skou-
loudis, in the course of lengthy interviews, declared that
the Allied forces had nothing to fear in Greece. Each
was convinced of their sincerity, and of the true motives
of their attitude : " They both," reported Lord Kitchener,
" seem very determined to stick to their neutrality."
Likewise General Dousmanis, Chief of the General Staff,
and Colonel Metaxas, who were represented to the Entente
pubhcs as Germanophile pedants, satisfied Lord Kitchener
of their genuine concern about the British sphere in the
East, and startled him by pressing upon him a plan of
action " almost exactly the same as detailed in my tele-
grams, and based their conclusions on the same argument
almost word for word. They emphatically stated that
there was no other way of preventing the accomplishment
of the German project."^ M. Denys Cochin even went so
far as to publish to the whole world that the suspicions
entertained against King Constantine had no other source
than party rancour. ^
For the rest, a striking proof that the Entente Powers
themselves did not beheve the story of the Greek Govern-
ment's hostile intentions is afforded by the fact that,
instead of demanding, they deprecated the disbandment of
the Greek army. When Lord Kitchener saw M. Skou-
loudis, the latter said that the Allies' mistrust might well
force Greece to consider whether it would not be better
for her to demobihze, leaving to them all responsibility
for the consequences. Lord Kitchener, in the presence
of the British Minister, replied that, " as to some partial
demobilization, it was for Greece to decide according
to her interests, but he did not think a general demobiliza-
tion advisable." And again, a little later on, when M.
questions : it is from M. Venizelos, and it is : " absent-mindedness ":
" Why did not the General Staff do this, since it was to Germany's
interest that the Anglo-French should not land ? Because, im-
mersed in politics, it no longer took account of military matters ! "
— Orations, p. 140.
1 Life of Kitchener, Vol. Ill, pp. 202-3.
2 See interview with M. Denys Cochin at Messina, in the Daily
Mail, 29 Nov., 1915. Cp. Le Temps, 25 Nov,
6
82 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Skouloudis, irritated by a fresh exhibition of mistrust,
told the French Minister that, in face of such a state of
things, nothing was left for his unhappy country but to
order at once a general demobilization, and let the Entente
Powers do what they liked to her, M. Guillemin cried out,
" Ah, no. I am decidedly against demobihzation."
Naturally : " the Greek Army," said Sir Thomas Cuning-
hame, the British MiUtary Attache, to General Moscho-
poulos, MiUtary Governor of Salonica, " saves and secures
the flanks and rear of the AUies."^
However, the story served the purpose of supplying a
pretext for pressure. All ships carrying foodstuffs and
other commodities were held up. In addition, Milo —
an island not far from Athens — ^was occupied, and the
Alhed Fleet was ordered to be ready, in case things should
be pushed to extremes, to open war on Greek commerce,
to destroy the Greek Fleet, and to bombard Athens, en
respectant les monuments anciens.^
Fortunately, the occasion for extreme measures, by
which even the ancient ruins might have suffered, did not
arise. General Sarrail, who at first urged that the naval
demonstration against Athens should be proceeded with
immediatel3^ on second thoughts, prompted by nervous-
ness as to the safety of his troops, deprecated such action.
At the same time, M. Skouloudis, alarmed by the blockade —
— Greece never has more than a very limited food reserve
— invited the Alhes to state their demands, saying that
he would accede to them if it was possible to do so.^
^^^lereupon the Alhes, " ever animated by the most
benevolent intentions towards Greece, and anxious that
the equivocal situation in which events had placed her
towards them should come to an end and their relations
be re-established on a basis of mutual and lasting con-
fidence," demanded first of all a formal assurance that
in no circumstances would the Greek troops attempt to
disarm or intern the retiring Alhed troops, but that the
policy of benevolent neutrality promised would be main-
tained with all its consequences. They disavowed any
wish or intention to compel the Hellenic Government to
1 Skouloudis, Apantesis, pp. 4-5 ; Semeioseis, p. 46.
* Journal Officiel, pp. 71-2.
3 Life of Kitchener, Vol. Ill, p. 199-203.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 83
participate in the European War from which it had declared
that it meant to hold aloof. But it was a vital necessity
for them not to let it in any way hinder the freedom of
their movements on land or sea, or compromise the security
of their troops throughout the field of their operations.
They therefore must be assured that they will obtain,
according to the promise already given by M. Zaimis, all
the facilities which they might require, notably in the port
of Salonica and on the roads and railways. It was under-
stood that the Entente Powers would restore in full at the
end of the War all the parts of Greek territory which they
might be obliged to occupy during the hostilities, and that
they would duly pay indemnities for all damage caused
by the occupation. ^
M. Skouloudis, after thanking the Entente Powers for
the benevolent intentions with which they declared
themselves to be animated towards Greece, willingly
repeated the assurances he had so many times already
given, that the Greek troops would in no circumstances
seek to disarm or intern the Allied troops, and that the
Greek Government in its relations with the Entente
Powers would in everything hold fast to its policy of
benevolent neutraUty. He once more noted the reiterated
disavowal by the AlHed Governments of any wish or
intention to force Greece into the War, and on his part
disavowed any wish or intention to hinder in any way the
freedom of their movements on land or sea, or to com-
promise in any way the security of their troops. The
Hellenic Government had always kept the promises made
by M. Zaimis to the very utmost of its ability, and had no
difficulty in renewing the assurance that the Allied Govern-
ments would continue to receive all the facilities their
troops might require in the port of Salonica, and on the
roads and railways.^
These prefatory amenities led on lo December to a
detailed Agreement, the Greek Government promising to
move its troops out of the way and " not to oppose by force
the construction of defensive works or the occupation of
fortified points," but reserving to itself the right to protest
^ Communication by the Entente Ministers, Athens, 10/23 Nov.,
1915-
2 Skouloudis lo Entente Ministers, Athens, 11/24 Nov., 1915.
81 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
against such operations " energetically and seriously, not
as a mere form " — a right which the AUies easily con-
ceded^ — and emphatically declaring that "should the
Alhed troops by their movements bring the war into
Greek territory, the Greek troops would withdraw so as to
leave the field free to the two parties to settle their differ-
ences."
The Entente Ministers expressed their satisfaction, and
M. Skouloudis expressed the hope that their Governments,
convinced at last of the Greek Government's sincerity,
would not only drop coercion, but complj' with its request
for financial and commercial facilities. They promised
that all difticulties would disappear as soon as the mihtary
authorities on the spot had given effect to the agi-eement ;
and the French Minister repeated his Government's
declaration that it would be happ}' to accord Greece all
financial and commercial faciUties as soon as the situation
cleared. ^
^ " Le Goiivernement Grec se reservait de protester; nous nous
riservions de ne pas ripondre. {Hires)." M. Briand in the Journal
Officiel, p. 72.
2 White Book, No. 54.
CHAPTER VIII
THE situation did not clear — how could it ?
Of all diplomatic fictions that of " benevolence " is
perhaps the most incompatible with the grim
realities of war.
General Sarrail had from the outset been empowered
to take any measures which he might judge necessary at
his discretion. But fear of the Greek army for a time
compelled him to temper vigour with caution. That fear
decreased in proportion as the Allied contingents in
Macedonia increased ; and hence a series of acts which
show how the General used his discretion.
First, he judged it necessary to blow up the bridge of
Demir-Hissar. He blew it up — thus completely cutting
off the Greek forces in Eastern Macedonia, and, incidentally,
letting the enemy know that no offensive across the
Struma was contemplated by the Allies. Next, he judged
it necessar}^ to seize the Fort of Kara-Burnu which com-
mands the entrance to Salonica Harbour. He seized it —
despite a solemn engagement to the contrary. ^ Then he
judged it necessary to occupy the town of Fiorina. He
occupied it. An appreciation of the efficacy or expediencj^
of these measures — beyond a passing allusion to the obvious
blunder committed by the destruction of the Demir-Hissar
bridge — would be out of place here. For our present
purpose their interest lies in the light they throw upon
the conditions, apart from the purely military difficulties,
created by the intrusion of foreign troops on neutral soil.
Afloat the Alhes were not less vigorous than ashore.
They judged it necessary to occupy Corfu, in order to
accommodate the remnants of the Servian army that had
escaped across Albania. They occupied Corfu. They
judged it necessary to occupy Castellorizo, an islet off the
coast of Asia Minor. They occupied Castellorizo. They
* See the Agreement of lo Dec, 1915 (Art, 5), White Book, No. 54 ;
Sarrail, pp. 94-6, 322-30.
85
86 tiKKEC'h: AND TIIK ALLIES
jiidf'.cd it iicccssiiiy Id ()((ii|)y Siula \'..\\ in CicN- aiKl
Arf,'osloli Jiay in Ccplialonia, I licy ()((:iiiii<(l (Ihiii.
Il is Wollliy of Utile Ih.il llir o((:ii|)ati()ii <»l ( ,i .|i llm i/.o
was |)r('j)ait{| hy a local icvoK sliiicd ii|) hy the I'niich
Consular and Naval aiillioiilics,' and that (lie («( npalion
oi (Oilii I iih J il iilcd a II.iiM.inl \'i(ilaliiin ol inh i nal idnal
jiarl'. (Iitalif. MJ I (ihdon, i.j Nov., j8()j, and „-() Manli,
lH().|) III wJiiili llic Ivnicnic rowcis wi^rc sif.naloi ics, and
liy viitnc ol vvliii II Ihf ]i(i|i(hial n(utralily ol llic island
was KH'"'ii'd<'('d a'. ■,lii(ll\ a. IJi.il ol Hcl/'jinn - a circuni-
slaiicc thai affoidcd llu- Ccidial J'ovvii'. an o|>|ioi I unily
to protest a^'ainst An/.^lo-Fren(li conleniiil loi the sanclily
ol llealies.-
Anioni; otiiei ailiiliaiy |ii oce((lin|;s may lie nientionid
nnnnion'. aricls and d( poi la! ions ot cn(iny suhjecls
and ( on:a 1 1;., and even t lie (Mini ion of some Greek subjects,
|i\' the Allied niililai\' and na\al ani lioi it i(,'S.'
A/,'ainst ea( li ol these enei'oaeluneiils nj)on its soverei/^idy
the (ireek (io\( rnni< nl j)rotested with e\'er-(leeiieiiin/^
liillerness. 'I'lie iudente (lovei imients a(ee]ited its jiio-
tests and disie^'aided them: intei national Law is the
will of the stroniMi. liesides, says M. J-Jiiand. " we were
there in a country where force is more elleetivc than
anywhere else."* From this ul lei nnc, \\hi( h was received
1)\' the I'Vench Chamhei' with apjilause, we ;m t a /.glimpse
inio the workin(.;s ol the ollii ial l'Jitent( mind, and moie
than a f^limpse of the ('jiidiuf^' piint ipli s ol I'.nlenle policy
in (ireece (huin/^ thai period.
The reason for that policy pul)licl\' allcf^ed was, as we
have seen, the Allies' need to do theii' own li/^ddinj^ in
• Sl«(iulnni!i'i Id ( aeck l-fgnlioii, I'.iiis, i .', i.], Mi Dvv. (O.S.);
(illillflllill 111 SIviiiildlKli'l, l(i/-'<> |)rc. ; Si((illlnii(|is lo ( J llillflllil],
1 7/v> I ><•( , oil ■,
" Skiilll.Mliili Id I'lllrlilr IVl ill islci S, AlilCII'l, )1 ])(■(■., |(;l'-,/l3
Jan., OMd; <<iy|i;ui:i, Vicima, .1/17 Jan., i<)it>.
" AinonK till" Urcflc Stale Papers llierc is a v«iluiniii<Mis lilr l.iliclicd
" Vidlatidiia (if llellciiii: Nfiitr.ility liy tlu- I'litciite Allies." It
Cdiitaiiiri a m.iHs of (:diii|ihiiiils l>y the Central I'tiwcrs Id the (ireek
(joverniiienl an<l liy tlu- (iri'ck (icjveriunenl to tlie Juilente (iovcrn-
inenls. S|i(.-(ial atlcntion is drawn td the ca.se of two (ireeka ])iit
to Uealh liy the I'rcneli military authoritieH in Macedonia lor having
lieen found in possession of (Jernian i)roelaniations drojipcd from
oero()lanfs : See Skouloudis to Frencli Legation, Athens, i3/a6
Apul, n)i<).
* Juuniul Ojffiiiitl, p, 70.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 87
peace and security. Their real aim, M. Skouloudis believed,
was to draw Greece gradually into the War. In so belie\'ing
he interpreted correctly the French Government's views
as the French Government itself had expounded them to
the Britisli Government: " To bring Greece in."^ With
that as one of its objects the Salonica expedition had
been persisted in ; and as Greece persisted in standing out,
the question resolved itself into one of continuous pressme.
M. Skouloudis was confirmed in his behef by the fact
that the Allies would not allow dcmobihzation, and at the
same time would not lend Greece the 150 million francs
which had been promised : they knew, through the
Liternational iMnancial Commission, that the mobilized
army swallowed up every available resource, and they
calculated that, when the strain reached tiie breaking
point, Greece would fall at their feet and beg for relief at
any price : the Ministry would have either to give way
or make place for one which favoured war. The Ministry,
determined to do neither, cast about for some means of
making ends meet, when Germany came forwai^d \vith an
offer to lend tem|)orarily a portion of the sum promised
by France. This offer, though, of course, prompted by
the desire to enable Greece to maintain her neutrality,
was free from any political conditions, and M. Skouloudis
accepted it thankfully. Negotiations began on 20 No-
vember, 191 5, and by 7 March, 1916, an instalment of
40 million francs was actually paid. For obvious reasons
the transaction was carried through without the knowledge
of the Allies, from whom the Greek Premier still cherished
some faint hopes of receiving the 150 millions. °
Whether he had any right to cherish such hopes, after
accepting iinancial assistance from their enemies, is a
very nice ethical point ; but a nicer point still is, whether
the Allies luul any right left to question the ethics of
others. M. Skouloudis doubtless could plead in self-
justification that his remaining armed was admittedly a
boon to them, as much as his remaining neutral was a
boon to their enemies ; and that both sides should therefore
help to defray the cost. He was impartial. However,
his hopes were dashed to the ground.
' Life of Kitrhrvrr, Vol. HI, p. 261.
^Skouloudis, Apantesis, pp. j-ii; White Book, No«. 75-8
82-3,88,91.
88 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
On 5 April the French and British Ministers called on
the Premier and informed him that the Ser\'ian army at
Corfu, having suthcienth' rested and recovered, the Entente
proposed to transport it to Salonica through Greece, and
they had no doubt that Greece would readily consent.
M. Skouloudis replied that Greece could not possibly
consent. The transport of over 100,000 men across the
country would mean interruption of railway traffic and
suspension of all economic life for at least two months ;
it would expose the population to the danger of infection
by the epidemic diseases from which the Serbs had been
suffering ; above all, it would be regarded b}' the Central
Powers as a breach of neutrality and might force Greece
into the War against her will. M. Skouloudis iirged these
reasons with all the firmness, and more than all the plain-
ness, that diplomacy allowed, ending up with an emphatic :
" No, gentlemen, such a thing we will not permit. I
declare this to you officially. "
" Our Governments," retorted the French Minister,
" have not instructed us to ask for your permission, but
to notify to you their decision."
M. Skouloudis was a proud old man, fiercely jealous of
his country's independence and inflexible in his defence
of it. Of his iron determination he had already given the
Alhes ample proof. But hitherto he had kept his gathering
indignation under control. He could do so no longer :
the Frenchman's speech and, more than the speech, the
manner in which it had been dehvered, were too much for
his feelings.
" And I," he repeated, " declare to you that my Govern-
ment's decision is not to permit this overland passage —
further, I declare to you that, in the contrary event, I
shall find myself under the necessity of blowing up the
railway," — then, in a crescendo of rage, he went on :
' ' You have left us nothing sound in this country — neither
self-respect, nor dignity, nor hberty, nor the right to live
as free men. But do not forget that there is a hmit to
the most benevolent patience and to the most wilhng
compliance, that one last drop makes the cup overflow. ..."
The British Minister, seeing that the conversation with
his colleague grew every moment more tempestuous,
interposed by asking if Greece would equally object to a
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 89
sea-passage of the Serbs by the Canal of Cormth ; and,
the Cabinet having been consulted, a favourable answer
was given. But meanwhile the demand for an overland
passage was pressed by the Servian Minister, and was
supported by all the Entente representatives. Again
M. Skouloudis gave a categorical refusal, and in a tele-
graphic circular to the Greek Ministers in London, Rome,
and Petrograd — experience had taught him that it was
worse than useless to argue with Paris — he reiterated the
reasons why Greece could not consent, laying special
stress on the now inflamed state of public opinion, and
pointing out that the dangers of the sea route were greatly
exaggerated since most of the journey would be through
close waters. He added that, in view of the absence of
any real military necessity for an overland transport,
and of the international consequences which compliance
involved, the whole civilized world would justify Greece
in her refusal and condemn any coercion on the part of
the Entente as an outrage. He concluded by requesting
the Greek Ministers to place all these reasons before the
respective Governments in order that, on realizing the
iniquity of the project, they might use all their influence
to dissuade the French Government from it. England
appreciated the force of M. Skouloudis's arguments and,
thanks to her, diplomatic pressure ceased. But there
remained another form of pressm'e, from which France
would not desist.
M. Briand angrily declared that, under the circumstances,
there could be no talk of a loan. M. Skouloudis pleaded
that Greece had not asked the loan as a price for the
violation of her neutrality ; she had asked it on the
supposition that the Entente Powers could not see with
indifference her military and economic paralysis.^
The plea made no impression ; and, rebufted by Paris,
M. Skouloudis's Government once more turned to Berlin.
It received another credit of forty million marks ; but,
notwithstanding this supply, day by day it saw its expenses
increasing and its revenues diminishing. Besides the men
under arms, there were crowds of destitute refugees from
Turkey, Bulgaria and Servia to be provided for, and the
native population, owing to the rise in the cost of living
^ Skouloudis, Senieioscis, pp. 33-6 ; White Book, Nos. 57-63.
[)0 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
and to unemploj'ment, also stood in urgent need of relief.
At the same time, customs and other receipts became
more and more precarious owing to the Allies' constant
interference with the freedom of commerce.^
Truly, after the Allies' landing on her soil, the neutrality
of Greece became something unique in the annals of
international jurisprudence : a case defj-ing all known
maxims, except Machiavelli's maxim, that, when placed
between two warring powers, it is better for a state to
join even the losing side than try to remain neutral. By
trying to do so, Greece could not avoid, even with the
utmost circumspection, exposing herself to insult and injur}'.
One more corollary of the Salonica Expedition deserves
to be noted. Since the beginning of the War, Athens,
Like other neutral capitals, had become the centre of
international intrigue and espionage ; each belligerent
group establishing, beside their ofi&cially accredited
diplomatic missions, secret services and propagandas.
In aim, both establishments were ahke. But their oppor-
tunities were not equal. The Germans had to rely for
procuring information and influencing public opinion on
the usual methods. The French and the British added
to those methods others of a more unusual character.
From the riffraff of the Levant they had recruited a
large detective force which operated under the sanctuary
of their Legations.* The primary function of these gentry
was to discover attempts at the fuelling and victualling
of German submarines ; and, stimulated by a permanent
offer of a reward of £2,000 from the British Minister, they
did their best to discharge this necessary function. Hardly
a day passed without their suppl3ing information which,
transmitted to the Fleets, led to raids at all points of the
Greek coasts and isles. Let one or two examples suffice
for many.
^ Skouloudis, Apaniesis, pp. 12-14.
* Of the 162 individuals who, by the end of 1916, composed the
personnel of the Franco-British Secret Police at Athens, only about
60 were natives of Old Greece ; the rest came from Crete, Con-
stantinople, Smyrna, etc. An anal3'sis of the official List, signed
by the Prefect of the Greek Police, reveals among them : 7 pick-
pockets, 8 murderers, 9 ex-brigands, 10 smugglers, 11 thieves,
21 gamblers, 20 White Slave traffickers. The balance is made up
of men with no visible means of subsistence.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 91
The French Intelligence Service reported that the
Achilleion — the Kaiser's summer palace at Corfu — was a
thoroughly organized submarine base, with a wharf, stores
of petrol, and pipes for carrying it down to the water's
edge. On investigation, the wharf turned out to be an
ordinary landing stage for the palace, the stores a few tins
of petrol for the imperial motor cars, and the pipes water-
closet drains.^
In consequence of similar " information received from a
trustworthy source " — that a Greek steamer had b}' order
of the Greek Government transported to Gerakini and
handed over to the Custom House authorities for the use
of German submarines a quantity of benzine — a French
detachment of marines landed, forced its way into the
Custom House, and proceeded to a minute perquisition,
even digging up the ground. The result was negative,
and the officer commanding the detachment had to apolo-
gize to the Chief of the Custom House. Whereupon the
Greek Government asked the French Minister for the
source of the information, adding that it was time the
Allies ceased from putting faith in the words of unscrupu-
lous agents and proceeding to acts both fruitless and
insulting.*
Were the Alhes in the mood to use ordinary intelligence,
they would have seen the truth themselves ; for not one
discovery, after the most rigorous search, was ever made
anywhere to confirm the reports of the Secret Services.*
As it was, the spies were able to justify their existence
by continuing to create work for their employers ; and the
^ Du Fournet, pp. 1 15-17 ; Skouloudis to Greek Legation, Paris,
19 Feb./4 March, 1916.
2 Politis to Guillemin, 9/22 Feb., 1916.
^ Considering the extent of the coast-Hne of Greece and the
poverty of her inhabitants, this would be incredible, were it not
attested by the Allies' Naval Commander-in-Chief, whose task it
was to verify every report transmitted to him : " Jamais un seul
de ses avis n'a H& reconnu exact ; la plupart itaient visiblenient
absurdes." " Malgri les verifications les plus r&pHies jamais un
seul de ces fails n'a dt& reconnu exact. Un certain nombre de
coquins, incompetents mais malins, vivaient du commerce de ces
fausses nouvelles." — Du Fournet, pp. 115, 304. Cp. also pp. 85,
270. The French Admiral of Patrols, Faton, and the British
Admiral Kerr, are equally emphatic in testifying " that all these
stories about supplying the submarines were fabrications." — See
Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, in the Morning Post, 13 Dec, 1920.
92 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
lengths to which they were prepared to go are well illus-
trated by a case that formed the subject of some questions
in the House of Commons. M. CalUmassiotis, a well-
known Greek Deputy, was denounced by the French
Secret Service as directing an organization for the supply
of fuel and information about the movements of Allied
shipping to German submarines. A burglarious visit to
his house at the Piraus yielded a rich harvest of com-
promising documents. The British Secret Service joined
in following up the clues, and two Mohammedan merchants
of Canea were arrested and deported to Malta on unim-
peachable evidence of complicity. Closer investigation
proved the whole affair from beginning to end a web of
forgery and fraud. The hoax ended in the British Minister
at Athens apologizing to the Greek Deputy, and in the
Mohammedan merchants being brought back home as
guests aboard a British destroyer.^
Thus a new field was opened up to those who wished
to ruin business competitors, to revenge themselves on
personal enemies, or, above all, to compromise political
opponents. From the words of Admiral Dartige : "The
revelations of the Venizelist Press concerning the revictu-
alling of German submarines in Greece are a tissue of
absurd legends," ^ we learn the main source of these myths
and also the principal motive. For if M. Venizelos and
his party had, b}^ their voluntary abstention, deprived
themselves of a voice inside the Chamber, they more than
made amends by their agitation out of doors. The
coercion of Greece came as grist to their mill. The Liberal
newspapers triumphantly pointed to it as concrete proof
of the wisdom of their Leader's policy, and held up the
names of the men who had thwarted him to obloquy and
scorn. M. Skouloudis and his colleagues were abused for
drawing down upon the country through their duplicity
the wrath of the Powers which could best help or harm it.
The " revelations " served a twofold purpose : to foster
the belief that they promoted secretly the interests of
Germany, and to furnish the Allies with fresh excuses for
coercion. And in the Franco-British InteUigence organi-
zation the scheming brain of M. Venizelos found a ready-
1 J. C. Lawson, Tales of /Egean Intrigue, pp. 93-142.
2 Du Fournet, p. 304.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 93
fashioned tool : men willingly shut their eyes to the most
evident truths that hinder their designs, and readily
accept any myth that furthers them.
Nor did that organization assist M. Venizelos merely
by traducing his opponents' characters and wounding
their amour-propre. In March, 1916, the Chief of the
French Secret Service, at a conference of the AlUed
admirals, proposed that they should lay hands on the
internal affairs of Greece : that they should stick at
nothing — qn' on devait tout oser. The motion was rejected
with disgust by the honest sailors. But the mover was
in direct communication with political headquarters in
Paris ; and his plan was only deferred. Meanwhile he
and his associates with the rogues in their pay made
themselves useful by collaborating in the VenizeUst
agitation, mixing themselves up in party disturbances,
carrying out open perquisitions and clandestine arrests,
and preparing the ground for graver troubles in the future.^
The representatives of the Entente at Athens pursued
these unedifying tactics in the firm conviction that the
cause of M. Venizelos was their cause ; which was true
enough in the sense that on him alone they could count
to bring Greece into the War without conditions. As to
the Entente publics, M. Venizelos was their man in a less
sober sense : he kept repeating to them that his opponents
under the guise of neutrality followed a hostile policy,
and that his own party's whole activity was directed to
preventing the King from ranging himself openly on the
side of the Central Powers. The Entente Governments,
whatever they may have thought of these tactics and
slanders, did not dream of forbidding the one or of contra-
dicting the other, since the former aided their client and
the latter created an atmosphere which relieved them
from all moral restraints.
They only upbraided M. Venizelos gently for keeping
out of Parliament. So M. Venizelos, seeing that he had
gained nothing by abstention and forgetting that he had
^ Du Fournet, pp. 1 12-16. In this work we find a full picture of
the French Secret Service. Unfortunately, or fortunately, no
authoritative record has been published of its British counterpart.
Mr. Lawson's account deals only with a provincial branch of the
establishment.
94 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
pronounced the Chamber unconstitutional, obeyed. Early
in May, two of his partisans carried two bye-elections in
Eastern Macedonia, and the leader himself was returned
by the island of Mytilene. Three seats in Parliament
could not overturn M. Skouloudis ; and it cannot be said
that his re-appearance on the scene enhanced the credit
of M. Venizelos with the nation. Ever since the landing
of the AlHes, and largely through their own actions, his
prestige in Greece declined progressively. He was re-
proached more and more bitterly for his " invitation "
to them ; and these reproaches grew the louder, the
closer he drew to the foreigners and the farther he di\'erged
from his own King. In a letter from Athens, dated
24 May, occurs the following passage : " Venizelos becomes
every day more and more of a red repubhcan. How that
man has "duped everybody ! We all thought him a genius,
and he simply is an ambitious maniac."
Later on M. Venizelos explained why he had not already
revolted. A revolution there and then, no doubt, would
have saved a lot of trouble ; " But before the idea of
revolution matures in the mind and soul of a statesman,
there is need for some evolution, which cannot be accom-
plished in a few moments," he said. Since October, this
idea had had time to evolve in his mind and soul. But
his hate of " tyranny " was not blind. It was pecuharly
clear-sighted, and he judged the difficulties with precision :
" Such a step would not have been favoured by the Entente
Powers, whose support would have been indispensable for
its success." Then again : "If before the Bulgarian
invasion of Macedonia I had kindled a civil war, pubhc
opinion would have held me responsible for the invasion,
and that would certainly have arrested my movement."^
It so chanced that, scarcely had a fortnight passed since
his reappearance in the Chamber, when the Bulgars
provided M. Venizelos and at least one of the Entente
Powers with this requisite for their evolution.
1 The New Europe, 29 March, 191 7 ; Orations, pp. 142-3.
CHAPTER IX
WHEN M. Venizelos taunted M. Skouloudis with
forgetting that he had promised the AUies " not
only simple neutrality, nor simply benevolent
neutrality, but most sincerely benevolent neutrality," the
aged Prime Minister, who apparently had a sense of
humour, replied : " I do not know how there can be such
a thing as benevolent neutrality. A neutrality really
benevolent towards one of the belligerents is really male-
volent towards the other, consequently it is more or less
undisguised partiality. Between benevolence and male-
volence there is no room for neutrahty." He only knew,
he said, one kind of neutrality — the absolute neutrality
towards both belligerents.^ And he hved up to his
knowledge so conscientiously that he earned the gratitude
of neither, but saw himself the sport of both.
No sooner had the Alhes begun to fall back from
Krivolak, than the German Mihtary Attache at Athena
presented to King Constantine a telegram from General
von Falkenhayn, dated 29 November, 1915, in which the
Chief of the German General Staff intimated that, if
Greece failed to disarm the retreating Entente forces or
to obtain their immediate re-embarkation, the development
of hostilities might very probabty compel the Germans
and the Bulgars to cross her frontiers. After a consulta-
tion, the Skouloudis Cabinet replied through the King
that Greece did not consent to a violation of her soil ;
but if the violation bore no hostile character towards
herself, she would refrain from opposing it by force of arms
on certain guarantees : that the Bulgars should categori-
cally renounce every claim to territories now in Greek
possession, that simultaneously with their entry into
Macedonia Greece should be allowed to occupy Monastir
as a pledge for their exit, that in no circumstance whatever
should the King of Bulgaria or his sons enter Salonica,
1 Orations, p. 155 ; Skouloudis's Semeioseis, p. 36.
95
96 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
that all commands should be exclusively in German hands,
and so forth — altogether nineteen conditions, the principal
object of which was to ward off the danger of a permanent
occupation, but the effect of which w^ould have been to
hamper mihtary operations most seriously.
The German Government, perturbed by the extent and
nature of the guarantees demanded, referred the matter
to Falkenhayn, who would only grant three comprehensive
assurances : to respect the integrity of Greece, to restore
the occupied territories at the end of the campaign, and
to pay an indemnity for all damage caused. On those
terms, he invited Greece to remove her army from Mace-
donia so as to avoid the possibiHty of an accidental collision.
The King refused, giving among other reasons that such
a concession had been denied to the Entente. Thereupon
Falkenhavn asked, as an alternative to a total evacuation,
that Greece should pledge herself to resist Entente landings
in the Gulfs of Cavalla and Katerini. Again Greece
refused, on the ground that this would involve the use
of force against the Entente, whereas she w^as determined
not to abandon her neutrahty as long as her interests, in
her own opinion, did not compel her so to do.^
After this answer, given on 27 January, 1916, conversa-
tions on the subject ceased for about six weeks.
Thus it appears that during the period when the Alhes
were, or professed to be, most nervous about the intentions
of Greece, it was the fear of Greek hostihty, carefully
nursed by Greek diplomacy, that checked the Germans
and the Bulgars from following up their advantage and
sweeping the Franco-British troops into the sea. It was
the same attitude of Greece that made the enemy hesitate
to break into Macedonia during the following months,
and gave the Alhes time to fortify themselves.
On 14 March, Falkenhayn returned to the charge, and
was once more met with a Hst of exorbitant conditions.
This time the conversations assumed the character of
recriminations ; the Greek Government complaining of
Bulgarian encroachments on the neutral zone fixed along
the frontier, Falkenhayn retorting that the provocative
movements of the Entente Forces obUged the Central
Powers to fortify their positions and threatening a rupture
1 White Book, Nos. 70-4, 79, 81, 84, 86-90.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 97
if the Greek soldiers continued to hinder the Bulgars.''-
Then, after another interval, he announced (7 May) that,
owing to an English advance across the Struma, he found
it absolutely necessary to secure in self-defence the Rupel
Pass — key of the Strmna Valley. ^
M. Skouloudis endeavoured to make the German Govern-
ment dissuade the General Staff from its project. Falken-
hayn, he said, was misinformed as to an English advance
— only small mounted patrols had crossed the Struma.
He suspected that he was deceived and instigated by the
Bulgars who, under cover of military exigencies, sought
to realize their well-known ambitions at the expense of
Greece. Their frequent misdeeds had already irritated
Greek public opinion to such a degree that he could not
answer for the consequences, should the project be carried
out. The appearance of Bulgarian troops in Macedonia
would create a national ferment of which Venizelos and
the Entente Powers would take advantage in order to
overthrow the present Ministr}' and force Greece into war.'
Impressed b}/ these arguments, the German Government
did its utmost to induce Falkenhayn to abandon his
scheme ; von Jagow even going so far as to di'aw up,
with the assistance of the Greek Minister at Berlin, a
remonstrance to the Chief of the General Staff. But it
was all to no purpose. The pohtical department had very
little influence over the High Command. Falkenhayn
insisted on the accuracy of his information, and adhered
to his own point of view. He could not understand, he
said, why a German move should cause any special excite-
ment in Greece, seeing that it was directed against the
French and the English, who paid no heed to Greek
susceptibilities, and he irritably complained that, while
Greece allowed the Entente full liberty to improve its
position day by day, she raised the greatest obstacles to
Germany's least demand.* In brief, from being more or
less pHant, the Chief of the General StaH became rigid :
he would no longer submit to rebuffs and denials. Strategic
reasons, perhaps, had brought about this change ; perhaps
the Bulgars were the instigators. It is impossible to say,
1 White Book, Nos. 92, 93, 96-102. ^ White Book, No. 104.
3 White Book, Nos. 106, iii, 113.
* White Book, Nos. no, 112, 116.
98 GUEECE AND THE ALLIES
and it docs not much matter. The essential fact is that
the man had power and meant to use it.
There followed a formal communication from the
German and Bulgarian Ministers at Athens to M. Skoulou-
dis, stating that their troops were compelled in self-defence
to push into Greek territor\^ and assuring him that neither
the integrity and sovereignty of Greece nor the persons
and property of the inhabitants would in any way suffer
by this temporary occupation. M. Skouloudis took note
of this decision without assenting to it, but also without
protesting : he felt, he said, that a premature protest
could onlv lose Greece the guarantees of restoration and
reparation offered. Sufhcient unto the da}/ the evil thereof :
confronted with powerful Empires in the height of their
mihtary strength, he had done all that was humanly
possible to ward off their advance, and, though unsuccess-
ful in the end, he had at least obtained a solemn pledge of
their ultimate retreat. The protest came a few days later,
when the invasion actually took place. ^
On 26 i\Iay, a Germano-Bulgarian force appeared at
Rupel. The garrison, in accordance Anth its instructions
of 27 April (O.S.) to resist any advance bej^ond 500 metres
from the frontier line, fired upon the invaders and drove
them back. But on fresh orders reaching it to follow
the instructions of g March (O.S.) — which prescribed that,
in the event of a foreign invasion, the Greek troops should
withdraw — it surrendered the fort.*
In Entente circles it had long been assumed that, let
the King and his Government do what they liked, the
instant a Bulgarian foot stepped over the border, soldiers
and civilians would fly to arms. Nothing of the sort
happened. However painful to their feelings their orders
might be, the soldiers obej'ed them. Among the ci\dlians
also the shock, severe as it was, produced no demoralization.
The Greek people generally understood that the surrender
of Rupel was an inevitable consequence of the landing at
Salonica. Nevertheless, the fears of M. Skouloudis that
1 White Book, Nos. 117-20, 134, 135 ; Skouloudis's Apantesis,
pp. 25-6.
2 White Book, Nos. 95, 105, 126, 130-33, 137. The instructions
of 27 April had been issued chiefly in consequence of information
that bands of Bulgarian irregulars [Comitadjis) were at that moment
preparing to cross the frontier. Skouloudis's Apantesis, p. 23.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 99
a Bulgarian invasion would place a powerful weapon in
the hands of his opponents were abundantly fulfilled.
By representing the event as the result of a treacherous
collusion between Athens and the Central Powers/ M.
Venizelos roused the Alhed nations to fury. Their Govern-
ments, of course, knew better. Even in France official
persons recognized that the occupation of Rupel was a
defensive operation which Greece could not oppose by
force. Yet they had hoped that she would have averted
it by diplomatic action. As it was, they concluded that
she must have received from the Central Powers very
strong assurances that the occupied territories would be
restored to her. In any case, they said, the Skouloudis
Cabinet's passivity in face of a move calculated to prejudice
the Allies' military position contradicted its oft-repeated
protestations of a benevolent neutraHty towards them.^
M. Skouloudis hastened to vindicate his conduct. He
did not tell the Entente Powers, as he might have done,
that he had by diplomatic action put off an invasion for
six months, and thus enabled them to increase their
forces and consolidate their position. Neither did he tell
them another thing which in itself formed an ample
refutation of the charge of collusion — that on 27 April
(10 May) General Sarrail had occupied the frontier fort
Dova-tep^ with the tacit consent of the Hellenic Govern-
ment, which had deliberately excluded that fort from the
instructions of resistance issued that day to its troops,
and that Greek officers urged him at the same time to
occupy Rupel, dwelling on the military importance of the
fort for the defence of Eastern Macedonia ; an advice
which the French General had ignored on the ground that
Rupel lay altogether outside the Allies' zone of action,
and he could not spare the troops necessary for its occupa-
tion."
^ The charge was supported by garbled "extracts" from the
instructions to the Greek troops (the full texts of which may now
be read in the White Book), published in Paris. See the Saturday
Review, lo Sept., 1921, pp. 321-2, citing the Petit Parisien of Dec,
1916.
^ White Book, Nos. 140, 146.
^ Sarrail, p. 104. Anyone familiar with the political and psycho-
logical atmosphere would have seen that the Greeks were anxious
to keep the Bulgars out by inducing the French to forestall them.
100 (JREECE AND THE ALLIES
The Greek Premier simply said that his Government's
passivity was in strict accord with the exphcit declarations
of its policy and intentions, enunciated at the very outset,
ratified by the Agreement of lo December, 1915, and
reiterated ad nauseam to the Entente Ministers — viz., that
" should the Allied troops by their movements bring the
war into Greek territory, the Greek troops would withdraw
so as to leave the field free to the two parties to settle
their differences." Far from changing his attitude, he
once more, in reply to M. Briand's threat that. " if the
Bulgarian advance continued \nthout resistance there
might ensue the most serious consequences for the Hellenic
Government," emphatically declared : " Resistance is only
possible if we abandon our neutrality, and the demand
that we should resist is therefore in flagrant contradiction
to the oft-repeated protestations of the Entente Powers
that they have neither the \\ish nor the intention to force
us into the War." Nor could he understand how the}'
could think of blaming Greece for recei\'ing from the Central
Powers the same assurances of eventual restoration as
those given by themselves.^
M. Skouloudis spoke in vain. Paris had made up its
mind to treat the incident as indicating a new and male-
volent orientation against which it behoved the Allies to
protect themselves. Accordingly, on i June, M. Briand
authorized General Sarrail to proclaim a state of siege at
Salonica.
General Sarrail, who had long sought to be freed from
the trammels of Greek sovereignty — " et a. etre tnaitre chez
nioi " — but had hitherto been denied his wish by the
British Government, jumped at the permission, and he
improved upon it with a personal touch, trivial yet charac-
teristic. So far back as 27 April he had recomm.endcd
that " we must strike at the head, attack frankh- and
squarely the one enemy — the King." Pending an oppor-
tunity to strike, he seized the occasion to slight. He
fixed the proclamation for 3 June, King Ccnstantine's
name day, which was to be celebrated at Salonica as in
every other town of the kingdom \rith a solemn Tc Deiim.
But Sarrail detected in their advice a subtle contrivance either to
find out his plans, or to cast the blame for the loss of Rupel on him I
1 White Book, No. 142.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 101
The British General, Mihie, who had arranged to assist at
the Te Deum, after vainly trying to obtain at least a
postponement of the date out of respect for the King,
found himself obliged to yield. And so on that festal
morning martial law was proclaimed. Allied detachments
with machine guns occupied various strategic points, the
public offices were taken possession of, the chiefs of the
Macedonian gendarmerie and police were expelled, and
the local press was placed under a French censor. All
this, without any preliminary notification to the Hellenic
Government, which expressed its indignation that a
French General, forgetting tlie most elementary rules of
courtesy and hospitality, thought fit to choose such a
moment for inaugurating a state of things that formed at
once a gratuitous affront to the sovereign of the country
and a breach of the terms of the Agreement of lo
December.^
But this was only a prelude, followed on 6 June by a
blockade of the Greek coasts, established in pursuance of
orders from Paris and London — poiirpeser sur la Grece et lui
montrer qu'elle etait d noire merci.^ Even this measure,
however, did not seem to M. Briand sufficient. He
advocated intervention of a nature calculated to disarm
our enemies and to encourage our friends. His views did
not meet with approval in London : Sir Edward Grey had
" des scnipules honorahles," which M. Briand set himself
to overcome by pen and tongue. The Entente Powers,
he argued, were protectors of Greece — guarantors of her
external independence and internal liberty. The Greek
Government was bound to defend its territories with them
against all invaders, and it had broken that obligation.
Further, it had sinned by violating the Constitution. On
both counts the Entente Powers had not only the right
but the duty to intervene. Thus only could they justify,
in the eyes of the Greek people, the blockade by which
the whole population suffered, and which it would other-
wise not understand. There was no time to lose : the
dignity of France demanded swift and drastic action : the
Athenians had gone so far as to ridicule in a cinema the
^ Journal Officiel, p. 72 ; Sarrail, pp. 105-8, 112, 355-7 ; White
Book, Nos. 142, 145.
* Sarrail, p. 113.
102 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
uniform of the lieroes of Verdun. If England would not
join her, she must act alone. ^
These arguments — particulai'ly, one may surmise, the
last — overcame Sir Edward Gre^^'s honourable scruples ;
and on i6 June a squadron was ordered to be ready to
bombard Athens, while a brigade was embarked at Salonica
for the same destination. Before the guns opened fire,
hj'droplanes would drop bombs on the royal palace ; then
the troops would land, occupy the town, and proceed to
arrest, among others, the royal family. Such were the
plans elaborated under the direction of the French Minister
at Athens, much to the joy of General Sarrail, who had
said and wTitten again and again that " nothing could be
done unless the King was put down."'*
All arrangements for this " demonstration " completed,
on 21 June the Entente Powers, " ever animated by the
most benevolent and amicable spirit towards Greece " —
it is wonderful to what acts these words often form the
accompaniment — had the honour to deliver to her Govern-
ment a Note by w^hich they demanded :
1. The immediate and total demobihzation of the Army.
2. The immediate replacement of the present Cabinet
b}' a business Ministry.
3. The immediate dissolution of the Chamber and fresh
elections.
4. The discharge of police officers obnoxious to them.
They admitted neither discussion nor delay, but left to
the Hellenic Government the entire responsibility for the
events that would ensue if their just demands were not
complied with at once.
As M. Briand had anticipated, the sight of our warships'
smoke quickened the Greek Government's sense of justice.
King Constantine promptly complied, the " demonstra-
tion," to the intense disappointment of M. Guillemin and
General Sarrail, w-as adjourned, and a Ministry of a non-
political character, under the leadership of M. Zaimis, was
appointed to carry on the administration of the country
until the election of a new Chamber.^
The event marked a new phase in the relations between
^ Journal Officiel, pp. 72-3.
2 Sarrail, pp. 115-24 ; Du Fournet, pp. 91-3.
3 Journal Officiel, p. 99 ; Sarrail, pp. 125-7 ; Du Fournet, p. 93.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 103
Greece and the Entente Powers. Henceforth they appear
not as trespassers on neutral territory, but as protectors
installed there, according to M. Briand, by right — a right
derived from treaties and confirmed by precedents.^
Concerning the treaties all comment must be postponed
till the question comes up in a final form. But as to the
precedents, it may be observed that the most pertinent
and helpful of all was one which M. Briand did not cite.
At the time of the Crimean War, Greece, under King
Otho, wanted to fight Turkey, and realize some of her
national aspirations v/ith the assistance of Russia. But
France and England, who were in alliance with Turkey
against Russia, would not allow such a thing. Their
Ministers at Athens told King Otho that strict neutrality
was the only policy consonant with the honour and the
interest of Greece : while hostilities lasted her commerce,
as a neutral nation, would flourish, and by earning their
goodwill she could, at the conclusion of peace, hope not
to be forgotten in the re-making of the map of Eastern
Europe. For refusing to listen to these admonitions King
Otho was denounced as a pro-Russian autocrat, and the
Allies landed troops at the Pirsus to compel obedience to
their will.
Once more a Greek sovereign had drawn down upon
himself the wrath of the Protecting Powers, with the
traditional charges of hostile tendencies in his foreign and
autocratic tendencies in his domestic conduct, for daring
to adopt an independent Greek policy.
This time the three Powers were united in a common
cause, which necessitated unity of action on all fronts.
But it would be an error to imagine that this unity of
action rested everywhere upon a community of views or
of ulterior aims. Certainly such was not the case in
Greece. France had her own views and aims in that part
of the world. M. Briand was bent on bringing Greece into
the War, not because he thought her help could exercise
a decisive influence over its course, but because he wanted
her to share in the spoils under French auspices : he
considered it France's interest to have in the Eastern
Mediterranean a strong Greece closely tied to her. ^
^ Journal Officiel, pp. 72, 73.
- Roinanos to Zaimis, Paris, 26 Aug./8 Sept., 1916.
104 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
That programme France intended to carrj- through at
all costs and b}' all means. England and Russia, for the
sake of the paramount object of the War, acquiesced and
co-operated. But the acquiescence was compulsory and
the co-operation reluctant. The underlying disaccord
between the three Allies reflected itself in the demeanour
of their representatives at Athens.
M. Guiliemin, the French Minister, stood before the
Greek Government A'iolentl}^ beUigerent. Brute force,
accentuated rather than concealed by a certain irritating
finesse, seemed to be his one idea of diplomac}', and he
missed no conceivable opportunity for gi\ ing it expression :
so much so that after a time the King found it hnpossible
to receive him. Sir Francis Elliot, the British Minister,
formed a pleasing contrast to his French colleague : a
scrupulous and courteous gentleman, he did not disguise
his repugnance to a policy in\'oh-ing at e\'ery step a fresh
infringement of a neutral nation's rights. As it was, he
endeavoured to moderate proceedings which he could
neither approve nor pre\'ent. Prince Demidoff, a Russian
diplomat of amiable manners, seconded Sir Francis Elliot's
counsels of moderation and yielded to M. Guillemin's
clamours for coercion.^
It is important to bear this disaccord in mind in order
to understand what went before and what comes hereafter :
for, though for the most part latent, it was alwa3^s present ;
and if it did not avert, it retarded the climax.
^ See Du Fournet, pp. iio-ii.
CHAPTER X
IN their Note of 21 June the AlUes assured the Greek
people that they acted for its sake as much as for
their own. One half of the preamble was taken up
by their grievances against the Skouloudis Government —
its toleration of foreign propagandists and its connivance
at the entry of enemies, which formed a fresh menace for
their armies. The other half was devoted to the violation
of the Constitution by the dissolution of two Chambers
within less than a year and the subjection of the country
to a regime of tjaann}'. Their aim, they said, was to
safeguard the Greek people in the enjoyment of its rights
and liberties.^
These generous sentiments left the Greek people strangely
cold. Indeed, the absence of any manifestations of
popular joy at the Allies' success was as striking as had
been the manifestations of resentment at the means
employed. The only persons who did applaud the action
were the persons whose party interests it served. The
Venizelist Press hailed the triumph of violence as a victory
for legahty. M. Venizelos addressed to M. Briand his
felicitations, and gave pubhc utterance to his gratitude
as follows : " The Note solved a situation from which there
was no other issue. The just severity of its tone, the
sincerity of its motives, its expressly drawn distinction
between the Greek people and the ex-Government, give it
more than anything else a paternal character towards the
people of this country. The Protecting Powers ha\'e
acted onl}' like parents reclaiming a son's birthright."-
Pared down to realities, the aim of the Protecting Powers
was to bring their protege to power and Greece into the
War. The demobilization of the army, which stood first
on their list, was the first step to that end. M. Venizelos
^ Journal Officiel, p. gg.
* The Daily Mail, 24 June, 1916.
106 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
had l)ccn asserting that the people were still with him,
aiid, given a chance, would upliold his polic}-, but that
chance was denied them by the mobilization. With a
pardonable ignorance of the people's feelings, and also,
it must be owned, with a too naive confidence in the
accuracy of the People s Chosen, the Allies had decided
to act on this assumption : an assumption on which
M. Venizelos himself was most reluctant to act.
We have it on his own evidence that he looked for a
solution of his difficulties, not to an election, but to a
revolution. Further, he has told us that, eager as he
might be for a revolutionary stroke, he could not lose
sight of the obstacles. To those who held up French
revolutions as a model, he pointed out that the analog}'
was fallacious : in France " long 3'ears of t3'ranny had
exasperated the people to its very depths. In Greece the
people had a king who, only two years earlier, had headed
his armies in two victorious campaigns."^ So he scouted
the idea of intervention at Athens, convinced that an}'-
attack on the Crown would spell destruction to himself. ^
His project was to steal to Salonica and there, under
General Sarrail's shield, to start a separatist movement
" directed against the Bulgars, but not against the king,"
apparently hoping that the Greek troops in Macedonia,
among whom his apostles had been busy, fired by anti-
Bulgar hate, would join him and drag king and country
after them. This project had been communicated b}- the
French Minister at Athens to General Sanail on 31 May :^
but, as the British Government was not \-et sufficiently
advanced to countenance sedition,* M. Venizelos and his
French confederate saw^ reason to abandon it for the
present.
Thus all concerned were committed to a test of the real
desires of the Greek people by a General Election, which
they declared themselves an.xious to bring off without
delay — early in August. This time there would be no
ambiguity about the issue : although the AlHes in their
Note, as w^as proper and politic, had again disclaimed any
^ The New Europe, 29 March, 191 7.
' Du Fournet, p. 91.
3 Sarrail, pp. 107, 354-5.
* " L'Angleterte avait mis son veto." — Sarrail, p. 153.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES lOT
wish or intention to make Greece depart from her neutrahty,
M. Venizelos proclaimed that he still adhered to his belHcose
programme, and that he was more confident of victory
than ever^ : had not the Reservists been set free to vote,
and were not those ardent warriors his enthusiastic sup-
porters ? With this cry — perhaps in this belief — he
entered the arena.
It was a lively contest — rhetoric and corruption on both
sides reinforced by terrorism, to which the AUies' military
authorities in Macedonia, and their Secret Service at
Athens, whose efficiency had been greatly increased by
the dismissal of many pohcemen obnoxious to them, and
by other changes brought about through the Note of
21 June, contributed of their best.
But even veteran politicians are liable to error. The
Reservists left their billets in Macedonia burning with
anger and shame at the indignities and hardships which
they had endured. The Allies might have had among
those men as many friends as they pleased, and could
have no enemies unless they created them by treating
them as such. And this is just what they did : from first
to last, the spirit displayed by General Sarrail towards the
Greek army was a spirit of insulting distrust and utterly
unscrupulous callousness.
Unable to revenge themselves on the foreign trespasser,
the Reservists vowed to wreak their vengeance on his
native abettor. They travelled back to their villages
shouting : " A black vote for Venizelos I " and immediately
formed leagues in the constituencies with a view to com-
bating his candidates. The latter did all they could to
exploit the national hate for the Bulgars and the alarm
caused by their invasion. But fresh animosities had
blunted the edge of old feelings : besides, had not the
Bulgarian invasion been provoked by the Allies' occupation,
and who was responsible for that occupation ? For the
rest, the question, as it presented itself to the masses, was
no longer simply one of neutrality or war. Despite M.
Venizelos's efforts, and thanks to the efforts of his adver-
saries, his breach with the King had become public, and
1 See his statement to the Correspondent of tbe Paris Journal,
in the Hesperia, of Loudon, 7 July, 1916.
lOS GREECE AND THE ALLIES
the division of the nation had now attained to tiie dimen-
sions of a schism — Royahsts against VenizeHsts, Nor
could there be any doubt as to the relative strength of the
rival camps.
Thus, by a sort of irony, the action which was designed
to clothe Venizelos with new power threatened to strip
him of the last rags of prestige that still clung to his
name. Therefore, the elections originally fixed for early
in August were postponed by the Entente to September.
Such was the internal situation, when external events
brought the struggle to a head.
With the accession of 120,000 Serbs, 23,000 Itahans,
and a Russian brigade, the Allied army in Macedonia had
reached a total of about 350,000 men, of whom, owing to
the summer heats and the Vardar marshes, some 210,000
were down with malaria.^ Nevertheless, under pressure
from home and against his own better judgment,- General
Sarrail began an offensive (10 August). As might have
been foreseen, this display of energy afforded the Bulgars
an excuse, and the demobilization of the Greek forces an
opportunit)^ for a fresh invasion. M. Zaimis, in view of
the contingency, imparted to General Sarrail his Govern-
ment's intention to disarm the forts in Eastern Macedonia,
so that he might forestall the Bulgars by occupying them.
But again, as in May, the Frenchman treated the friendly
hint with scornful suspicion.^ There followed a formal
notice from the German and Bulgarian Ministers at Athens
to the Premier, stating that their troops were compelled,
by military exigencies, to push further into Greek territory,
and repeating the assurances given to his predecessor on
the occupation of Fort Rupel.^
The operation was conducted in a manner which belied
these assurances. Colonel Hatzopoulos, acting Command-
ant of the Fourth Army Corps, reported from his head-
quarters at Cavalla that the Bulgarian troops were
accompanied by irregular bands which indulged in murder
* Du Fournet, p. 99.
2 Caclamanos, Paris, 1/14 June, 1916.
^ M. Zaimis's deposition on oath at the judicial investigation
instituted by the Venizelos Government in 1919. Cp. Sarrail,
p. 152.
•* White Book, Nos. 158-60.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 109
and pillage ; that the inhabitants of the Serres and Drama
districts were fleeing panic-stricken ; and that the object
of the invaders clearly was, after isolating the various
Greek divisions, to occupy the whole of Eastern Macedonia.
He begged for permission to call up the disbanded reservists,
and for the immediate dispatch of the Greek Fleet. But
the Athens Government vetoed all resistance, and the
invasion went on unopposed.^ B3' 24 August the Bulgars
were on the outskirts of Cavalla.
Truth to tell, the real authors of the invasion were the
Allies and M. Venizelos, who, by forcing Greece to disarm
before the assembled enemy, practically invited him.
But it was not to be expected that they should see things
in this light. They, as usual, saw in them a new " felony "
— yet another proof of King Constantine's desire to assist
the Kaiser and defeat M. Venizelos- — and acted accordingly.
M. Venizelos opened the proceedings with a meeting
outside his house on Sunday, 2-] August, when he delivered
from his balcony a direct apostrophe to the King — an
oration which may have lost some of its dramatic effect
by being read out of a carefully prepared manuscript, but
which on that account possesses greater documentary
value :
" Thou, King, hast become the victim of conscience-
less counsellors who have tried to destroy the work accom-
phshed by the Revolution of 1909, to bring back the
previous maladministration, and to satisfy their passionate
hate for the People's Chosen Leader. Thou art the
victim of military advisers of limited perceptions and of
oligarchic principles. Thou hast become the victim of
thy admiration for Germany, in whose victory thou hast
beheved, hoping through that victory to elbow aside our
^ White Book, Nos. 161-5.
" " The King, having no illusions as to the result of an election,"
says M. Venizelos, in the New Europe, 29 March, 191 7, " organized,
in connivance with the Germans and Bulgarians, the invasion of
Western and Eastern Macedonia. As the Liberals thus lost about
sixty seats, the King might hope ... to secure at least some sem-
blance of success at the coming elections." On the first opportunity
that the people of Macedonia, Eastern and Western alike, had of
expressing their opinion — at the elections of 14 Nov., 1920 — they
did not return a single Venizehst. — See Reuter, Athen3, 15 Nov.,
1920.
110 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
free Constitution and to centre in thy lumds the whole
authority of the State." After enumerating the disastrous
results of these errors — " instead of expansion in Asia
Minor, Thrace, and Cyprus, a Bulgarian invasion in
Macedonia and the loss of valuable war material" — the
orator referred to the elections and warned the King that
persistence in his present attitude would involve danger
to the throne : " The use of the august name of Your
Majesty in the contest against the Liberal Party introduces
the danger of an internal revolution." The discourse
ended with another scarcely veiled menace to the King :
"If we are not listened to, then we shall take counsel as
to what must be done to rescue all that can be rescued
out of the catastrophe which has overtaken us."^
It was not an empty threat. The Chief spoke on
Sunday, and on Wednesday his followers at Salonica rose
up in revolt and, supported by General Sarrail, took
possession of the public offtces, set up a revolutionary
committee under a Cretan, and launched a war proclama-
tion for Macedonia on the side of the Entente. The
Royalist troops, after some fighting, were besieged in their
barracks, starved into surrender, and finally shipped off
to the Piraeus, while many civil and ecclesiastical personages
were thrown into prison. The French General received
notice that M. Venizelos himself would arrive on 9 Sep-
tember to take command of the movement.*
Concurrently with this first product of the plot hatched
between M. Venizelos and M. Guillemin in May, was
carried on the more orthodox mode of action inaugurated
by the Allied Governments in June. At the news of the
Bulgarian invasion, the French Minister at Athens felt or
feigned unbounded fear — tout etait d redonbtcr : even a
raid by Uhlans to the very gates of the capital — and
asked Paris for a squadron to be placed at his disposal.
Paris did what it could. On 26 August Admiral Dartige
du Fournet was ordered to form a special squadron and
proceed against Athens according to the plans drawn up
1 For the Greek original, see the He-speria, 1 Sept., igi6. A
much longer text, apparently elaborated at leisure, with a colourless
Enghsh translation, was published by the Anglo-Hellenic League.
2 S.arrail, pp. 152-4 ; Official statement by the Revolutionary
Committee, Renter, Salonica, 31 Aug., 1916.
GREECE AND TlIE .\LLIES 111
in June. He immediately left Malta at the head of thirty-
four ships, and on the 28th arrived at Milo, where he
found a British contingent of thirty-nine ships awaiting
him. The joint armada thus formed was believed to be
strong enough to preclude all danger of resistance. For
all that, every precaution was taken to secure to it the
advantage of a surprise, though in vain : its size and the
proximity of its objective rendered secrecy impossible.
Four days were wasted in idleness — a delay due to
England's scruples. But at last all was ready ; and on
the morning of i September the AlHed Fleet stood out
to sea : seventy-three units of every description, the big
ships in single file, flanked by torpedo-boats, steaming
bravely at the rate of fifteen knots, and leaving behind
them a track of white-crested waves that stretched to the
very edge of the horizon : le coitp d'ceil est iynpressionant .
All arrangements for battle had been made, and each
contingent had its special role assigned to it : only the
Intelligence Services, being otherwise occupied, had faikd
to furnish any information about Greek mines and sub-
marines. It was therefore necessary to be more than
ever careful. But the six hours' voyage was accomplished
safely, and not until the armada cast anchor at the mouth
of the Salamis Strait did it meet with a tangible token of
hostility. The Greek Admiral commanding the Royal
Fleet before the arsenal of Salamis — a force composed of
two ironclads, one armoured cruiser, eighteen torpedo-boats
and two submarines — failed to bid the Alhes welcome : a
breach of international rules which was duly resented and
remedied.
The expedition had for its objects : (i) To seize a dozen
enemy merchantmen which had taken refuge since the
beginning of the War in the harbours of Eleusis and the
Pirfeus ; (2) to obtain the control of Greek posts and
telegraphs ; (3) to procure the expulsion of enemy propa-
gandists, and the prosecution of such Greek subjects as
had rendered themselves guilty of compUcity in corruption
and espionage on the wrong side.
Of the first operation, which was conducted to a success-
ful issue that same evening " with remarkable activity "
by one of Admiral Dartige's subordinates, no justification
was attempted : we needed tonnage and took it. The
112 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
pretext for the second was that the Allies had heard
" from a sure source " that their enemies were furnished
by the Hellenic Government with miUtary information.
So serious a charge, if made in good faith, should have
been supported by the clearest proofs. Yet even Admiral
Dartige, whose disagreeable duty it was to prefer it,
bitterly complained that " he never received from Paris a
single proof which could enlighten him." On the other
hand, he did receive abundant enlightenment about the
"sure source" : the Russian Minister needed to send a
cipher message to the American Embassy at Constantinople
which was entrusted with Russian interests, and, the
Hellenic Government readily agreeing to transmit it
through its Legation at Pera, Prince Demidoff, with the
consent of his Entente colleagues, proceeded to make use
of the Athens wireless for that purpose. Witliin forty-
eight hours the Admiral received from Paris an excited
telegram asking him what measures he had taken to
prevent the Hellenic Government from " violating its
engagements." The rebuke, explains the Admiral, was
the result of a sensational report from the head of the
French Secret Intelhgence at Athens, denouncing the
above transaction as an example of " the bad faith of the
Greeks." On this pretext all the means by which the
Hellenic Government could communicate with its repre-
sentatives abroad and reply to the attacks of its enemies
passed under the Alhes' control.
Somewhat less neat were the methods adopted to secure
the third object of the expedition. The Secret Services
had compiled a voluminous register of undesirable persons
out of which the}^ drew up a select list of candidates for
expulsion and prosecution. Unfortunately, despite their
industry, it teemed with embarrassing errors : individuals
put down as Germans turned out to be Greeks ; and the
suspects of Greek nationahty included high personages,
such as M. Streit, ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs, General
Dousmanis and Colonel Metaxas, ex-Chiefs of the General
Staff, and so on. At last an expurgated list was approved
and carried out summarily. ^ Some of the criminals
escaped punishment by transferring their services from the
German to the French and British propagandas ; for,
^ Du Fournet, pp. 99-104, 122-4, 127, 129.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 118
while to intrigue with the former was to commit a crime,
to intrigue with the latter was to perform a meritorious
deed.
There the Alhes and M. Venizelos stopped for the moment,
hoping that Rumania's entry into the War, which had
just taken place, would induce Greece to do likewise.
CHAPTER XI
RUMANIA'S policy had always been regarded by
the Greeks as of capital importance for their own ;
and as soon as she took the field, King Constantine,
though suffering from a recrudescence of the malady that
had nearly killed him in the previous year, set to work to
consider whether her adhesion did not make such a differ-
ence in the military situation as to enable him to abandon
neutrality. Two or three days before the arrival of the
Allied Fleet he had initiated conversations in that sense
with the Allied Ministers.^
Simultaneously the question of a waj- Government came
up for discussion ; the actual Cabinet being, by order of
the Allies, a mere business Ministry charged only to carry
on the administration until the election of a new Parliament.
Two alternatives were suggested. The first, which found
warm favour in Entente circles, was that M. Zaimis should
lay down the cares of of&ce and make place for M. Venizelos.
Constantine was advised to " bend his stubborn will to
the inevitable and remain King of the Hellenes " — that is,
to become an ornamental captain — by abandoning the
ship of State to the management of the wise Cretan. " It
is now possible," the homily ran, " that the precipitation
of events will prevent the return of M. Venizelos by the
voice of the electorate." But that did not signify:
" M. Venizelos can count on the backing of nine-tenths
of the nation, given a semblance of Royal support."* In
less trenchant language, the British Minister at Athens
expounded the same thesis.
But Constantine showed httle incHnation to perform
this noble act of self-effacement. On no account would
1 See Constantine I and the Greek People. By Paxton Hibben,
an American journalist who took part in these diplomatic transac-
tions, pp. 281-90.
2 See Crawfurd Price, Athens, i Sept., in the Pall Mall Gazette.
15 Sept., 1916.
114
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 115
he have a dictator imposed upon him to shape the fortunes
of Greece according to his caprice, unfettered by " military-
advisers of hmited perceptions." If Greece was to have
a dictator, the King had said long ago, he would rather be
that dictator ; though he had no objection to a Cabinet
with a Venizelist admixture. In fact, he insisted on
M. Venizelos accepting a share in the responsibility of war,
either by himself sitting in the Cabinet or by permitting
three of his friends to represent him in it. " It will not
do," he said frankly, " to have his crowd standing out,
trying to break up the army and making things difficult
by criticizing the Government."^
The other alternative was that M. Zaimis should be
invested with political functions ; but for this the consent
of the Alhes and of their proteg^ was needed. The latter,
in his oration of 27 August, had magnanimously declared
himself willing, provided his policy were adopted, to leave
the execution of it in the hands of M. Zaimis, whose
honesty and sincerity remained above all suspicion :
" the Liberal Party," he had said, " are prepared to back
this Cabinet of Affairs with their pohtical authority."
On being asked by M. Zaimis to explain precisely what he
meant, M. Venizelos broached the subject of elections.
As already seen, he and the Allies had reason to regret
and to elude the test which they had exacted. It was,
therefore, not surprising that M. Venizelos should stipulate,
with the concurrence of the Entente Ministers, that the
elections now imminent be postponed to the Greek
Kalends.^ By accepting this condition, M. Zaimis ob-
tained a promise of support ; and straightway (2 Sept.)
proceeded to sound London and Paris.
Before making any formal proposal, he wanted to
know if the Western Powers would at least afford Greece
the money and equipment which she required in order to
prepare wdth a view to eventual action. England wel-
comed these overtures, convinced that thus all misunder-
standings between Greece and the AlHes would vanish ;
^ Paxton Hibben, p. 2S9.
^ " La question de la dissolution de la Chambre fut icartie. . . .
De plus tout faisait supposer que de nouvelles Elections ne seraient pas
favorables au parti venizSliste, dont la cause itait si intimement Hie
d, la nCtre." — Du Fournet, pp. 121-2 ; Paxton Hibben, pp. 278-9,
306-7.
11(3 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
but, before giving a definite reply, she had to communicate
with France. France manifested the greatest satisfaction ;
but M. Briand urged tliat there was no time for negotia-
tions : the vital interests of Greece demanded immediate
action : she should hasten to make a formal declaration
without delay ; after which he would do all that was
necessary to pro\dde her, as soon as possible, with money
and material. M. Zaimis in his very first dispatch had
said : " Unfortunately the state of our finances and of
our militar}^ organization does not permit us to think of
immediate action : we need a certain delay for prepara-
tion " ; and all the exhortations of M. Briand to leap
first and look afterwards failed to move him. Besides
the matter of equipment — a matter in which the Entente
Powers, owing to their own necessities, had been the
reverse of liberal to their small alhes, as Belgium and
Servaa had aheady found, and Rumania was about to
find to her cost — there was another point Greek statesmen
and strategists had to weigh very carefully before com-
mitting themselves : would Rumania co-ordinate her
military action with theirs ? Unless she were inclined and
able to divert enough forces from the Austro-Hungarian
to the Bulgarian frontier, her entry into the War could
not be of any help to them. So, after nine days' corre-
spondence, we find M. Zaimis still wTiting : "When the
English answer arrives, the Roj^al Government will take
account of it in the examination in which it will engage
before taking a definite decision — a decision which "wdll be
subordinated to its military preparations and to the
course of war operations in the East."^
Directly afterwards (ii Sept.) M. Zaimis resigned " for
reasons of health." These reasons convinced no one :
everyone agreed in ascribing his withdrawal to his discovery
that he was the victim of duplicity ; but as to whose
duphcity, opinions differed. According to M. Venizelos,
while the conversations about entering the War went on,
King Constantine, in consequence of a telegram from the
^ Zaimis to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 20 Aug./2
Sept.; Rome, Bucharest, Petrograd, 29 Aug./ii Sept. Romanes,
Paris, 20 Aug./2 Sept., 22 Aug./4 Sept., 25 Aug./y Sept.,
26 Aug./8 Sept. Gennadius, London, 22 Aug./4 Sept., 25 Aug./7
Sept., 1916.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 117
Kaiser assuring him that within a month the Germans
would have overrun Rumania and flung Sarrail's army
into the sea, and asking him to hold out, reverted to the
policy of neutrahty ; and M. Zaimis, realizing that he was
being fooled, refused to play the King's game and resigned. ^
For this statement we have M. Venizelos's authority ;
and against it that of M. Zaimis, who, on hearing from
Paris that his resignation gave rise to the supposition that
the old policy had prevailed, replied : " My impression
is that the Cabinet which will succeed me will not quit
the hne of policy which I have pursued."^
Another account connected the fall of the Cabinet with
an incident which occurred at that critical moment and
strained the situation to the utmost. In the evening of
9 September, as the Entente Ministers held a conference
in the French Legation, a score of scallywags rushed into
the courtyard, shouting " Long live the King ! Down with
France and England I " fired a few revolver shots in the
air, and bolted, Immediatel}^ M. Zaimis hastened to the
Legation and expressed his regrets. But that did not
suffice to placate the outraged honour of the French
Repubhc. Despite the objections of his colleagues,
M. Guillemin had a detachment of bluejackets landed to
guard the Legation ; and next day a Note was presented
to the Greek Premier demanding that the perpetrators
of this grave breach of Liternational Law should be
discovered and punished, and that all Reservists' leagues
should instantly be broken up. It was even proposed
that the King should be asked to issue a Proclamation
disavowing and condemning the demonstration. Inquir}^
proved that the demonstration was the work of agents
provocateurs in the pay of the French Secret Service which
acted in the interest of M. Venizelos.
Wliereupon, M. Zaimis, reahzing that the negotiations
he was trying to conduct could not be sincere on the part
of the French, begged to be relieved of his mandate.
The King was loth to let him go. The British Minister
was equally upset, and added his plea to that of the
Sovereign. M. Zaimis said that, if M. Guillemin disavowed
^ The New Europe, 29 March, 1917.
* Romanos, Paris, 31 Aug./i3 Sept. ; Zaimis, Athens, 1/14
Sept., 1916.
118 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
the intrigue and displayed a willingness to continue the
negotiations in a spirit of candour, he would remain ; but
M. Guillemin could not bring himself to go so far.^
Whatever may be the truth in this matter — for, owing
to lack of documentary evidence, it is impossible fully to
ascertain the truth — the whole position, for a man of
M. Zaimis's character, was untenable : if sense of duty
had prompted him to take up the burden, common-sense
counselled him to lay it down. So he resigned ; and the
fat was once more in the fire — and the blaze and the stench
were greater than ever ; for his resignation synchronized
with another untoward event.
Colonel Hatzopoulos with his own and the Serres
Division had for some time past been isolated at Cavalla
— the Bulgars occupying the forts on one side, while the
British blockaded the harbour on the other. Suddenly,
upon a false report that King Constantine had fled to
Larissa and Venizelos was master at Athens, the demeanour
of the Bulgars, which had always been harsh, became
thoroughly hostile. They strengthened their outposts,
cut off the food supplies that came from Drama and Serres,
and, on 6 September, demanded that the heights immedi-
atety above the town still held by the Greeks should be
abandoned to them, on the plea that otherwise they would be
unable to defend themselves in case of an Entente landing :
refusal would be considered an unfriendly act. As his
orders forbade resistance. Colonel Hatzopoulos had no
choice but to yield. Thus the Greeks were reduced to
absolute helplessness ; and their isolation was completed
on 9 September, when British sailors landed and destroyed
the wireless station.
The worst was yet to come. Next m.orning (lo Sept.)
a German officer peremptorily notified Colonel Hatzopoulos
on the part of Marshal von Hindenburg that, as the Greek
troops scattered over Eastern Macedonia obstructed the
operations of the Bulgarian arm\', the}- should all be
concentrated at Drama. Colonel Hatzopoulos, perceiving
that compliance meant captivity in the hands of the
Bulgars, asked that as his instructions were that all the
troops should concentrate at Cavalla, and as he could not
act otherwise without orders from the King, he might be
1 Paxton Hibben, pp. 313-19; Du Foumet, pp. 119-21, 129.
GREECE AND THE AXLIES 119
allowed to send a messenger to Athena via Monastir.
This being refused on the ground that the journey would
take too long, he pleaded his inability to decide about so
grave a matter on his own initiative, but must call a
council of the principal officers. Meanwhile, in order to
avoid capture by the Bulgars, he asked if, should they
decide to surrender, Hindenburg would guarantee their
transportation to Germany with their ai"ms. The German
promised to communicate with headquarters and to let
him know the answer on the following morning.
Evidently the invaders, who would formerly ha\'e been
more than content with the withdrawal of the Greek
forces, were now — in violation of the pledges given to
Athens by the German and Bulgarian Governments —
resolved on making such withdi'awal impossible. It is
not hard to account for this change. The pledges were
given in the belief that Greece would continue neutral.
This behef had been shaken not only by the Venizehst
movement, but more severely still by M. Zaimis's soundings
of the Entente Powers. The Greek Premier had from the
first insisted on secrecy, stating among the main reasons
which rendered absolute discretion imperative, " the
presence in part of our territory of the eventual adversaiy,"
and " the need to extricate two divisions and a large
quantit}/ of material" from their grip.^ Nevertheless,
the Entente Press gloried in the hope that the Allies would
soon have the only non-behigerent Balkan State fighting
on their side, and the principal Entente news agency
trumpeted abroad M. Zaimis's confidential conversations. *
Hence the desire of the Germano-Bulgars to prevent the
escape of men and material that might at any moment
be used against them.
On the other hand, the Greek officers' council decided
1 Zaimis to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 20 Aug./2 Sept.,
1916. All his dispatches are marked " strictly confidential and to
be deciphered by the Minister himself." The replies are to be
addressed to him personally, and for greater security, must be
prefaced by some meaningless groups of figures.
2 See messages from the Athens Correspondents of The Times and
the Daily Chronicle, 3 Sept. ; Reuter, Athens, 9 Sept., 1916. In
view of the strict censorship exercised during the war and in view
of the Franco-Venizelist anxiet}' to rush Greece into a rupture
these indiscretions can hardly be considered accidental.
120 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
to tr}' first every means of escape, and only if that proved
impossible to comply with the German demand on condition
that they should be taken to Germany and not be left in
the hands of the Bulgars. Accordingl}^ Colonel Hatzo-
poulos addi^essed a most earnest appeal to the British for
vessels to get his men away to Volo or the Pir<eus, and,
having received a promise to that effect, he secretly
arranged for flight. In the night of lo September all the
men with their belongings gathered on the sea-front ready
to leave. But they reckoned without the partisans of
M. Venizelos in their midst. One of them, the Comman-
dant of the Serres Division, a month ago had informed
General Sarrail that he would fight on the side of the
Allies,^ and another on 5 September, in a nocturnal meeting
on board a British man-of-war, had proposed to kidnap
Colonel Hatzopoulos, arm volunteers, and attack the
Bulgars with the aid of Alhed detachments landed at
Cavalla. His proposal having been rejected, it was agreed
that all " patriotic " elements should be transported to
Salonica. In pursuance of this agreement, only those
were allowed to embai'k who were willing to rebel. Those
who refused to break their oath of allegiance to their King
were turned adrift. Some tried to gain the island of Thasos,
but their boats were carried to the open sea and capsized,
drowning many, the rest got back to the shore in despair.
As a last hope of escape. Colonel Hatzopoulos begged
the British na^-al authorities, who controlled all means of
communication between Cavalla and Athens, to transmit
to his Government a message asking if he might surrender
to the British and be interned in the isle of Thasos. The
message was duly transmitted through the British Legation
on II September, and in reply the Greek Minister of War,
after an understanding with the British authorities, ordered
him through the same channel to embark at once with all
his men and, if possible, material for Volo, on Greek ships
by preference, but if such were not available, on any other
ships. Whether these orders were never forwarded, or
whether they reached their destination too late, is not
quite clear. It is certain, however, that during the critical
hours when the fate of the unhappy soldiers hung in the
balance, the British Fleet did not permit embarkation
1 Sarrail, p. 152.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 121
except to the few who joined the Rebellion. ^ For the
loyal majority there was nothing left but the way to Drama.
Nor was any time allowed for vacillation. When, in
the morning of ii September, Colonel Hatzopoulos met
the German officer, the latter handed to him a telegram
from Hindenburg, guaranteeing the transport of the
Greeks to Germany with their arms, where they would be
treated as guests. He added that the departure from
Cavalla would not be enforced for the present. But in
the afternoon he intimated that this was due to a mis-
understanding, and that they should leave the same night.
Their efforts to escape had obviously become known to
the Germans, who, taking no chances, imposed immediate
depaiture under threat to cancel Hindenburg's guarantee.
Thus, the two Greek divisions were under compulsion hud-
dled off to Drama, whence, joined by the division stationed
there, they were taken to Germany and interned at Goerlitz. ^
Nothing that had hitherto happened served so well to
blacken the rulers of Greece in the eyes of the Entente
publics, and the mystery which enveloped the affair
facilitated the propagation of fiction. It was asserted
that the surrendered troops amounted to 25,000 — even
to 40,000 : figures which were presently reduced to " some
8,000 : three divisions, each composed of three regiments
of 800 men each." The surrender was represented as made
by order of the Athens Government : King Constantine,
out of affection for Germany and Bulgaria, and hate of
1 King Constantine has publicly taxed the Allies with not for-
warding the orders (see The Times, 8 Nov., 1920). On the other
hand, there is on record a statement by Vice-Consul Knox that the
orders were forwarded from Athens and that he himself delivered
them at Cavalla. Cp. Admiral Dartige du Fournet : " Au moment
ou les Grecs virent les Bidgares en marche sur Cavalla, Us voulurent
embarquer leiirs troupes et leur matiriel. L'aniiral anglais qui
commandait en mer Egie leur refusa son concours, espirant sans
doute les determiner a se difendre. Quand, se rendant un comple
plus exact de la situation, il donna son assentiment a cette Svacuation.
11 6tait trop tard : les Bulgares entraient A Cavalla le jour meme."
— Du Fournet, p. 151.
2 My chief sources of information concerning this event are a
Report by Col. Hatzopoulos to Marshal von Hindenburg, dated
" Goerlitz, 13/26 Oct., 1916," and another report drawn up at
Athens in July, 192 1, from the records of the judicial investigation
instituted by the Venizelos Government in 1919, including the
evidence of the British Vice-Consul G. G. Knox.
122 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
France and England, had given up, not onl}- rich territories
he himself had conquered, but also the soldiers he had
twice led to victorj'.
In point of fact, as soon as the Athens Government
heard of the catastrophe — and it did not hear of it until
after the arrival of the In-st detachment in Germany — it
addressed to Berhn a remonstrance, disavowing the step
of Colonel Hatzopoulos as contrary to his orders, and
denj'ing German3''s right to keep him as contrary to
International Law : " for Greece being in peaceful and
friendly relations with Germany, the Greek troops can
neither be treated as prisoners of war nor be interned,
internnient being only possible in a neutral countr5% and
only with regard to belligerent troops — not vice versa."
The dispatch ended with a request that " om' troops with
their arms and baggage be transported to the Swiss frontier,
whence they may go to some Mediterranean port and re-
turn to Greece on ships which we shall send for the purpose." ^
Berlin answered that she " was ready to meet the desire
of the Greek Government, but actual and effective guaran-
tees would have to be given that the troops under German
protection would not be prevented by the Entente Powers
from returning to their fatherland, and would not be
punished for their loyal and neutral feeling and action." ^
This because the Entente press was angrily denouncing
the step as a " disgraceful desertion " and asking " with
what ignominious penalty their War Lord has visited so
signal and so heinous an act of mutiny, perjury, and
treason on the part of his soldiers "' — the soldiers who
went to German}^ precisely in order to avoid committing
an act of mutin}/, perjury, and treason. Truly, in time
of war words change their meaning.
1 White Book, No. 173.
* Telegram from Berlin reported by Reuter'a Amsterdam Corre-
spondent, 23 Sept., 1916. I find this confirmed by a dispatch from
the Greek Minister at Berlin (Theotckis, Berlin, 18/31 Oct.,
1916), in which he gives an account of his elforts to obtain from the
German Government the return of the troops and restitution of
the war material, as well as the Greek officers' protests to Hinden-
burg and Ludendorff against the pressure under which they had
been hurried from Cavalla. It is to be regretted that M. Venizelos
did not find room for this document and for Col. Hatzopoulos's
illuminating Report in his White Book.
^ Leading article iu The Times, 19 Sept., 1916.
CHAPTER XII
MEANWHILE the unfortunate King of Greece
was faced by a state of things which he himself
describes with admirable lucidity in a dispatch
to his brother Andrew, then in London, labouring, vainly
enough, to obtain a fair hearing for the Royalist side,
while another brother, Prince Nicholas, was engaged on a
similar mission at Petrograd. The document is dated
3/16 September, 1916, and runs thus :
" The resignation of the Cabinet of M. Zaimis, who
enjoyed my absolute confidence, as well as the unanimous
confidence of the country, and whom the Entente Govern-
ments declared to me that they surrounded with their
entire sympathy, has rendered the situation very difficult.
" I charged M. Dimitracopoulos to form a new Cabinet.
He declared himself ready to continue the conversations
opened recently by M. Zaimis in the hope of bringing them
to a happy conclusion. Before accepting definitel}', he
thought it necessary to sound the views of the Powers on
important questions of an internal order, and went to
the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, the British Minister,
whence he carried away a very clear impression that, not
only the coercive measures would not be raised before
mobilization, but that they might be intensified, notably
by direct interference in personal domestic questions, and
that, even after mobilization, the measures would be only
relaxed. As to the question of elections, after having
demanded by the Note of 8 (21) June the dissolution of
the Chamber and new elections, which we accepted, now
they demand that the elections shall not take place,
without, at the same time, allowing the existing Chamber
to meet. M. Dimitracopoulos has laid down his mandate.
" Under these conditions the situation becomes inextri-
cable. The military and naval authorities of the Entente
foment and encourage in the country a revolution and
jumed sedition, and they favour by every means the
123
124 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Salonica movement by continuing the vexatious measures
and restricting all freedom of thought and action. The
Entente Ministers paralyze all Government. Thus the
country is pushed towards anarchy.
" Such conduct not only conflicts with the assurances
which they have given us, but excludes all practical
possibility of reconsidering our policy freely to the end
of taking a decision in a favourable direction. For the
rest, Greece divided would not be of any use as an ally.
It is necessary that there should return in the country
comparative calm and the feeling of independence, indis-
pensable for taking extreme resolutions. It is necessary
that conlidence in the sympathy of the Entente should
be restored. A resolution to participate in the war taken
under present circumstances would run the risk of being
attributed to violence and of being received with mistrust.
More, that resolutions may be taken without danger of
disaster, there is need of circumspection and discretion, so
as not to provoke an attack from the Germano-Bulgars
who are in our territory, before we are read}' to lend real
assistance to the Entente. A more definite declaration
of principle, which would have to be kept secret in the
common interest, would be of no practical value.
" Under certain circumstances, rendering the partici-
pation of Greece useful and conformable to our interests,
I have already declared that I am ready to enter into the
war on the side of the Entente. I am ready to envisage
negotiations in this sense. But, before all, I need, that
I may be able to occup}' myself usefully and with a certain
mental calmness with foreign questions, to see comparative
quiet restored at home, and so to save the appearances of
liberty of action. In this I ask, for the sake of the common
interest, the Powers to give me their help.
" I have charged M. Calogeropoulos to form a Ministry :
he is equally animated by the best intentions towards the
Entente."
The new Premier, who had already held office with
distinction as Minister of the Interior and as Minister of
Finance, possessed every quahlication for the delicate task
entrusted to him. On the day of his accession The Times
Correspondent wrote of him : "In the Chamber he is
highly esteemed. Although he is a Theotokist, and
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 125
therefore anti-Venizelist, M. Calogeropoulos, who studied
in France, declared to me that ah his personal sympathies
are with the Entente. He is likewise a member of the
Franco-Greek League."^ In harmony with this character
was his programme : " The new Cabinet, inspired by the
same policy as M. Zaimis, is resolved to pursue it with
the sincere desire to tighten the bonds between Greece and
the Entente Powers." This declaration, made in every
Allied capital, was supplemented by a more intimate
announcement in Paris and London : " Sharing the views
which inspired the negotiations opened b}^ its predecessor,
the Royal Government is resolved to pursue them in the
same spirit."^
No sooner had M. Calogeropoulos spoken than M.
Venizelos set to work to cast doubts on his sincerity, with
remarkable success : " M. Venizelos does not believe that
the composition of the new Ministry permits of the hope
that a national pohcy will be adopted, since it springs
from a party of pro-German traditions,"^ — this ominous
paragraph was added by the Times Correspondent to
his report the same day. And next day the British
Minister, in an interview with the editor of a Venizelist
journal, said : " The situation is certainly not an agreeable
one. I have read in the papers the declaration of the
new Premier. What has surprised me is to find that
M. Calogeropoulos characterized his Ministry as a political
one, whereas in their last Note the Allies required that
Greece should be governed by a business Cabinet. This,
as you see, makes a distinct difference."* Simultaneously,
the Entente Press, under similar inspiration, reviled the
new Cabinet as pro-German, clamoured for M. Venizelos,
whom they still represented as the true exponent of the
national will, threatened King Constantine with the fate
of King Otho, and his country with " terrible and desperate
things."^
^ The Times, i8 Sept., 1916.
^ Carapanos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd,
3/16 Sept., igi6.
^ The Times, loc. cit.
* Exchange Tel., Athens, 17 Sept., 1916. Cp. Romanes, Paris,
5/18 Sept.
* See leading articles in The Times, 19 Sept., and the Morriing
Post, 20 Sept., 1916.
126 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
It was in such an atmosphere that M. Calogeropoulos and
his colleagues attempted to resume the conversations
which M. Zaimis had opened. Thej^ reaHzed that, since
elections and like legal methods no longer commended
themselves to the Allies, since they menaced the country
\\ith " terrible and desperate things," Greece might drift
into chaos at any moment. They were anxious to avoid
chaos. But how ? A bhnd acceptance of the VenizeUst
poUcy of an immediate rush into the War, without regard
to ways and means, might prove tantamount to burning
one's blanket in order to get rid of the fleas : while saving
Greece from the coercion of the French and the British,
it might expose her to subjugation by the Gemians and
the Bulgars : the plight of Rumania afforded a fresh
warning. They therefore adopted the only course open
to sane men.
On 19 September Greece formally offered to the Entente
Powers " to come in as soon as by their help she had
accomplished the repair of her military forces, within a
period fixed by common accord." But, " as her armed
intervention could not, ob\aously, be in the interest of
anyone concerned, unless it took place w^ith chances of
success, the Royal Government thinks that Greece should
not be held to her engagement, if at the time fixed the
Balkan theatre of war presented, in the opinion of the
Allies' General Staffs themselves, such a disequihbrium
of forces as the military weight of Greece would be insuffi-
cient to redress. "1
Russia received these advances with cordiality, her
Premier declaring to the Greek Minister at Petrograd that
she would be happy to have Greece for an ally, and that
the Tsar had full confidence in the sentiments of King
Constantine. He added that he would immediately
communicate \\dth Paris and London. ^ There was the
rub. French and British statesmen affected to regard
the offer as a ruse for gaining time : they could not trust
a Cabinet three members of which they considered to be
ill-disposed towards the Entente: a "national pohcy "
^ Carapanos to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 6/19 Sept.,
1916.
- Panas, Potrograd, 14/27 Sept., - '6.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 127
should be carried out by a " national Cabinet " — that if,
by M. Venizelos.^
While frustrating liis country's efforts to find a way out
of the pass into which he had intrigued it, the Cretan and
his partisans did not neglect other forms of activity. We
have seen that rebellion had already broken out at Salonica.
In Athens itself the walls were pasted with Venizehst
newspapers in the form of placards displaying headlines
such as these : " A LAST APPEAL TO THE KING ! "
" DRAW THE SWORD, KING, OR ABDICATE ! "
It was no secret that arms and ammunition were stored
in private houses, that the French Intelhgence Service
had a depot of explosives in a ship moored at the Piraeus,
and a magazine of rifles and grenades in its headquarters
at the French School of Athens.^ The Royalist journals
threatened the Venizelists with condign punishment for
their treasonable designs. The Venizehst journals, far
from denying the charge, rephed that they would be fully
justified in arming themselves against the hostile Reservist
Leagues. In short, the capital swarmed with conspirators,
but the guardians of public order were powerless, owing
to the proximity of the Allied naval guns, ready to enforce
respect for the Allied flags under whose protection the
conspiracy was carried on. By this time the French and
British detectives had usurped the powers and inverted
the functions of the police organs ;^ and the French and
^ Roraanos, Paris, 10/23 Sept. Cp. Reuter statement, London,
26 Sept., 1916. This view is crystallized in a personal dispatch
from the Greek Minister at Paris to the Director of Political Affairs,
at Athens : " L'appel an pouvoir par S.M. le Roi de M. Venizilos
parait au Gouvernement frangais le seul moyen de dissiper la mSfiance
que r attitude des conseillers de S.M . le Roi ontfait naitre dans I'esprit
des cercles divigeants d. Paris et d. Londres. . . . L'opinion publique
en France n' approuverait une alliance avec la Grice et les avantages
qui en decouleraient pour nous, que si I'homme politique qui incarne
I'idSe de la solidaritd des intirets franfais et grecs dtait appeld au
pouvoir." — Romanos to Politis, Paris, 29 Sept./i2 Oct., 1916.
* Du Fournet, p. 116. Small wonder that the honest sailor's
gorge rose at such proceedings : " Could I associate myself with
manoeuvres of this sort ? " he asks in disgust. " When German
arms and bombs were seized in the bag from Berlin to Christiania,
when similar things were discovered at Bucharest, and were detected
in the United States under Bernstorf's protection, the Allies mani-
fested their indignation. They were a hundred times right ; but
what was odious in America, was it not odious in Greece ? "
^ The British Intelhgence Service demonstrated its sense of
128 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
British agents, after fomenting those fatal differences
which divide and degrade a people, had developed into
directors of plots and organizers of sedition.
But, in spite of such encouragement, the capital — or,
indeed, any part of Old Greece — had never appealed to
M. Venizelos as a starting-point of sedition. He knew that
only in the recently acquired and as yet imperfectly
assimilated regions — regions under the direct influence of
the Alhes — he could hope to rebel with safety. His plan
embraced, besides Salonica, the islands conquered in 1912,
particularly his native Crete. In that home of immemorial
turbulence his friends, seconded by British Secret Service
and Naval officers, had found many retired bandits eager
to resume work. Even there, it is true, public opinion
was not strikingly favourable to disloyalty ; but the
presence of the British Fleet in Suda Bay had much of
persuasion in it.^
Our diplomacy did not openly commit itself. Sir
Francis Elliot still nursed the hope of effecting a reconciUa-
tion between the ex-PreiTiier and his King. When, in
August, a conference was secretly held at Athens between
M. Venizelos and a number of Cretan conspirators, the
latter carried back the depressing inteUigence that British
official sympathy with their project lacked the necessary
degree of warmth. And again, on 11 September, when
the British Consul of Canea went over to Athens with
some of those conspirators, he was ordered by the British
Legation to stay there, so as to avoid any suspicion of
comphcity. This attitude of correct reserve on the part
of the British Foreign Office, however, did not prevent
the British naval authorities on the spot from working
out, in concert with the insurgents, a plan of operations
under which some chieftains were to invest the coast towns
on the land side, while our men-of-war patrolled the sea
in their interest. ^
humour and shame by furnishing its secret agents with a formal
certificate of their identity to be presented at the central ofifice of
the Greek Pohce : one such patent of British protection was issued
to an ex-spy of Sultan Abdul Hamid who had also spent six months
in German pay. Besides the certificate, was issued a brassard,
which the rogue might wear to protect him from arrest when break-
ing the Greek Law on British account. Incredible, yet true. See
J. C. Lawson's Tales of Mgean Intyigue, p. 233.
1 Lawson, pp. 143-66. " Lawson, pp. 168-78.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 129
France, on the other hand, made no distinction between
diplomatic and naval action. On i8 September M.
Gnillemin informed Admiral Dartige du Fournet that
M. Venizelos was sailing for the islands, and orders were
given for a French escort. But at the last moment M.
Venizelos did not sail. He hesitated. The French Secret
Service urged the National Leader to lead, instead of being
prodded from behind ; but he resisted their pressure and
their plain speaking.^ When questioned by the Associated
Press Correspondent if there was any truth in the reports
that he was going to put himself at the head of the revolu-
tionary forces, he replied : "I cannot answer now. I
must wait a little while yet and see what the Government
propose to do."
It is possible that this was the reason why M. Venizelos
paused irresolute on the brink. It is possible that he
suffered, as the disrespectful Frenchmen hinted, from one
of those attacks of timidity to which he was subject in a
crisis. It is possible that the ambiguous attitude of
England damped his martial spirit. For the rest, to make
a revolution is a matter that may well give the strongest-
minded pause. What wonder if, reckless, obstinate, and
unscrupulous as he was, M. Venizelos, when faced with
the irrevocable, felt the need to weigh his position, to
reconsider whether the momentous step he was taking was
necessary, was right, was prudent ?
However, events soon put an end to his hesitation.
The decisive event — the hair which turned the scale —
according to M. Venizelos himself, was supplied, appro-
priately enough, by a barber. One day, whilst the Leader
of the Liberals wrestled with his soul, a friend called and
reported to him a talk he had just had with his hairdresser,
" a terrible VenizeUst, who spoke thus : ' We here, simple
folk, say that Venizelos bears a heavy responsibility : he
tells us we are going to the dogs. Eh, well then, why
doesn't he stop us ? ' This conversation shook me deeply.
My friend gone, I said to myself : ' Indeed, this barber
speaks wisely, and my hesitations to discharge my duty
to the end must vanish, because they may possibly spring
from purely egotistical motives. Sir, I said to myself,
having laid up from many struggles and many successes
^ Du Fournet, pp. 130-1.
9
130 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
a capital above the average, you don't wish to risk it and
think it better to sit quiet, choosing to enjoy the moral
satisfaction of seeing the fulfilment of your prophecies
rather than make an effort to prevent it.' "^ It is always
interesting to trace mighty events to trifling causes ; and
it would have been particularly pleasant to believe that
the destinies of Greece for once literally stood "on a
razor's edge."^ But we will do M. Venizelos the credit of
belie\'ing him less childish than he represents himself.
There were weightier tilings " to shake " him into a
decision.
On 20 September, when, according to plan, he was due
in Crete, the train laid there exploded. His friends had
come down from the hills thirsting for the blood of Greek
and IVIohammedan victims : should the massacre they
meditated take place, M. Venizelos would never leave
Athens alive. ^ The news was of a nature to compel him
at last to take the plunge ; and in the small hours of
25 September, the National Leader stole out of Greece on
a ship escorted by a French torpedo-boat. His flight had
been organized by the French Secret Service like a carnival
masquerade, on the painful details of which, says Admiral
Dartige, it would be better not to dwell.*
His advent in Crete had been so efficiently prepared by
the British Secret Service and naval officers — without
whom there would have been neither mutiny nor insurrec-
tion — that, on landing, M. Venizelos had nothing to do
but instal himself in the best hotel at Canea and proclaim
himself with his confederate Admiral Coundouriotis the
Provisional Government.^
Under the fostering care of the Allied men-of-war the
movement spread to Samos, Mytilene, Chios, Lemnos,
and Thasos, where the constitutional operations witnessed
in Crete were duly repeated. But all the other islands
and the mainland — that is, the whole of the Hellenic
Kingdom, ^vith the exception of the new territories —
^ Orations, p. 190.
2 " Now, to all of us it stands on a razor's edge : either pitifu
ruin for the Achaians or life." Homer, Iliad, X, 173.
3 Lawson, pp. 180-9.
* Du Fournet, p. 131.
^ Lawson, pp. 198-226.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 131
adhered steadfastly to the person and the pohcy of theii"
King. As for the armed forces of the Crown, Admiral
Coundouriotis had hoped by his prestige, deservedly high
since the Balkan wars, to bring away with him the whole
or a large part of the Fleet : he brought away only two
torpedo-boats and another small unit, the desertion of
which was effected by a trick, " for which," says the
French Admiral, " France would have cause to blush. "^
In itself the Venizelist movement, as a disruptive force,
was negUgible.2 But the co-operation of the French
Republic and the British Empire invested it with an
alarming significance.
M. Calogeropoulos and his colleagues who watched this
rising tempest anxiously did everything they could to
conjure it. Although to their offer no reply was given,
on hearing informally that the Entente Powers would
not accept the proffered alliance unless Greece declared
war on Bulgaria at once, they signified their willingness
so to do, if, content with that, the Entente would accord
Greece adequate military and financial assistance during the
struggle and support her territorial claims at the conclusion
of peace ; if, in addition, M. Briand deemed the Cabinet
question of immediate importance, they were prepared
to solve it definitely for the sake of restoring complete
harmony between Greece and the Entente Powers. ^
The authors of this message were given to understand
that the reply would be handed to King Constantine
himself, the Entente Governments declining to recognize
the actual Cabinet ; that it would be in the form of an
ultimatum, demanding that Greece should declare war on
Bulgaria within forty-eight hours unconditionally, after
which they promised to supply her with money and
munitions during the struggle and at the conclusion of
peace to take into account her territorial claims as far as
^ Du Fournet, p. 136.
2 A paragraph of the Debierre Report, adopted by the French
Senate on 21 Oct., 1916, may be quoted in this connexion : " La
revolution Salonicienne vue de pris, n' est Hen. Elle est sans raclue,
sans lendeniain probable. Venizelos est ires anioindri. La Grice,
dont les officiers et les soldats ne veulent pas se battre, est avec Con-
siayitin." — Mermeix, Le Commandcment Unique, Part II, p. 60.
3 Romanos, Paris, 14/27, 15/28 Sept. ; Carapanos to Greek
Legation, Paris, 15/28 Sept., 1916.
132 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
circumstances would permit ; meanwhile, they demanded
the formation of a new Ministry, and, failing compliance,
they threatened " most energetic measures." M. Briand
kindly added that he delayed the presentation of this
ultimatum in order to give His Majesty the advantage of
making a spontaneous gesture without the appearance of
compulsion.^
Whereupon (3 Oct.) INI. Venizelos at Canea was sounded
whether, if the Calogeropoulos Cabinet made place for one
ready to declare war on Bulgaria, he would insist on
presiding over such a Cabinet or would be satisfied with
being represented in it by some of his partisans.
These overtures may be regarded as a last attempt on
the part of Athens to take the Cretan at his word. For
M. Venizelos had never tired of professing his wiHingness
to support any Government which would adopt his poHcy
of prompt action : it was not personal power he hungered
after, but national prosperit}''. Even at the moment of
going to head a rebellion, he had not ceased to proclaim
his patriotic unselfishness.^ We have seen to what extent
hitherto his actions had accorded with his professions :
how adroitly he had maintained abroad the reputation,
without incurring the sacrifices, of magnanimity. Once
more he gave proof of the same adroitness :
" True to his previous declarations, M. Venizelos replied
that he was ready to give his support and that of his
party to a Government which would declare war on
Bulgaria, and that he asked neither to preside over such
a Government nor to be represented in it by his partisans.
As a patriot and a statesman, seeking only his country's
welfare," etc., etc., etc. But — " the principal followers
of M. Venizelos do not believe that this new step taken
by the authorities at Athens indicates a change in the
right direction in the councils of the Palace. They main-
tain that the idea behind this demarche is simply to gain
time. I have pressed M. Venizelos on this, and, although
he did not wish to appear to be as emphatic as his followers,
he had to admit to me that he had no illusions and that
he remained sceptical. If King Constantine is really
1 Romanos, Paris, 16/29, 17/30 Sept. ; Gennadius, London,
17/30 Sept., 1916.
^ See " Message from M. Venizelos," iu The Times, 27 Sept., 1916.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 133
sincere, he can give a proof which will allay all doubts.
Let him order a mobilization at once . . . and call in
M. Venizelos to form a new Government."^
King Constantine, instead of treating the Cretan as a
rebel, still wished to treat him as a responsible citizen, and
by his moderation to give him an opportunity of a decent
return to legal order. But he could not, even if he wished,
call to power a man in open revolt : by so doing he would
alienate the loyal majority without conciliating the
disloyal minority.
After thus burning the last boat that might have carried
him back to legahty, M. Venizelos took the first boat that
travelled in the opposite direction. He left Suda Bay on
5 October, amidst the cheers of the Allied squadrons,
bound for Salonica by way of Samos and Mytilene. At
Samos he received a fresh token of the approval with
which the Entente viewed his operations : the commander
of a British man-of-war, acting on instructions, officially
called on him and paid his respects. ^
And so he reached Salonica, took up his abode at the
royal residence, and with Admiral Coundouriotis and
General Danglis composed a Triumvirate which, having
appointed a Ministry, began to levy taxes and troops, and
to negotiate for a loan.
The metamorphosis of a Prime Minister into an insurgent
chief, though a remarkable phenomenon, is no matter
for surprise. I\I. Venizelos sprang from people among
whom insurrection formed the traditional method of
asserting political opinions. His father was a veteran of
the Greek Revolution of 1821, and passed most of his life
plotting. His grandfather is supposed to have been a
refugee of the earlier Greek revolt of 1770. ^ He himself
had grown up amidst vivid echoes of the Cretan Rebellion
of 1866. While contact with the frock-coated world of
^ The Daily Telegraph, 5 Oct., 19 16.
^ The Daily Telegraph, 7 Oct., 1916.
^ The authentic history of the Venizelos family begins with our
hero's father ; his grandfather is a probable hypothesis : the re-
moter ancestors with whom, since his rise to fame, he has been en-
dowed by enthusiastic admirers in Western Europe, are purely
romantic. In Greece, where nearly everyone's origin is involved
in obscurity, matters of this sort possess little interest, and M.
Venizelos's Greek biographers dwell only on his ascent.
13t GREECE AND THE ALLIES
modern Europe during the latter period of his career had
clothed him with a statesman's proper external circum-
stance, it had not eradicated the primitive instincts
implanted in him by heredity and fostered by environment.
Sechtion was in his blood, which perhaps explains the
flair — the almost uncanny /at> — he had for the business.
Nor did he lack experience. After sharing in one
Cretan insurrection against the Sultan in i8g6, he led
another against Prince George in 1905. This exploit —
known as the Therisos Movement — deserves special notice,
for it bears a curious and most instructive analogy to the
enterprise with which we are now dealing.
In 1899 M. Venizelos became a member of the first
Cretan Administration appointed by the High Commis-
sioner, Prince George — King Constantine's brother. The
status of the island was provisional, and the fulfilment
of the national desire for union \\dth Greece depended
partly on the poHcy of the Powers which had combined
to act as its Protectors, partly on the prudence of the
islanders themselves and of their continental kinsmen.
Such was the situation when, in 1901, INI. Venizelos suddenly
conceived the idea of turning Crete into an autonomous
principaUty. Prince George objected to the proposal,
arguing that neither in Crete nor in Greece would public
opinion approve it. M. Venizelos sounded the Hellenic
Government and the Opposition, and was told by both
that, from the standpoint of national interest and senti-
ment, his scheme was absolutely imacceptable. Neverthe-
less, he persevered and succeeded in forming a party to
support his views. It may be, as he affirmed, that his
scheme was a merely temporary expedient intended to
pave the way to ultimate union. But the Greeks, inter-
preting it as a proposal for perpetual separation, remained
bitterly hostile, and the fact that autonomy was known
to be favoured in certain foreign quarters deepened their
resentment. M. Venizelos was roandly denounced as a
tool of foreign Powers, and Prince George was accused of
comphcity, and threatened with the lot of a traitor unless
he dismissed him. The High Commissioner made use of
the right which the Constitution of the island gave him,
and M. Venizelos was dismissed (March, 1901).
A truceless war against the Administration and everyone
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 135
connected with it ensued. Prince George was attacked —
not directly, but through his entourage — as a born autocrat
holding in scorn the rights of the people, tyrannizing over
the Press, persecuting all those who refused to bow to
his will, aiming at the subversion of free institutions. At
first this campaign met with more success abroad than at
home. The Cretan people expressed its opinion by its
vote : among the sixty-four deputies elected to the
Chamber in 1903 there were only four Venizehsts.
His defeat did not daunt M. Venizelos, who, after a
brief repose, resumed operations. He hesitated at no
calumny, at no outrageous invention, to get even with
his adversaries. Charges of all kinds poured in upon the
Prince. Speeches which he had never made were attributed
to him, and speeches which he did make were systematically
misreported and misinterpreted. At last, in 1904, when
Prince George decided to visit the Governments of the
Protecting Powers in order to beg them to bring about
the union of Crete with Greece by stages, M. Venizelos,
dropping the scheme which had lost him his popularity,
rushed in with an vmcompromising demand for immediate
union, though he knew perfectly well that such a solution
was impracticable. The Cretans knew it, too. On finding
that they looked upon his change of creed with suspicion,
he resolved to seize by violence what he could not gain
by his eloquence. With some 600 armed partisans (out
of a population of 300,000) he took to the hills (March, 1905),
called for the convocation of a National Assembly to revise
the Constitution, and meanwhile urged the people to
boycott the impending elections. Despite his speeches and
his bravoes, only 9,000 out of the 64,000 electors abstained
from voting ; and most of them abstained for other
reasons than the wish to show sympathy with the
insurgents.
The High Commissioner wrote to the Powers at the
time : " If M. Venizelos was truly animated by the desire
to defend constitutional institutions, he would have come
before the electors with his programme and, whatever the
result, he would certainly have earned more respect as a
politician. But, instead of choosing the legal road to
power, he preferred to stir up an insurrection, disguising
his motives under the mask of ' The National Idea,' but,
13G GREECE AND THE ALLIES
as is proved by his o\\"n declarations, really inspired by
personal animus and party interest. It mattered little to
him how disastrous an effect this upheaval might have on
the national cause by plunging the country into civil war
or into fresh anarchy. Can anyone recognize in this way
of acting the conduct of a genuine and serious patriot ? "
M. Venizelos repelled these imputations, protesting that
his movement was no way directed against the Prince.
Yet it resulted in the departure of the Prince : the Powers
who went to Crete to restore order entered into relations
with the rebels ; the manner in which these intimacies
were carried on and the decisions to which they led made
the Prince's position untenable, and he gave up his Com-
missionership in 1906. Likewise M. Venizelos affirmed
that he had not stirred up an insurrection, but only headed
a spontaneous outbreak of popular discontent. Yet even
after his triumph he failed, in the elections of 1907, to
obtain a majority.^
The Therisos performance in every point — plot and
staging, methods and motives — was a rehearsal for the
Salonica performance. Would the denouement be the
same ? This question taxed M. Venizelos's dialectical
dexterity very severely.
At the outset he repudiated as a monstrous and maUcious
calumny the common view that his programme was to
march on Athens and to dethrone the King. His move-
ment was directed against the Bulgars, not against the
King or the Dynasty : " We are neither anti-royalist nor
anti-djTiastic," he declared, " we are simply patriots."
Only, after the liberation of Greece from the foreign
invaders, her democratic freedom should be assured by
a thorough elucidation of the duties and rights of the
Cro^vn — a revision of the Constitution to be effected through
a National Assembly. ^
So spoke M. Venizelos at the outset, partly because the
^ For one side of this affair see Memorandum de S.A .R. Le
Prince Georges de Grece, Haul Commissaire en Crete, aux Quatre
Grandes Puissances Protectrices de la Crete, 1905. The other side
has been expounded in many publications : among them, E. Veni-
zelos : His Life, His Work. By Costa Kairophyla, pp. 37-65 ;
Eleutherios Venizelos. By K. K. Kosmides, pp. 14-16.
fr 2 See The Times, -z-j Sept. ; The Eleutheros Typos, 23 Oct. (O.S.),
1916.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 137
Allies, who did not want to have civil war in the rear of
their armies, bade him to speak so,^ and partly because
he wished to give his cause currency by stamping upon it
the legend of loyalty. He realized that for the present
any suspicion that he wished to embark on a campaign
against King Constantine would be fatal, and by declaring
war only against the Bulgars he hoped to entice patriotic
citizens anxious to help their country without hurting
their sovereign. But when time proved the futility of
these tactics, the same M. Venizelos avowed that his
programme was, first to consolidate his position in Mace-
donia by breaking down resistance wherever it might be
encountered, and then, " when we had gathered our forces,
we meant to follow up our work, if need be by arms, on
the remainder of Greek territory." If he had not given
an anti-dynastic character to his enterprise, that, he
naively expla.ined, was " because the Entente had been
good enough to promise me their indispensable aid under
the express stipulation that the movement should not be
anti-dynastic." However, the error was not irreparable :
" After victory, grave internal questions will have to be
solved," he said. " King Constantine, who has stepped
down from the throne of a constitutional king to become
a mere party chief, must accept the consequences of the
defeat of his policy, just as every other defeated party
chief. "^
In other words, the Salonica sedition, though not solely
revolutionary, involved a revolution within certain limits.
M. Venizelos was far too astute to countenance the republi-
can chimeras cherished by some of his followers. Republi-
canism, he knew well, found no favour in Greece and
could expect no support from England. Therefore, with
the monarchical principle he had no quarrel : his hostility
was directed wholly against the person of the reigning
monarch. A prince pHant to his hand would suit M.
Venizelos. If he got the best of it, his avowed intention
was to treat King Constantine precisely as he had treated
King Constantine 's brother in days gone by.
We now understand Prince George's earnestness in
urging his brother, as long ago as May, 1915, to run before
1 Du Fournet, p. 176.
2 The New Europe, 29 March, 19 17.
188 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
the gale : he spoke from bitter experience of the Protecting
Powers and their protege.
It is seldom that history repeats itself so accurately ;
and it is more seldom still that the historian has the
means of tracing so sm-ely a rebel's progress. In most
cases it is hard to decide whether the hero was guided by
events which he could not have foreseen, or whether he
had from the first a clear and definite goal in view. In
the case of M. Venizelos this difficulty does not exist.
Each of his actions, as illuminated by his past, was a step
to an end ; and he has himself defined that end.
CHAPTER XIII
MVENIZELOS had unfurled the standard of
rebellion in the true spirit of his temperament
• and traditions. To him civil war had nothing
repulsive about it : it was a normal procedure — a ladder
to power. Naturally, he persuaded others, and perhaps
himself, that he acted purely with the patriotic intention
of devoting to the public benefit the power which, for that
purpose only, it became his duty to usurp. Moved by
the ambition to aggrandize Greece, he felt at liberty to
use whatever means might conduce to so desirable an end.
The sole question that troubled him was, whether this
old ladder would serve him as faithfully as in the past.
And once again the answer depended on the attitude of
the " Protecting Powers."
Those Powers had hitherto blundered in all their Balkan
deaUngs with depressing uniformity. First came the
mistake about Bulgaria. The hate of the Greeks for the
Bulgars was a psychological force which, properly esti-
mated and utilized, could without any difficulty have been
made to do our work for us. But that force was never
properly estimated by our diplomacy. The Entente
Governments, instead of enlisting it on their side, ranged
it against them ; thereby sacrificing Servia and estranging
Greece. To that initial error was added a second. Until
the truth could no longer be ignored, the AHies persisted
in the egregrious fallacy that the popularity of King
Constantine was as nothing compared with the popularity
of M. Venizelos — to our detriment. " Two years before,"
observes Admiral Dartige du Fournet, " all the Greeks
were the friends of France ; in October, 1916, two-thirds
of them were her enemies." That was the fact ; and,
according to the same witness — ^who described himself,
not without reason, as " a Venizelist by profession " — the
cause was this : " The mass of the people of continental
139
liO GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Greece was hostile to the Chief of the Liberals. When
that mass saw that M. Venizelos started a sedition and
that we supported him, it became plainly hostile to us."^
The Admiral mentions also German pressure, but he
rightly regards it as a subsidiary cause. The Germans
did little more than " blow on the fire kindled by our
own clumsiness and violences." Baron Schenck, the
director of the German propaganda at Athens, watched
our coercion of King Constantine with that apparent
indignation and secret joy which the faults of an enemy
inspire, and when expelled by the Allies, said that he did
not mind going : the Allies could be trusted to carry on
his mission. They did.
What their plan was will appear from their actions.
We cannot penetrate into the minds of men, and we
cannot always beUeve their words ; but their actions are
open to observation and speak more truly than their lips.
As soon as he settled at Salonica, M. Venizelos applied
to the Entente Powers for official recognition of his Provi-
sional Government. They refused him this recognition :
but instructed their Consuls to treat with the Provisional
Government " on a de facto footing " ;2 and, while pouring
cold water upon him wdth one hand, with the other they
gave him money. This mode of action was the result of
a compromise, achieved at the Boulogne Conference,
between France and her partners. A feeble and inconse-
quent way of doing things, no doubt. But to be consequent
and powerful, a partnership must be bottomed on some
common interest or sentiment ; and such in the Greek
question, as already explained, did not exist.
At Athens the action of the AlHes was less open to the
criticism of tameness.
After a life of three weeks passed in fruitless efforts to
enter into relations with the Entente Powers, even by
proposing to discard the Ministers obnoxious to them, the
Calogeropoulos Cabinet resigned (4 Oct.), and King Con-
stantine, having exhausted his stock of politicians, sought
a candidate for the Premiership in circles which, remote
from party intrigue, might have been thought immune
from suspicion. Professor Lambros, who accepted the
1 Du Fournet, pp. 132, 171.
^ The New Europe, 29 March, 191 7 ; The Times, 17 Oct., 1916.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 141
mandate (8 Oct.), was known as a grave savant, generally
esteemed for his kindly nature as much as for his intellec-
tual eminence and administrative capacity. But Professor
Lambros laboured under the universal disability of not
being a Venizelist. Therefore, he was " believed to be
Germanophile," and it was " questionable whether his
Cabinet will be recognized by the Entente Powers."^
However, in less than a week, he " estabhshed contact "
with their representatives. It was " contact " in a sense
of the term more familiar to soldiers than to statesmen.
On 10 October Admiral Dartige de Fournet resumed his
activities by launching on the Hellenic Government an
Ultimatum. Greece was summoned, within twenty-four
hours, to disarm her big ships, to hand over to him all
her light ships intact, and to disarm all her coast batteries,
except three which were to be occupied by the Allies. In
addition, the port of the Piraeus, the railways, and the
police were to be placed under Allied control.
The demand for her Fleet, Greece was told, arose from
uneasiness about the safety of the Allied armada — a
pretext that exposed itself : the Greek Fleet consisted of
only five battleships dating from 1891-2, except one whose
date was 1908 ; two cruisers, dating from 1911 and 1914 ;
and a microscopic light flotilla. " To see there a serious
danger, it would be puerile," says Admiral Dartige himself ;
and far from feeling elated at the success of the operation,
he tells us that he " suffered at being constrained by
events to use force against a neutral and weak nation."
But he had to do it : though not a matter to be proud of,
it was a precaution not altogether unjustifiable. He
could, however, neither justify nor qualify the other
measures. They involved, he says, a high-handed en-
croachment on the internal affairs of the country — an
abuse of power pure and simple : " We admitted officially
the right of Greece to neutrality, and yet we laid hands
upon part of her national life, even upon the secrets of
the private life of every Greek. It was the execution of
the plan which the admirals assembled at Malta had
repelled in March, 1916. Well might the Germanophiles
point out that Germany did not act thus in Denmark, in
Sweden, in Holland ; that a victor would not have imposed
^ The Times, dispatch from Athens, 8 Oct., 1916.
142 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
harder terms of armistice." These measures were entirely
the work of the French Government : the French Admiral
himself disapproved of them as much as did the Ministers
of England and Russia.^
The Hellenic Government could not be deceived by
pretexts which their very authors despised. But neither
could it argue A\dth persons accustomed to
" Decide all controversies by Infallible artillery,
And prove their doctrine orthodox By apostolic blows
and knocks."
It could only protest and submit.
The Hellenic people proved less discreet. What could
be the motive of such measures ? they asked. Were they
intended to prevent or to provoke troubles ? The answer
lay under their very eyes. From the moment when
M. Venizelos left Athens, the AlUes did everything they
could to assist his partisans in following the Leader to
Salonica. Their warships patrolled the coast picking up
rebels, and giving them a free passage : even entertaining
the more important among them as the personal guests
of the Commander-in-Chief on his flagship. But now they
took the movement openly under their direction. With
an excess of zeal which the British Minister deplored and
the French Admiral himself condemned, the French Secret
Ser\'ice at Athens organized convoys of insurgents which
defiled through the streets of the capital escorted by
French marines under French officers in uniform.^
The resentment of the Greeks was intense ; but the
consciousness of impotence served as a curb on their
emotions. It is true that one day, as AUied aeroplanes
flew over Athens, they were greeted with derisive shouts :
" Not here ; to BerUn ! " another day, as a band of rebels
were convoyed through the principal streets by the French,
the crowds gave vent to lively protests ; and every day
the newspapers told the champions of Libert}^ and Justice
what they thought of them so frankly that the French
Chief of the Police Control had to warn their editors to
desist on pain of suspension. But of active hostihty,
such as any western capital would have manifested in
similar circumstances, there was no sign at Athens. The
only impressive manifestations were manifestations of
1 Du Fournet, pp. 138-9, 141-3. ^ Du Fournet, pp. 133-5, 146-
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 143
loyalty to the King, who set his subjects the example of
self-restraint. At a review of the crews of the warships
taken by the French, he thanked them for their fidelity
and expressed the hope that they would soon be able to
return to their vessels. After this quiet ceremony, bodies
of citizens paraded the streets carrying portraits of their
sovereign.^
Had there been no popular demonstrations at all, one
can fancy M. Venizelos and the Allies pointing to that
fact as proof of their contention that the great majority
of the people remained VenizeHst. As it was, they derived
what profit they could from the opposite fact. The various
incidents were attributed by the Anglo-French and
Venizelist journals to German intrigue. The consolation
which the King administered to his sailors — men who had
so brilliantly disappointed the rebels' expectations by not
deserting — was twisted into a defiance of the Entente.
The bodies of peaceful demonstrators were exaggerated
into crowds of rioters. And so, " in the interests of public
order," Admiral Dartige proceeded to land reinforcements
for the police : 1,200 bluejackets. Some occupied the
town hall at the Piraeus and the railway stations ; some
went to the forts on the heights ; others were posted about
the harbour, or were told ofi to patrol the streets (16 Oct.),
while a detachment was quartered at Athens itself, in the
Zappeion— a large exhibition building within a few hundred
yards of the Royal Palace. ^
Under such circumstances the diplomatic intercourse
between the Entente and the new Greek Government
went on. M. Lambros declared that he intended to
continue his predecessor's policy of friendly relations with
all the belUgeients and of benevolent neutrality towards
the AlHes, dwelling on the fact that nearly everyone of
his predecessors had plainly stated Greece's willingness to
co-operate with the Entente on terms not contrary to her
own interests, and recalling that the Calogeropoulos
Ministry had set forth the conditions of co-operation, but
the Entente Governments had given no reply. So the
Premier spoke to the Entente representatives and asked
that the coercive measures might be brought to an end,
^ The Times, dispatch from Athens, i6 Oct., 1916.
^ Du Fournet, pp. 146-8.
144 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
expressing the fear lest, should these measures go beyond
a certain limit, their acceptance by Greece might become
very difficult, and emphasizing the sorrow which the
Greek people felt at seeing its independence fettered.^
England found this declaration satisfactory ; but before
answering it definitely, she must take counsel with her
allies. 2 France, by the mouth of j\I. Briand, pronounced
the allusion to friendly relations with all the belhgerents
unfortunate : she was unable to understand how Greece
could maintain friendly relations with Germany and even
with Bulgaria after the occupation of Eastern Macedonia. ^
And so, having taken counsel together, the Allies set
forth their views in a tardy reply to King Constantine's
last offer. The gist of it was contained in this phrase :
" The Greek Government has several times since the
beginning of the War offered to come in on our side ; but
its offers, and particularly the last one, were accompanied
by conditions which rendered them unacceptable." The
Entente Powers added that they did not want Greece,
unless she declared, on her own initiative, war against
Bulgaria. It was the only way to gain their confidence.*
In other words, Greece should take the field without any
agreement, so that she should have no claims either to
adequate support during the war or to compensations at
the conclusion of peace : nay, it was even hoped in Paris
and London that Bulgaria might yet be seduced from the
Central Powers, and in that case not only would Greece
gain nothing in Thrace, but might very likely lose a portion
of Macedonia.^ It was the old story — to which King
Constantine could never listen. He would suffer anything
rather than plunge his country into war wdthout even an
assurance of its territorial integrity. When at this juncture
a well-intentioned adviser warned him that his policy
might cost him his throne, he answered promptly : " I do
not care about my throne. I only think of Greece."^
1 Zalocostas to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd,
3/i6 Oct., 1916.
2 Gennadius, London, 6/19 Oct., 1916.
3 Romanos, Paris, 7/20 Oct., 1916.
* Gennadius, London, 10/23 Oct., 1916.
5 Romanes, Paris, 26 Aug./8 Sept., 1916 ; Cp. Deville, pp. 221.
foil. ; Du Fournet, p. 171.
^ P. E. Drakoulis, in The Times, 30 Nov., 1920.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 145
At the same time, there was little he would not do to
remove those fears and suspicions which were perpetually
pleaded as reasons for coercion. The surrender of the
Fleet had allayed once for all the AHies' uneasiness about
their forces at sea. There remained their uneasiness about
their forces on land. In spite of his repeated declarations
that under no circumstances would Greece take up a
hostile attitude, the King was credited with a treacherous
design — to mass in Thessaly 80,000 men, lay up munitions
and provisions, wait until the Allied Army should march
on Monastir, and then attack it from behind.^ After
reading M. Venizelos's own avowal of his intention to
follow up the conversion of Macedonia with an attack
on the rest of Greece, particularly Thessaly, ^ one hardly
needs to be told at whom King Constantine's precautions
were aimed.
Yet, wishing to prove his good faith in a practical manner,
the King called the British Minister and offered to reduce
his army to less than half by disbanding about 35,000 men
and to withdraw certain units from Thessaly. The British
Minister, delighted by this spontaneous offer, thanked the
King, expressing the hope that his action would be greatly
appreciated, that all mistrust would vanish, and that the
Powers would moderate their coercions. With a remark
from the King, that the one thing he would not tolerate
was a descent of rebels on Thessaly and the rest of Old
Greece, and that he would attack them if they appeared,
Sir Francis Elliot fully concurred.
Instead of the return which the King expected to this
spontaneous proof of his sincerity, he received (20 October)
an intimation that the Powers not only demanded what
he had already granted, but in addition things which he
could not possibly grant — the internment of the small
remnant of his army in the Peloponnesus and a surrender
of arms and war material equivalent to a complete dis-
armament. These measures, while exceeding all require-
ments for the security of the Allies, put the security of
Greece in danger by leaving her a prey to revolutionary
agitation. The King, therefore, begged the Powers not
1 Du Fournet, p. 149.
* The New Europe, 29 March, 191 7.
146 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
to insist on concessions which neither could he make nor
would his people let him make.^
Nothing, indeed, was better calculated to excite to the
highest degree the passions fermenting against the Allies
than an insistence on total disarmament at a moment when
M. Venizelos at Salonica and his partisans at Athens were
arming. Fortunately a mediator appeared in the person
of M. Benazet, a French Deputy and Reporter of the War
Budget, who was passing through Athens on his way to
Salonica to inspect the sanitary condition of the Army.
His connexions had brought him into touch with the most
influential leaders of both Greek parties ; and with the
sanction of M. Briand, procured through M. Guillemin,
who, himsell no longer received at Court, saw an advantage
in reaching it by proxy, he undertook to negotiate an
amicable an^angement between King Constantine and the
Entente.
M. Benazet 's idea was to obtain from the King not only
tangible pledges which would eliminate all possibility of
danger from the Allies' path, but also positive reinforce-
ments for them in arms and men ; and as a price he was
prepared to guarantee to Old Greece her neutrality, her
liberty in the management of her internal affairs, and her
immunity from aggression on the part of M. Venizelos.
Young, eloquent, and refined, the spokesman brought into
an environment corrupted by diplomatic chicanery a
breath of candour. His manner inspired and evoked
confidence. The King readily agreed, besides the reduc-
tion which he had already offered, to transfer the remainder
of his army to the Peloponnesus, to hand over to the
Allies a considerable stock of guns, rifles, and other war
material, and to allow all men who were released from their
military obligations, and all officers who first resigned their
commissions, to volunteer for service in Macedonia. M.
Benazet, on his part, made himself guarantor for the
French Government as to the pledges which the King
required in exchange.^
This agreement met, at least in appearance, with the
approval of M. Briand, who sent a telegram of congratula-
1 Zalocostas to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Rome, Petro-
grad, 7/20 Oct., 1916. Cp. Du Fournet, pp. 149-50.
* Du Fournet, pp. 152-4, and Appendix 5.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 147
tions to M. Benazet/ and with that of M. Guillemin,who
was at last received by the King. Both the French
Premier and his representative at Athens expressed them-
selves enchanted with the new turn of affairs, and even the
fire-breathing Head of the French Secret Service declared
that the result of the negotiation surpassed all hopes. As
to Admiral Dartige, he could not but rejoice at an arrange-
ment so consonant with his own ideas.* Thus all out-
standing differences seemed happily settled, and the
removal of mutual misunderstandings was celebrated by
inspired pens in Paris and London.^
The only discordant note was struck by the Venizelist
Press, which made no attempt to conceal its disappoint-
ment. And suddenly, just as the withdrawal of the royal
troops from the north was about to begin, the troops of the
Provisional Government attacked Katerini on the southern
frontier of Macedonia. M. Venizelos had dropped the
pose that his movement was directed solely against the
Bulgars : he marched on Old Greece. Did he by this
move try to force the hand of the Allies, as formerly by
bringing them to Salonica he had tried to force the hand
of the King ? And was he encouraged in this move by
those who were secretly opposed to an accommodation with
the King ? Admiral Dartige did not know. What he
did know was that this coup de force was designed to
compromise the arrangement with Athens ; and as he could
neither play nor appear to play a double game, he im-
mediately telegraphed to Salonica demanding the retreat
of the Venizelists. At the same time the King informed
the French and British Ministers that he could not with-
draw his troops from Thessaly until all danger was removed,
and asked them to do everything that depended on them to
remedy this state of things. Whereupon General Roques,
the French Minister of War then at Salonica, disavowed
the Venizelist action, and to prevent similar exploits in
future decided to create a neutral zone under French
occupation and administration. The Athens Government
wcis not pleased to see part of its territory passing into
French hands; but, after some demur, bowedto the decision.*
^ Du Fournet, p. 316.
* Du Fournet, pp. 155-6.
3 The Times, 28 Oct., i Nov., 1916.
* Zalocostas to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 12 Oct./
118 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Not so the Salonica Government. M. Venizelos keenly
resented this barrier to his impetuosity. The neutral
zone, he complained, by blocking off his access to Thessaly,
forbade all extension of his movement and prevented him
from " carrying with him three-fifths of Greece and levy-
ing important contingents such as would have made him
the absolute master of the country."^ But the Allies
were no longer to be deluded. They had discovered that
" the mass of the people of continental Greece was hostile
to the Chief of the Liberals." An extension of his move-
ment could only be effected by overwhelming force, and
as M. Venizelos had neither the men nor the arms required
for the enterprise, the Allies would have to provide both.
In other words, civil war in the rear of their armies would
not only jeopardise their security but entangle them in a
campaign for the conquest of Greece : a thing which they
could not afford to do even to oblige M. Venizelos. They
preferred a subtler and safer, if slower, way to the success
of their common cause.
Baulked in his design on continental Greece, M. Venizelos
demanded from Admiral Dartige the light flotilla in order
to promote his cause in the islands. But here, also, he met
A\dth a check. The Admiral had a different use for those
vessels in view. Many months back he felt the want of
patrol and torpedo-boats to cope with the growng sub-
marine peril, and had suggested asking Greece for the
cession of her light flotilla. The matter was postponed in
the expectation that the vessels would go over to the Allies
spontaneously as a result of the Venizelist movement, and
on this expectation being disappointed they were, as we
have seen, sequestered under the pretence of security for
the Allied armada. Another excuse was needed for their
appropriation ; and it came in the nick of time : two Greek
steamers at that moment struck mines, presumably sown
by an enemy submarine, in the Gulf of Athens. With the
promptitude that comes of practice, Admiral Dartige
announced to the Hellenic Government his decision to
employ, at a valuation, its hght flotilla in the submarine
3 Nov. ; General Roqucs to Greek Premier, Athens, 2/15 Nov. ;
Zalocostas to Greek Legation, Paris, 4/17 Nov., 191 6. Cp. Du
Fournet, pp. 169-70, 182.
1 The New Europe, 29 March, 191 7.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 149
warfare, and to use the Salamis arsenal for repairs
(3 November.) 1
M. Lambros replied that compliance with the Admiral's
request involved a breach of International Law, which
forbade the sale of naval units by a neutral State to a
belligerent, as well as a breach of a Greek law which for-
bade the alienation of ships possessing military value.
Besides, public opinion would never endure to see the
country stripped of its naval means of defence and exposed
to possible aggi^ession. He was, therefore, regretfully
obUged to refuse the Hellenic Government's consent.^
The Admiral could not let a refusal stand in his way :
" It would be unpardonable," he wrote in answer, " to
leave these vessels unutilized whilst German submarines,
heedless of the neutrality of Greece, came and sank her
merchant ships in her waters, thus stopping maritime
traffic and seriously prejudicing the life of the country."^
Having got over these little formalities, he hoisted the
French flag on the vessels and seized the arsenal (7 Novem-
ber). The Hellenic Government's protest against this
fresh outrage,* naturally, had no effect. Only the British
Minister made it clear that the act was exclusively the
work of France.^
Nothing done by one group of belligerents, needless to
say, escaped the attention of the other ; and the represen-
tatives of the enemy Powers, besides fulminating against
a step which, " in flagrant contravention of the principles
of neutrality came to augment the armed forces of their
adversaries," improved the occasion by reciting all the
proofs of "a benevolent neutrality without parallel,"
which Greece had been giving those adversaries since the
beginning of the War : the free passage of munitions and
provisions for Servia ; the facihties accorded to Entente
shipping ; the toleration of recruiting bureaux and wireless
stations in Greek territory ; the use of isles and ports as
naval bases. Then the landing of the Allies in Macedonia
1 Du Fournet, pp. 135-6, 165, 167, 183.
2 Lambros to Dartige du Fournet, Athens, 23 Oct./5 Nov., 1916.
^ Dartige du Fournet to Lambros, on board the Provence, 7 Nov.,
1916.
* Zalocostas to the Entente Legations, Athens, 25 Oct./7 Nov.,
1916.
^ Du Fournet, p. 168.
150 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
had inaugurated a period of continuous violations of
neutrality and the establishment of a regime of terror
towards them : their Consuls were arrested, members of
their Legations were assaulted, great numbers of their
nationals were led into captivity or driven into exile, their
merchant ships were seized, and the Ministers themselves
were deprived of all means of communicating with their
Governments. Last of all came the installation of Allied
troops in Athens itself and the sequestration of the Greek
navy, now transformed into a definite cession ; and,
according to trustworthy intelUgence, the Entente Powers
meant to exact shortly the disarmament of the Greek army
also. They ended with a hint that the indulgence of their
Governments might reach its Hmit.^
A more painful position for a free people and its rulers
could not be imagined. But King Constantine comforted
himself with the thought that the " pledges of friendship "
exacted from him by the Allies would be followed by
corresponding pledges from them. His negotiation with
M. Benazet had received its finishing touches in the
evening of 7 November : the Entente Powers would present
to the Greek Government a Note setting forth their
demands in the form of a " Summons," the terms of which
were, word for word, agreed upon between the two parties.
By this document the Allies bound themselves " to repeal
the coercive measures taken up to now and never to tolerate
that armed Greek bodies which had declared to have as
their sole aim a struggle for the vindication of national
ideas should turn aside from that aim in order to engage in
acts of sedition. "2
This clause formed the corner-stone of the whole pact.
" It is clear," telegraphs M. Benazet to Paris, " that some
sort of compensation is admitted in principle," — for very
good reasons : " The King's sole fear — and a very intel-
ligible one — is lest his own arms should be handed over to
Greeks who would use them to march on Athens and
overthrow his dynasty." ]\Ioreover, without such guaran-
tees it will be impossible for the King and his Premier
" to make disarmament acceptable by the Royahst Party,
^ Mirbach, Szilassy, Passaroff, Ghalib Kemaly, Athens, 26 Oct./
8 Nov., 1916.
2 Du Fournet, p. 177.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 151
which constitutes the great majority of the nation." He
added that neither the King nor his Premier was unaware
of the hostihty with which these efforts for concihation
were viewed by certain personaUties : but botli were
resolved to show the greatest patience until the agreement
had produced all its effects. The negotiator himself,
equally aware of the hostile forces at work, left Athens
with a heart full of misgivings.^
^ Du Fournet, pp. 174-8.
CHAPTER XIV
A WEEK had hardly elapsed since the conclusion
of the agreement between the King of Greece and
the French Deputy, when (16 November) Admiral
Dartige du Fournet addressed to the Hellenic Premier a
letter, claiming 18 batteries of field and 16 of mountain
artillery wdth 1,000 shells for each gim ; 40,000 rifles with
220 cartridges for each rifle ; 140 machine-guns with am-
munition ; and 50 motor-vans. The claim was presented
as " compensation " for the war material abandoned to the
Germano-Bulgars in Cavalla : about guarantees not a word.^
The King called the Admiral (19 November) and, with
perfect courtesy, yet with a visible change in his attitude,
expressed his astonishment at so unexpected a version of
the " Summons " agreed upon. The Admiral had no
explanation to give to the King. But to us he explains
ever^'thing. The French Minister at Athens was hostile
to M. Benazet's amicable arrangement, and repudiated
his pledges, notably the one concerning the spread of
sedition. " We are not made to defend kings against
their peoples," he said. The French Government likewise
completely ignored the agreement, and the French Minister
of War had dictated the lines on which the claim was
drafted. Admiral Dartige 's comments on this volte-face
are interesting : " Without wanting to give the Greek
Government the two guarantees which it demanded, they
claimed from it the fulfilment of the engagements of which
those guarantees were the counter-part. It was a truly
draconian and tmexpected pretension," he says, and to
base that pretension on the Cavalla affair was " to mis-
construe in part the reality of facts." ^
Why, then, was M. Benazet encouraged to negotiate ?
Probably there were in France moderate elements strong
enough to make it necessary to throw a sop to them. But
the extremists were the stronger party ; and when it came
^ Du Fournet, pp. 188-9.
2 Du Fournet, pp. 151, 179-80, 182-3, i9o-i-
152
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 153
to a decision they carried the day. However, be the
motive of the mission what it may, its repudiation meant
that the old poUcy still held the field. It was an essential
part of that policy not to allow Greece any attitude other
than that of a belligerent. So, while the Entente Cabinets
continued disclaiming all desire to drag an unwilHng
country into war and declaring that the only thing they
asked for was the observance of a benevolent neutrality,
the practical exponents of their policy on the spot con-
tinued to take steps in which Greece could acquiesce only
if she contemplated a rupture with the Central Powers.
In the evening of the same day (19 November) Admiral
Dartige, at the instance of the Entente Ministers, ordered
their German, Austrian, Turkish, and Bulgarian colleagues
to quit the coimtry in three days.^ The Hellenic Govern-
ment, to whom the Admiral communicated his decree,
protested against this blow at the representatives of
Powers with whom Greece, in virtue of her neutrality
recognized by the Entente, was on terms of friendship and
peace ; pointing out that the step was a breach not only
of the inviolability assured to diplomats by International
Law, but also of a formal promise given by the French and
British Ministers to Premier Zaimis when the Allied Fleet
arrived at the Piraeus — viz. that the missions of the Powers
at war -with the Entente had absolutely nothing to fear.
It asked that the decision might be revoked.^
Our representatives experienced no difficulty in dis-
posing of this protest. The promise given was merely
" an act of spontaneous courtesy " — it had not " any
character of a definite, irrevocable engagement " — " and
could not, in any case, have for effect to guarantee the
Ministers of countries at war with the Entente against the
consequences of hostile acts foreign to their diplomatic
functions and contrary to the neutraUty of Greece " —
acts of espionage and intrigue which, as a matter of fact,
form an integral part of a diplomat's functions. They did
not, therefore, " deem it possible to ask Admiral Dartige
du Fournet to revoke the decision taken by him in virtue
of the powers wdth which he was invested."^
^ Du Fournet, pp. 195-7.
2 Zalocostas to the Entente Legations, Athens, 7/20 Nov, 191 6.
^ Guillemin, Elliot, Bosdani, Demidoff, Athens, 8/21 Nov., 1916.
154 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Thus the Ministers of Germany, Austria, Turkey, and
Bulgaria were bundled off (22 November), protesting
vigorously " against the outrages committed on four
diplomatic representatives in neutral territory," charac-
terising the things which took place at Athens as " beyond
all comment," and wondering " whether a firmer attitude
would not have spared the country these affronts on its
sovereignty."^
This unprecedented measure added still further to the
irritation of the Greeks, and the manner in which it was
executed — wdthovit even a show of the courtesies pre-
scribed between diplomats by the tradition of centuries —
shocked the very man who acted as the executioner. Not
for the first time had Admiral Dartige been made to serve
ends which he did not understand, by means which he did
not approve, in association with persons whom he could
not respect. But the worst was yet to come.
The Greek Premier delivered his answer to the Admiral's
claim on 22 November. In that answer M. Lambros
showed that the Allies had already " compensated them-
selves " amply : the war material which they had appro-
priated — not to mention the light flotilla — being superior
both in quantity and in quality to anything that had been
abandoned to their enemies. Then he went on to state
that the surrender of any more material would be equivalent
to a departure from neutrality ; and the Central Powers,
which had already protested against the hght flotilla's
passing into the hands of the Entente, would so regard it.
Lastly, public opinion would never tolerate that Greece
should so denude herself of arms as to be unable to defend
herself in case of need. For all these reasons, the Hel-
lenic Government categorically refused the Admiral's claim. ^
The Admiral felt keenly the iniquity of compelling a
neutral country to give up, without conditions, the arms
which constituted its safeguard at once against invasion
and against insurrection. But what could he do ? He
had his orders, and it was his duty to carry them out as
soon as possible.^ So, making use of the plenary aiithority
^ Mirbach, Szilassy, Passaroff, Ghalib Kemal}', Athens, 8/21
Nov., 1916.
2 Lambros to Dartige du Fournet, Athens, 9/22 Nov., 191 6.
Cp. Du Fournet,^pp. 192-4.
2 Du Fournet,^p. 187.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 155
thrust upon him, he retorted (24 Nov.) with an Uhimatum :
ten mountain batteries should be handed over to him by
I December at the latest, and the remainder by 15 Decem-
ber. FaiHng obedience to his command, suitable steps
would be taken on i December to enforce it. He declined
to beheve that " the pubhc opinion of a country so enhght-
ened as Greece could regard as intolerable the idea of
handing over to Powers towards whom it professed a
benevolent neutrality a stock of arms and munitions
destined for the liberation of territory saturated with the
noblest Greek blood : their place was, not at the bottom
of magazines, but at the front. "^
There is always a limit beyond which human intelHgence
cannot be insulted with success, or human patience tried
with impunity. France had long since overstepped that
limit. Across all the self-contradictory subtleties of her
statesmen, the Greeks, thanks to the self-revealing acts of
her soldiers, sailors, and agents, had discerned the real object
of her diplomacy : to force upon them M. Venizelos and
to rule them through him : she had already helped M.
Venizelos to establish his sway over N.ew Greece, and was
now attempting to extend it over Old Greece. The
creation of a " neutral zone " did not blind them : they
had only too much reason to know what neutraUty meant
in the vocabulary of the Allies : they had taken the
King's ships : all that remained was to take his arms
and to hand them over to their protege. Such was the
true significance of the fresh " pledges of friendship "
claimed from them ; and the claim aroused unanimous
indignation : we will not submit to any further robbery,
they cried. What have we gained by submission so far ?
Our conciliatory attitude towards the Allies and our
efforts for a friendly settlement of the questions daily
raised by them are regarded as signs of fear and rewarded
accordingly : their arrogance increases with our compHance.
No more compliance. The indignation was, naturally,
most pronounced in military circles, and the officers of
the Athens garrison took a vow to lay down their lives
in defence of the King's and country's honour.
Before pushing matters to extremes. Admiral Dartige
called on the King (27 Nov.) and tried to intimidate him
^ Du Fournet, pp. 197-9.
156 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
by telling him that the Allied armada had Greece at its
mercy, and that by simply cutting off the supplies of corn
and coal it could break all resistance. The King agreed
that the Allies possessed all-powerful means of persuasion,
but did not seem as much impressed as was expected. He
reminded the Admiral that he had done everything possible
to prove his goodwill by spontaneously reducing his active
army. He could do no more : the people and the army
were so excited over this last demand that to make them
accept it was beyond his power. The measure might be
accepted, if the quantity claimed was lessened : he would
take steps in that sense with the French Government
through his brother, Prince George. It was clear that
the King's change of tone arose from the absence of the
guarantees which he had asked and hoped for : not having
received those guarantees he considered himself released
from the promises he had given. The x\dmiral understood
the position perfectty, and in his heart did not blame the
King for rejecting the " draconian pretension " that he
should disarm while not secure that his arms would not
be used against himself. But he had his orders and
could only say that he meant to carry them out : on
Friday morning, i December, he would impose the will
of the Entente Governments. He still thought that the
King would not resist " energetic pressure."^
Proportionate to their loyalty was the Athenians' ani-
mosity against the Venizelists in their midst, who had
long been plotting and arming in conjunction with the
French, and preparing for one of those coups for w-hich
Paris had set the fashion during a hundred years. Admiral
Dartige had expressed his concern for these unhappy
patriots to the King at his last interview, and on going
from the Palace to the French Legation he found there
the British Minister greatly alarmed because several
important Venizelists had prayed him to obtain for them
the Admiral's protection ; but no sooner had the Admiral
acted on their prayer, than the panic-stricken patriots
implored him not to protect them, lest the measures taken
for their safety should cause their destruction. ^ How^ever,
next day, the King assured the Admiral through his
Marshal of the Court, that neither the persons nor the
^ Du Fournet, pp. 201-4. ^ Du Fournet, pp. 202-3.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 157
property of the Venizelists should suffer, on condition that
neither the Entente Powers' detectives nor the detach-
ments he was going to land indulged in arrests, deporta-
tions, or disappearances of Greek subjects, and that the
Venizelists themselves abstained from acts calculated to
provoke reprisals.^
Such was the state of things created by the Admiral's
Ultimatum. What would happen when the time-limit
expired ? The inhabitants of Athens debated this question
anxiously, and their anxiety was deepened by the sight
of many disquieting symptoms : day after day Allied
aeroplanes and automobiles carried out reconnaissances
over the capital, paying special attention to the Royal
Palace, intensifying the irritation of civilians and soldiers,
and stiffening their resolution to resist, come what might.
The Hellenic Government endeavoured to ward off the
storm by remonstrating with the Governments of the
Entente direct. As the Admiral's claim was presented ex-
clusively in the name of France, it began with Paris. The
answer was that King Constantine had promised to the
French Government the war material demanded, and the
French Government had promised in exchange to relax the
coercive measures : since the Greek Government declared
that it could not fulfil this promise, it must suffer the
consequences. Paris, in Admiral Dartige's words, " wanted
to reap the fruit of the Benazet negotiation without
paying the price agreed to.'"^ Whatever London may
have thought of this manoeuvre, it said that the British
Government was in full knowledge of the French Admiral's
steps and supported them. Petrograd was equally
cognizant of the affair, and, as it was a question of military
measures with which Russia could not interfere, advised
Greece to comply, assuring her that " what was done was
for her good."^
As a last resource, Greece appealed to neutral countries,
describing the condition in which she had long found
herself, because she was not strong enough to impose
respect for her neutrality, and protesting against this
latest demand as most injurious to her honour and sub-
^ Du Fournet, pp. 208-g. 2 Dy Pournet, p. 205.
^ Romanos, Paris, 15/28, 1O/29 Nov. ; Gennadius, London,
16/29 Nov. ; Panas, Petrograd, 17/30 Nov., 1916.
158 GREECE AND THE ALIJES
versive of all her rights.^ The soUcitation remained
fniitless. The great American Republic was too intimately
connected with France and England to intervene on
behalf of Greece. The small states knew too well from
their own experience how frail are the foundations upon
which rest the honour and the rights of weak neutrals in
a world war.
Nevertheless, firm in the knowledge that he had the
vast majority of the nation behind him, M. Lambros, on
30 November, by a final letter, declared to the French
Admiral that his claim was utterly unacceptable. " I do
not wdsh to believe," he concluded, " that, after examining
in a spirit of goodwill and equity the reasons which render
it impossible for the Greek people and its Government to
give you satisfaction, you will proceed to measures which
would be incompatible wth the traditional friendship
between France and Greece, and which the people would
justly regard as hostile acts."^
In face of Greece's unequivocal determination not to
jdeld, the Admiral would have been well advised to insist
with his Government on an amicable accommodation.
He had not the means of carrying out his threats. It is
true, his ships dominated the sea and their guns the
capital ; but, since the Greeks were determined to stand
another blockade and to risk the bombardment of their
capital rather than surrender their arms, how could he
take them without an army ? The problem had not
escaped the worthy sailor. So grave a claim, he tells us,
could not be enforced without war ; and the Entente
Powers were not thinking of going to war with Greece.
Therefore, he had hit on the expedient of giving to his
action the name and, so far as the nature of the thing
permitted, the character of a " pacific demonstration."
Not one shot would be fired except in self-defence : the
troops would not seek to seize the material by violence :
they would simply occupy certain points of vantage until
they received satisfaction. He admits that his confidence
in the success of these tactics, since his last interview with
the King, had suffered some diminution. But he still
^ Zalocostas to Ministers of the United States, etc., Athens,
14/27 Nov.
2 Lambros to Dartige du Fournet, Athens, 17/30 Nov., 1916.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 159
nourished a hope — based on the fact " that the Athens
Government had always hitherto ended by bowing to our
will."^ He overlooked the inflamed minds of the
people.
Before break of day, on i December, a body of marines
some 3,000 weak landed at the Piraeus with machine-guns
and marched on Athens in three columns, driving back
the Greek patrols, which retired at their approach, and
occupied some of the strategic positions aimed at without
encountering any resistance. So far the pacific demonstra-
tion lived up to its name. Both sides conformed to their
respective orders, which were to avoid all provocation,
and on no account to fire first. But for all that the situa-
tion teemed with the elements of an explosion. Admiral
Dartige, on landing, had noted the faces of the people :
sullen and defiant, they faithfully reflected the anger
which seethed in their hearts. And, about ii o'clock, at
one point the smouldering embers burst into flame. How,
it is not known : as usually happens in such cases, each
side accused the other of beginning. Once begun, the
fight spread along the whole line to the French head-
quarters in the Zappeion.
At the sound of shots. King Constantine caused a
telephone message to be sent through the French Legation
to the French flagship, asking for Admiral Dartige, to beg
him to stop the bloodshed. The officer at the other end
of the wire hesitated to disclose the Admiral's whereabouts,
fearing a trap ; but at last he replied that his Chief had
gone to the Zappeion, where indeed he was found shut up.
A parley between that building and the Palace led to an
armistice, during which negotiations for a peace were
initiated by the Entente Ministers. In the middle of
these, fighting broke out afresh ; according to the Royalists,
through the action of the Venizelists who, desirous to
profit by the foreign invasion in order to promote a domestic
revolution, opened rifle fire from the windows, balconies,
and roofs of certain houses upon the royal troops patrolling
the streets : a statement more than probable, seeing that
arms had long been stored in Venizelist houses with a
view to such an enterprise. At the same time. Admiral
Dartige, who seems to have completely lost his head,
^ Du Fournet, p. 204.
160 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
considering the armistice at an end, ordered the warships
to start a bombardment.
While shells fell upon the outlying quarters of the
town, and even into the courtyard of the Royal Palace
itself, forcing the Queen to put her children in the cellar,
the Entente Ministers arrived to conclude the treaty :
" Are these your arguments, gentlemen ? " asked the
King, as he received them. Amid the general consterna-
tion, he alone maintained his calmness.
The conference went on to the accompaniment of
whistling and bursting shells, and at 7 o'clock ended in an
agreement, whereby Admiral Dartige consented to stop
hostilities and accept the King's offer of six mountain
batteries, in heu of the ten he had demanded ; the Entente
Ministers undertaking to recommend to their Governments
the abandonment of his other demands.
There ensued an exchange of prisoners, and the retreat
of the Allies to their ships during the night, followed next
day by the detachment quartered at the Zappeion, and all
the controllers of police, posts, telegraphs, telephones, and
railways. Many of the ruffians in the pay of the Franco-
British Secret Services anticipated this evacuation by
slipping out of the capital which they had terrorized for
nearly a year.
And so the pacific demonstration was over, having cost
the Greeks 4 officers and 26 men killed, and 4 officers and
51 men wounded. The Alhed casualties were 60 killed,
including 6 officers, and 167 wounded.
For the rest, no epithet was less applicable to the affair
than that of " Athenian Vespers," with which the Parisian
press christened it. Admiral Dartige protests indignantly
against the grotesque exaggerations of his imaginative
compatriots. Apart from the tragic features natural to
a pacific demonstration, he declares that the whole drama
passed off as pleasantly as a drama could. Not a single
Alhed subject was ill-treated. Not one shot was fired on
the Legations of the Entente Powers, whose IMinisters and
nationals, in the midst of it all, incurred only such danger
as came from their own shells — shells showered upon an
open town. Even the French bluejackets, who had long
been a thorn in the very heart of Athens, were conducted
back to their proper place under a Greek escort, ingloriously
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 161
but safely. A like spirit, to a still higher degree, marked
the treatment in Greek hospitals of the Allies* wounded,
whose rapid recovery, says the Admiral, testified to the
care which they received. " We assisted in a civil war :
the Royalists struck in our marines the protectors of their
political enemies."^
It was upon those enemies that RoyaUst wrath satiated
itself. On 2 December, veritable battles took place in
many parts of Athens ; suspect houses, hotels, offices,
and shops being assailed and defended with murderous
fury. The house of M. Venizelos, as was fitting, formed
the centre of the conflict. Twenty Cretan stalwarts had
barricaded themselves in it and held out until machine-guns
persuaded them to surrender. Within was discovered a
small arsenal of rifles, revolvers, hand-grenades, dynamite
cartridges, fuses : among them a bundle of weapons still
wrapped in the French canvas in which it had arrived.
Tell-tale articles of a similar nature were discovered on
the premises of other conspirators, who were led off to
prison, pursued by crowds hooting, cursing, spitting at
them, so that their escorts had the greatest difficulty in
saving them from being lynched. Although not com-
parable to parallel scenes witnessed by many a Western
city under analogous circumstances, the event was an
exhibition of human savagery sufficiently ugly in itself :
it did not require the legends of massacre and torture with
which it was embelHshed by pious journalists anxious to
excite in the Allied publics sympathy for persons whom
the AlHes' own advance had instigated to violence and
their precipitate retreat had exposed to a not unmerited
vengeance. 2
^ Du Fournet, pp. 210-51 ; Paxton Hibben, pp. 440-80 ; Resumi
du Rapport Official sur les Evenements du 18 novembre/i decembre,
1916.
2 According to the Hellenic Government, the losses of the
Royalists in this civil strife amounted to 13 soldiers killed and
24 wounded, 6 civilians killed and 6 wounded, besides 5 killed
(including 3 women) and 6 wounded (including 4 women) by the
insurgents accidentally ; the Venizelist losses were limited to
3 killed and 2 wounded. — Zalocostas to Greek Legations abroad,
Athens, 27 Nov./io Dec, 1916.
II
CHAPTER XV
BY 3 December calm had descended on Athens.
But echoes of the storm continued reverberating
in Paris and London. In Paris it was asserted,
and in London repeated, that the French Admiral had
fallen into a cunningly laid trap : King Constantine had
promised to hand over his war material ; but when the
Allies landed to receive it, he caused them to be treacher-
ously attacked and murdered.^ On the strength of this
assertion, the Entente newspapers demanded punishment
swift and drastic : a prince who broke faith deserved no
pity. His offer of six batteries was " an atonement "
both cynical and inadequate for the " ambush " by which
French and Enghsh blood had been spilt. Similarly the
internecine strife of 2 December and the subsequent
proceedings against the Venizelists were depicted as a
wanton hunt of harmless and law-abiding citizens. Day
by day the stream of calumny, assiduously fed from the
fountain-head at Salonica, grew in volume and virulence ;
and King Constantine was branded with every opprobrious
epithet of liar, traitor, and assassin.
These were weapons against which the King of Greece
and his Government had nothing to oppose. They tried
to explain the true nature of the abortive Benazet negotia-
tion, shomng that, if there was any breach of faith, it was
not on their part ; they denounced the falsehoods and
the exaggerations relating to the suppression of the sedi-
tious outbreak ; they asked that a mixed Commission
should be appointed to conduct an impartial inquiry on
the spot while the events were still fresh and evidence
abundant. The French and British Press Censors took
care that not a whisper of their defence should reach the
French and British publics.^ Frenchmen and EngUshmen
1 See Le Temps and The Times, 4 Dec, 1916.
^ Zalocostas to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petrograd,
Rome, 24 N0V./7 Dec. ; 25 Nov./S Dec. ; 26 N0V./9 Dec.
162
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 163
might hear of M. Venizelos's deeds through his friends.
They were allowed to hear of the King's only through his
enemies. It was clear that the policy which had prompted
the disastrous enterprise of i December had not yet
worked itself out to its full issue.
Admiral Dartige could not very well endorse the breach
of faith legend. He knew that the engagement about the
delivery of arms was reciprocal, and that, as France had
failed to ratify it on her part, King Constantine rightly
considered himself free from all obhgations on his part.
He also knew that, far from being lured into landing by
false assurances of surrender, he had been emphatically
warned against it by categorical refusals and intimations
of resistance. Yet, human nature being what it is, the
honest sailor, maddened by his discomfiture, called the
inevitable collision a " guet-apens " and, even whilst
negotiating for release, he meditated revenge.
To him the peace arranged through the instrumentahty
of the Entente Ministers was but a " sorte d' armistice."
He had agreed to it only in order to extricate himself from
his present difficulties and to gain time for resuming
hostilities under more favourable conditions. He and his
men, he tells us with an engaging candour, were at the
mercy of the Greeks : had he not accepted the King's
offer — outnumbered, surrounded, and without food or
water for more than twenty-four hours — ^they would have
been ignominiously arrested. Besides, the configuration
of the ground sheltered the Greek troops from the naval
fire, while the Legations both of the Entente and of neutral
Powers lay exposed to it. Lastly, a continued bombard-
ment might have driven the Greeks to exasperation and
perhaps to a massacre of Entente Ministers and subjects.
It was imperative to give the Allies and neutrals time for
flight and himself for serious war preparations. The
dehvery of the whole stock of arms had been fixed by his
Ultimatum for 15 December. In that fortnight he pro-
posed to obtain from his Government the forces necessary
28 Nov./ii Dec; Metaxas, Paris, 24 Nov./? Dec; 2/15 Dec.
Delyannis, London, 3/16 Dec, 1916. The documents containing
the King's promises to M. Benazet were not pubUshed until 191 8
(see The Times, April 22, 1918) ; while those containing M. Benazet's
promises to the King became known only through the publication
of Admiral Dartige du Fournet's book in 1920.
16A GREECE AND THE ALLIES
for a battle, and permission to bombard Athens in earnest
— ^witli or without notice to its inhabitants, but, of course,
always with due regard for its monuments historiques.
Such was his plan. General Sarrail embraced it with
ardour ; the Paris Government sanctioned it ; troops
began to arrive and French and British residents to flee
{3-5 Dec). But very soon difficulties became manifest.
The transports had brought men and mules, but no provi-
sions for either. Greek volunteers and regulars mustered
in defence of their capital. The British Admiral decHned
to take part in any war operations. The French Minister
dreaded open hostihties. In the circumstances, Admiral
Dartige found it expedient to " give proof of his spirit
of self-denial," by renouncing his heroic dream of vengeance
" immediate, retentissante," and by advising Paris not to
set up a new front at Athens : after all, the matter was
not really worth a war. He now proposed, instead, a
pacific blockade ; and, Paris assenting, he proclaimed the
blockade as from 8 December.^
With this act Admiral Dartige du Fournet's career came
to a sudden end. A few days later the French Government
deprived him of his command and placed him on the
retired list. After a decent interval, the British Govern-
ment decorated him with the Grand Cross of the Bath.^
Whether his conduct entitled him to a decoration, his
character should certainly have saved him from disgrace ;
for of all the men engaged in these transactions, he seems
to have been the most respectable. No impartial reader
of his book can fail to see that he blundered because he
moved in the dark : it was never explained to him what
pohtical designs lay beneath the pretended military
necessities ; and the constant incongruity between the
avowed aims of his employers and the steps dictated by
his instructions tended to bewilder a mind devoid of all
aptitude or appetite for diplomacy.
Admiral Dartige gone, the blockade was carried on by
his successor. Admiral Gauchet. The Greeks took it as
an accustomed evil. " This measure," wrote one of their
1 Du Fournet, pp. 226-9, 234, 256-7, 260-2, 266, 269-72.
^ Du Fournet, pp. 272-4, 284-5. He complains bitterly of the
injustice of his treatment : he was condemned unheard — like King
Constantine ; and for a similar reason : " un debal large et public
aurait etabli toutes les responsabilites."
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 165
leading journals, " cannot terrify a population which has
faced with serenity and fortitude much greater dangers.
The Hellenic people did not hesitate, when the need arose,
to come into collision with four Great Powers in defence
of its independence and honour. It did so without hate,
without perturbation, but calmly, as one performs an
imposed and unavoidable duty. It dehberately chose to
risk annihilation rather than see its fatherland disarmed
and enslaved. It preferred a hopeless struggle to degrada-
tion. To-day it is threatened with the spectre of famine.
It will face that spectre with serenity and fortitude. The
menace is aimed at its stomach : very well, the people will
tighten its belt."^
At the same time, Paris, London, and Petrograd were
vigorously discussing the demands which were to be
enforced by the blockade ; but, owing to the wide diver-
gences of opinion existing between the various Cabinets,
decisions could only be reached by degrees and dealt out
by doses. Not until 14 December did the Entente
Governments deliver themselves of the first-fruit of their
travail : Greece was to keep the arms of which she could
not be despoiled, but she should remove them, as well as
her army, from the northern regions bordering on Mace-
donia. The Hellenic Government was given twenty-four
hours in which to comply ; refusal would constitute an
act of hostihty, and the Allied Ministers would forthwith
leave Athens. ^
To show that they were in earnest, the French and
British Ministers embarked on two ships moored at the
Piraeus, where they awaited the Hellenic Government's
reply ; and, before the time-limit expired, the French
Admiral, by a notice put up at the Piraeus town-hall,
warned the inhabitants to close their shops and retire to
their homes by 4 p.m. in view of an impending bombard-
ment of Athens.
The Hellenic Government acceded to the contents of
the Ultimatum, and immediately gave orders for the
removal of troops and war material.^ This prompt
compliance was received by the people of Greece with
^ The Nea Himera, 25 Nov./S Dec, 1916.
2 Guillemin, Elliot, Bosdari, Demidoff, Athens, 1/14 Dec, 1916.
2 Zalocostas to the Legations of France, England, Italy, and
Russia. Athens, 2/15 Dec, 1916.
16C GREECE AND THE ALLIES
loud disapproval. They criticized vehemently their rulers'
readiness to yield as pusillanimous and injudicious. The
Government, they said, instead of profiting by the events
of I December to clear up the situation, drifts back into
the path of concessions which led to those fatal events :
it encourages the Entente Powers to put forward increas-
ingly exorbitant pretensions, and, forgetting that it is for
us to complain and claim better treatment, it creates the
impression that they are in the right and we in the wrong.
For some time past such had been the tone even of moderate
critics ; and upon this fresh submission there was a
general outcry of alarm. It is true, the Alhes in their
Note averred that they demanded the removal of troops
and guns simply and solely " in order to secure their forces
against an attack." But the Greeks were less inclined
than ever to treat the alleged danger to the Allied army
in ]\Iacedonia as anything more than a pretext : the true
object, they maintained, was to secure M. Venizelos's
return and the expulsion of King Constantine.
The conduct of the Entente representatives hitherto
had given only too much ground for such bitter suspicions,
and the search of Venizehst houses had recently produced
concrete evidence, in the form of a letter from the Leader
to one of his adherents stating, among other things, that
a definite agreement concluded between him and the
representatives of the Entente Powers assured his speedy
domination of Athens through the whole strength of the
Entente. The pubhcation of this document, with a
photographic facsimile,^ had confirmed the apprehensions
which had long haunted the popular mind. Nor did
M. Venizelos's indignant denial of its authenticity, or the
Entente Ministers' emphatic protestation that never,
since the Cretan's departure from Athens, had they done
anything to facilitate his return, shake the conviction that
the big coup was planned for i December.
If any doubts as to the Alhes' ulterior aims still Ungered,
they were dispelled by their Press, the most serious organs
of which, on the eve of Admiral Dartige's landing, pointedly
referred to the great error committed by the Powers in
allowing King Constantine to dismiss M. Venizelos in
September, 1915, and urged that the time had come to
* The Nea Himera, 21 N0V./4 Dec, 1916.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 167
remedy that error, informing their readers that England,
France and Russia were not bound to guarantee the
possession of the Greek throne to any individual sovereign,
irrespective of his constitutional behaviour. The coup
having failed, the same organs, in commenting on the
Allies' present Ultimatum, still declared that the true
remedy for Greece was to place her under the control of
M. Venizelos ; but, as such a course was not possible in
the presence of a hostile King and an over-excited army,
the first necessity was to ehminate the Greek army.^
However, the Greeks submitted to it all with sullen
resignation : they had learned that the wisest thing for
the weak is to control themselves.
The next step remained with the Entente Governments,
who were exhorted by their Press organs not to be deluded
by King Constantine's concessions. For it was one of
the ironies of the situation that, while his own subjects
blamed the King for his conciUatory attitude, that attitude
was denounced by his enemies as a fresh instance of
duplicity. They aihrmed — ^with what amount of accuracy
will appear in the sequel — that this great deceiver was
making, in concert with the Kaiser, stealthy preparations
for war against the Allies, and that meanwhile he intended
by a semblance of submission to lull them into a false
security. Extreme measures were, therefore, needed, not
only to punish him for his past crimes, but also to prevent
Greece from becoming a base of hostile operations in the
near future.
Thus certain in advance of pubUc support, the Alhes,
on 31 December, served upon the Hellenic Government a
series of demands divided into guarantees and reparations.
Under the first heading, Greece was required to transfer
all her arms and munitions to the Peloponnesus, which,
being practically an island, could be guarded by the Allied
Fleet ; to forbid all Reservist meetings north of the
Peloponnesus ; to enforce rigorously the law prohibiting
civihans from carrying arms ; to admit the re-establish-
ment of the foreign controls over her police, telegraphs,
telephones, and railways. Under the second, all persons
detained on charges of high-treason, conspiracy, and
sedition, should be immediately released, and those who
1 See leading articles in The Times, 30 Nov., 16 Dec, 1916.
168 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
had suffered indemnified ; the General commanding the
Athens garrison on i December should be cashiered ;
formal apologies should be tendered to the Allied Ministers
and their flags pubhcly saluted in the presence of the
assembled garrison. On their part, the Powers gave
Greece a formal undertaking that they would not allow the
forces of the Salonica Government to take advantage of
the withdrawal of the Royal troops from Thessaly in order
to cross the neutral zone. They ended with the announce-
ment that the blockade would be maintained until satis-
faction had been accorded on all the above points, and
that they reserved to themselves full hberty of further
action should the attitude of the King's Government give
them fresh cause for complaint.^
Before returning a definite answer to this Note, the
Hellenic Government submitted a Memorandum by which
it promised forthwith the reparations demanded, except
the wholesale release without trial of pohtical prisoners ;
and accepted in principle the demand for guarantees on
condition that the Powers, on their part, should give an
absolute and irrevocable guarantee against the extension
of the revolutionary movement, not only across the
neutral zone, but over any territories which had not been
annexed by the Salonica Committee before i December,
pointing out that this was an indispensable requisite to
reassure the nation and induce it to acquiesce in total
disarmament. In conclusion, the Hellenic Government
expressed the hope that, as total disarmament would put
Greece out of all possibiHty of hurting the Allies, they
would renounce the Hberty of further action which they
had reserved to themselves, and that they would, in justice
to the people, raise the blockade. ^
In reply, the AUies launched another Ultimatum :
insisting upon the definite acceptance of their demands.
If such acceptance were not forthcoming within fortj'-eight
hours, or if, after an undertaking was given, any obstacles
were wilfully placed in its execution, they threatened to
have recourse to their military and naval weapons. On
the other hand, they promised to respect Greece's resolution
^ Guillemin, Elliot, Demidoff, Piraeus, 18/31 Dec, 1916.
2 Zalocostas to Legations of France, England and Russia, Athens,
23 Dec./5 Jan., 191 7.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 169
to keep out of the War, and pledged themselves not to
allow the adherents of the Salonica Government to take
advantage of the withdrawal of the Greek troops into the
Peloponnesus in order to invade by land or by sea any
part whatever of Greek territory thus left defenceless, or
to permit the installation of Venizelist authorities in any
territories actually in the possession of the Royal Govern-
ment which they might see fit to occupy hereafter for
miUtary reasons. Lastly, they signified their readiness
to raise the blockade as soon as special delegates should
judge that the evacuation of troops and material had
been partly carried out, and that its completion was
assured.^
These pledges, which had been the subject of acute
discussion between the AlHes at the Rome Conference,
and were carried in face of strong opposition from France,
marked another victory of moderation over consistency.
That they lessened the alarm of the Greek people may be
doubted ; but the Greek people had by this time found
that if it wanted, not only to hve at peace, but to exist at
all, it had to accept the situation on the AlUes' own
terms.
As to the rulers, they understood the popular feeling,
sympathized with it, shared it. But their powerlessness
prevented them from refusing terms which their pride
compelled them to resent. They could not entertain
seriously thoughts of active resistance, unless the AlHes
were attacked by the Germans ; but how little prospect
of this there was has been revealed by a number of messages
exchanged at that period between Athens and Berlin.
From these documents it appears that on 6 December the
Queen, whose indignation at the long-sustained persecution
had been brought to a head by the bombardment of her
home and the narrow escape of her children, telegraphed
to her brother, anxiously inquiring when the Germans
would be ready for a decisive offensive in Macedonia. On
i6 December the Kaiser rephed to his sister, condoling
with her on the ordeal she and her husband had gone
through, congratulating them on the courage they had
displa3'ed, pointing out that the Entente had once more
1 Guillemin, Bosdani, Demidoff, Erskine, Salamis Strait, 26 Dec./
8 Jan., 1917.
170 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
shown clearly what its real aims were, and expressing the
opinion that no other course was left to King Constantine
but " to turn openly on his executioners : Tino's inter-
vention with his main forces against Sarrail's left wing
would be decisive," he said. The Queen answered, on
26 December, that the solution the Kaiser advised would
be possible only if Sarrail, attacked by the Germans, were
forced to retire into the parts of Greece occupied by the
Royalists : as it was, the distance which separated his left
\\ang from them was too great and their lines of communi-
cation would be too much exposed : besides, their provi-
sions and munitions were not sufficient for a prolonged
struggle. Under these conditions, she added, only a
speedy attack by the Germans could afford Greece the
opportunity of fighting for deUverance from a frightful
situation. But Von Hindenburg did not see his way to
promise an attack. Meanwhile, the pressure of the
blockade increased. By 2 January, the Queen, as her
indignation cooled, prepared to resign herself to the
situation : " We have bread only for a few da^'s more,
other provisions are also running short," she telegraphed,
" consequently war against the Entente is out of the
question now. I consider the game lost." Her husband
concurred. ^
The King and his Ministers also knew that, unless they
accepted the AlHes' terms, worse would be forced upon
them by starvation. Clearly, the first thing to be done
was to have the blockade raised. So far the httle ship
had contended \\-ith the gale hardily — in fact, foolhardily
— coming out of the contest with scarce a sail. Captain
and crew at last decided to give up the unequal struggle :
the gale appeared to have almost spent itself : conversa-
tions for peace were at that moment in progress between
the belligerents : at the worst, things would go on much
as they had been going on, until the end of the War put
an end to the sorry drama. So, on 10 January, after an
all-night sitting of the Crown Council, Greece made her
^ In his one message (6 January) he dwelt on Greece's critical
condition, asldng if a German attack was intended, and when it
would probably take place. Such is the gist of these famous
telegrams. For the rest, they consist of allusions by the Queen to
her sufferings and appropriate epithets applied to the authors of
them. See White Book, Nos. 177 foil.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 171
unconditional surrender : she would drain the cup of
humiliation to its bitterest dregs. ^
To all seeming, the pledges given by both sides formed
a solid basis for a modus vivendi : the King gave guarantees
thoroughly safeguarding the Allies against any danger,
real or imaginary ; and the AHies gave guarantees equally
safeguarding the King against seditious intrigues. All
that remained was that the Allies should exact from the
King a fulfilment of his engagements, and fulfil their own.
They did not fail in the first part of the programme. The
transfer of troops and armaments to the Peloponnesus was
scrupulously carried out under the supervision of an
Allied Military Commission, which counted and examined
every man, every gun, every rifle and cartridge both at
the point of departure and at the point of arrival. The
Reservists' leagues were dissolved, and the people, in so
far as such a measure is possible, were compelled to give
up the firearms, mostly obsolete, in their possession. The
foreign Controls, so far as the Hellenic Government was
concerned, might be re-established at the Allies' discretion.
The Venizelist prisoners were set free, and a mixed Com-
mission was in due course appointed to deal with the
question of indemnities. The General commanding the
Athens garrison was cashiered. Formal apologies were
tendered to the AUies' Ministers, and their flags were
saluted with all the solemnities prescribed by themselves.
In brief, on the unanimous testimony of Entente diploma-
tists and publicists, Greece loyally fulfilled every one of
her obhgations, serious and frivolous. ^ Yet, despite her
Government's reiterated prayers that the blockade should
in accordance with the promise given, be raised, the
blockade was not only continued, but, as the months
dragged on, was intensified.
1 Zalocostas to Legations of France, England, Italy and KHSsia,
28 Dec./io Jan., 1917.
* See Th» Times, 20, 23, 24, 30 Jan., 191 7.
CHAPTER XVI
AMONG the acts sanctioned by International Law,
none is more worthy of a philosopher's or a philan-
^thropist's attention than the " pacific blockade."
The credit for the institution belongs to all the great
civilised communities, but for its pleasant designation the
world is indebted to the eminent jurist M. Hautefeuille —
a countryman of the ingenious Dr. Guillotin. It denotes
" a blockade exercised by a gi^eat Power for the purpose of
bringing pressure to bear on a weaker State, without
actual war. That it is an act of violence, and therefore
in the nature of war, is undeniable " ;^ but, besides its
name, it possesses certain features which distinguish it
advantageously from ordinary war.
First, instead of the barbarous effusion of blood and swift
destruction which open hostilities entail, the pacific
blockade achieves its ends by more refined and leisurely
means : one is not shocked by the unseemly sights of a
battlefield, and the \vielder of the weapon has time to watch
its effects as they develop : he can see the victim going
through the successive stages of misery — debility, languor,
exhaustion — until the final point is reached ; and as his
scientific curiosity is gratified by the gradual manifestation
of the various symptoms, so his moral sense is fortified by
the struggle between a proud spirit and an empty stomach
— than which life can offer no more ennobling spectacle.
Then, unfike crude war, the pacific blockade automatically
strikes the nation at which it is aimed on its weakest side
first : instead of having to begin with its manhood, one
begins with its old men, its women, and its infants. The
merits of this form of attack are e\ident : many a man who
would boldly face starvation himself, may be reasonably
expected to flinch at the prospect of a star%'ing mother,
1 See the article on " Pacific Blockade " in the Encyclopcsdia
Britannica (loth Ed.), Vol. XXXI. p. 401.
172
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 173
wife, or child. Lastly, whilst in war the assailant must
inevitably suffer as well as inflict losses, the pacific blockade
renders him absolutely exempt from all risk. For " it
can only be employed as a measure of coercion by mari-
time Powers able to bring into action such vastly superior
forces to those the resisting State can dispose of, that
resistance is out of the question."^
In brief, the pacilic blockade is not war, but a kind of
sport, as safe as coursing, and to the educated mind much
more interesting. The interest largely depends on the
duration of the blockade, and its duration on the victims'
physical and moral resources.
When the blockade was proclaimed on the 8th of Decem-
ber, Allied journalists predicted that its persuasive force
would be felt very soon. The country, they reasoned,
owing to the manifold restrictions imposed upon its over-
seas trade by the Anglo-French Fleet, had been on short
commons for some time past. The total stoppage of
maritime traffic would bring it to the verge of famine within
a week. And, in fact, before the end of the month Greece
was feeling the pinch. ^ As might have been expected,
the first to feel it were the poor. Both the authorities and
private societies did their utmost to protect them by
keeping prices down, and to relieve them by the free dis-
tribution of food and other necessaries.^ But, although
the achievement was great, it could not prove equal to the
dimensions of the need. The stoppage of all maritime
traffic caused a cessation of industry and threw out of
employment thousands of working-people. As the fac-
tories grew empty of labourers, the streets grew full of
beggars. The necessary adulteration of the flour pro-
duced epidemics of dysentery and poisoning, especially
among children and old people, while numerous deaths
among infants were attributed by the doctors to want of
milk in their mothers' breasts. Presently bread, the
staple food of the Greeks, disappeared, and all classes took
1 Ibid.
2 The Times, g, 19, 21, 30 Dec, 1916.
' Among these charitable organizations the foremost place
belongs to the " Patriotic League of Greek Women," which, under
the competent management of the Queen, was able to distribute
10,000 meals a day, as well as clothes, blankets, medicine, milk for
infants, etc.
174 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
to carob-beans and herbs. ^ On 22 February a lady of
the highest Athenian society wrote to a friend in London :
" If we were in England, we should all be fined for cruelty
to animals. As there is no flour, our tiny portions of
bread are made of oats, and rather rotten ones, that had
been reserv^ed for the cab-horses. Now the poor things
have nothing to eat and have become a collection of
Apocalyptic beasts. We go on foot as much as we can,
as they really could not carry us."
Next to bread, the most prominent article of Greek diet
is fish. The French, who in their treatment of this neutral
nation gave e\idence of a thoroughness and efficiency
such as they did not always display in their operations
against the enemy, saw to it that this source of subsistence
also should, within the measure of their ability, fail their
victims. French cruisers stopped the fishing-smacks and
asked if their community had joined the Rebellion. When
the answer was in the negative, they sank the vessel and
confiscated the tackle, often accompan3ing the robbery
of property \\dth violence on the persons of the owners and
abuse of their sovereign. To the wretched fishermen's
protests, the French commanders replied : "If you
want to be left alone, you have only to drive out j'^our
King. "2
These speeches confirmed the general suspicion that the
ultimate object of the blockade was to propagate rebelhon.
Other things spoke even more eloquently. The few
cargoes of flour that arrived in Greece now and then were
sequestered by the Allies and sent to the Salonica Govern-
ment, which used them as a bait, inviting the King's
subjects through its agents to sell their allegiance for a loaf
of bread. Generally the reply was : " We prefer to die."^
Of this stubborn endurance, the women of modern Greece
gave instances that recall the days of ancient Sparta. In
a village near Eleusis, on the Sunday preceding Lent, the
matrons and maidens set up a dance, and while dancing
they improvised songs in praise of Hunger. At the end,
^ Zalocostas to Greek Legations abroad, 25 JaD./7 Feb. ; 3/16
Feb. ; 12/25 March, 1917.
2 Zalocostas to Greek Legations abroad, 3/16 Feb. ; to French
Minister at Athens, 16/29 March, 191 7.
3 Zalocostas to Greek Legations abroad, 25 Jan./7 Feb. ; 15/28
Feb. ; 12/25 March.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 175
the men who stood round Hstening with tears in their eyes,
burst into frenetic cheers for the King.^
Never, indeed, in the hour of his triumphs had King
Constantine been so near the hearts of his people as he was
in this period of their common affliction. Although the
operation-wounds in his ribs were still open, he met the
emergency with dauntless fortitude, and never for a
moment forgot his part, either as a prince or as a man.
" The King is wonderful," wrote the correspondent already
quoted. " He never complains, and gives us all courage."
Many a time, as the weary months dragged on, he went
over his past course, asking himself : " Could he have been
mistaken, after all ? " No ; the more he pondered, the
more convinced he felt that what he had done was the best
for Greece. Now, if the worst came to the worst, his
sincerity at least could not be questioned. When his
friends ventured to express their admiration of his stoicism,
he answered simply : "I know that I am doing right."
The great source whence he derived consolation amidst all
his calamities was undoubtedly this consciousness of
rectitude : a sense which in him seems to have been as
free from arrogance as it was from rancour.
The people who had formerly admired their sovereign as
a hero, now revered him as a martjn" ; and the man upon
whom they visited their anger was he whom they regarded
as the true cause of their misery. After his flight to
Salonica M. Venizelos was never mentioned except by the
name of The Traitor ; after the events of i December
he was formally impeached as one ; and after the blockade
had been in force for some weeks, he was solemnly anathe-
matized : on 26 December, the Archbishop of Athens,
from a cairn of stones in the midst of a great multitude,
pronounced the curse of the Church upon " the traitor,
Venizelos." The Government had forbidden the demon-
stration, but that did not prevent myi-iads of people from
going to add their own stone to the monument. ^ One
old woman was heard, as she cast her contribution, crying :
" We made him Premier ; but he was not content. He
would make himself king. Anathema !" Subsequently,
every village and hamlet repeated the ceremony. " These
^ The Nea Himera, 15/28 Feb., 1917.
^ Zalocostas to Greek Legations abroad, 14/27 Dec, 1916.
176 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
spontaneous ceremonies," observes an eye-witness, " were
vastly more indicative than any elections could ever have
been of the place to which the great Cretan had fallen in
the esteem of his countrymen."^
Appeals from the Holy Sjiiod of the Greek Church to
the Pope and the heads of other Christian Churches
availed as little as the appeals of the Greek Government
to Alhed and neutral Governments. Month after month
the blockade went on, and each month produced its own
tale of suffering : deaths due directly to starvation ;
diseases due to the indirect effects of inanition ; a whole
nation wasting for want of food ; horses starved to provide
it ; mothers praying to God for their daily bread with
baizes drooping at their desiccated bosoms.- Yet of
yielding there was no sign : " Give in ? " said a woman
outside a soup-kitchen at the Piraeus, in March. " We
will eat our children first ! "
In such a manner this ancient race, which has lived so
long, done so much, and suffered so much, bore its martyr-
dom. By such an exercise of self -discipline it defied the
Powers of Ci\alisation to do their worst. In spite of the
licence given to brute force, in spite of the removal of the
machinery of civil control, in spite of the internment of
the army and its arms, in spite of the ostentatiously
paraded support to the Rebel, in spite of actual famine
and the threat of imminent ruin, the people held to the
institutions of their country, rallied to their King ; and
expressed their scorn for the usurper of his authority by
inscribing over the graves of their babies : " Here hes my
child, starved to death by Venizelos."
^ Paxton Hibben, p. 522.
2 The Censorship succeeded in keeping these facts, as it kept many
others, from the British public ; they were not suitable subjects
for war propaganda.
CHAPTER XVII
IT seems now proper to return to M. Venizelos and to
consider in some detail the other measures which he
and his patrons at this time adopted for the purpose
of consolidating and extending his dominion.
As we have seen, shortly after the Cretan's installation
at Salonica, the Entente Powers, by a diplomatic fiction,
decided to treat his Committee as a de facto Government.
It was not until his countr5nTien impeached him as a
traitor that the recognition assumed a de jure character,
by the appointment of duly accredited diplomatic agents
to his capital. These steps were accompanied by other
marks of sympathy. While the Allies negotiated with
the King, their naval commanders canvassed for M.
Venizelos— sweeping islands under his sway : Syra was
first shepherded into the fold, and a little later the rest
of the Cyclades.
A brief suspension of operations supervened as a result
of the solemn promise given to Athens that the Allies
would neither by land nor by sea allow the extension of the
revolutionary movement. For an instant the Entente
respected its own pledges. Just before the surrender of
the Lambros Cabinet, on lo January, the Cretan had
rushed to estabUsh another accomphshed fact by liberating
the island of Cerigo ; but, on the Government's protest,
the Allies obliged him to undo his accompHshment ;
though, on the plea that the island would resent being
replaced under King Constantine's yoke, it was made
temporarily autonomous.^
Soon, however, these pledges went the way of all words.
Between February and May, Cephalonia, Zante, and Corfu
1 Zalocostas to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd,
30 Dec./i2 Jan. ; to Entente Legations, Athens, 19 Jan./i Feb. ;
8/21 March, 1917. For a full and intimate account of this intrigue,
somewhat ambitiously styled " The Conquest of Cerigo," see Lawson,
pp. 241 foil.
12 177
178 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
were converted one by one : everyv^'here the apostles from
Salonica preaching, " Be our brethren or die of hunger " ;
and every\vhere having behind them the guns of France
and England to enforce respect for their gospel. The
instance of Leucas, the last of the Ionian Isles to be
gathered into the fold, will suffice as an illustration. In
the middle of March a French vessel, carrying a consign-
ment of maize, rice, and Venizelist missionaries, called at
the island and in\dted the inhabitants to come, buy, and
be saved : they answered that they would never touch
food brought by traitors. Towards the end of May, the
French Admiral commanding the Ionian Reserve was able
to announce that the Leucadian population had joined the
National Movement.^
To secure his authority over these maritime possessions,
the Cretan obtained from his patrons some of the warships
of which they had robbed the King.
A similar propaganda was simultaneously going on in
the " neutral zone " and in the lands to the south of it —
particularly Thessaly — whose immunity from emancipation
the Allies had also guaranteed. Only, as this region lay
nearer to the base of the Franco- Venizehst Mission, it
benefited more severely from its influence. General
Sarrail's patrols raided the \allages, harrjnng the peasants
and sparing not even the honour of their women. Anyone
who knows the Greek peasant's fierce views on feminine
chastity can imagine the indignation which such an
outrage would have aroused in any case ; but in this case
their horror was deepened by the circumstance that the
assailants sometimes were African semi-savages — ^the
Senegalese whom France brought to Greece, as to other
parts of Europe, obHvious of the most rudimentary dictates
of decency and sound policy. On one occasion (22 Feb.)
the coloured libertines paid for their lust with their lives :
a patrol of a dozen of them was surprised and massacred. ^
Summary executions were among the methods of
1 Zalocostas to Greek Ministers abroad, 12/25 March ; The Nea
H inter a, 8/21 March; Exchange Tel., Athens, 16 April, 28 May,
1917-
2 General Sarrail mentions the punishment (Sarrail, p. 235), but
not the provocation. This, together with other atrocities, is the
subject of a Note from M. Zalocostas to the French Minister at
Athens, 9/22 March, 191 7.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 179
military tyranny in which General Sarrail rejoiced without
scruple and with a certain brutal pride. When once he
found himself obliged to justify his conduct, he wrote :
" The six inhabitants of Dianitza, who were shot, were
Comitadjis. There is no doubt in that respect. Doubt
still exists about eight others. If they are proved to be
in the same case as the former, they will be shot in the
same way. The two men shot at Lourani were put to
death because they were known to be Comitadjis. The
other two, whose houses were burnt down, are likewise
Comitadjis : they would have been shot, if they were not
away : they shall be, if they are caught. If a church has
been burnt down, it was because it had been transformed
into a magazine for arms. If barley has been carried
away, it has been paid for or requisitioned." After some
more statements of the same enlightening kind, the gallant
soldier concludes : "To sum up, the Greek Government
organizes bands and maintains them. The security of
our Army in the Orient exacts their suppression, I have
given orders to put to death all irregulars. These orders
have been carried out : they shall continue to be carried
out."i
It was by precisely similar arguments that General von
Bissing justified his severities in Belgium : with this
difference, that in Greece the danger never existed.
Comitadjis — bands of irregulars — did exist ; it would have
been strange if the adherents of the King had not done
everything to counter the efforts of his enemies. Long
before this period the French Secret Service, Admiral
Dartige du Fournet tells us, had been busy equipping
guerillas on the frontier. ^ Further, in the mainland, as
in the islands, the Venizelist recruiting sergeants sought
" volunteers " by force : " How many villages had to be
surrounded by constabulary. . . . How much shooting
had to be done to keep the men of military age from
escaping. . . . How many deserters or those unwilling
to serve had to be rounded up from hiding places ! "
exclaims General Sarrail.^ Some of the recruits thus
enlisted snatched at the earliest opportunity of regaining
^ Le Temps, ii April, 1917 ; Sarrail, pp. 236-7.
* Du Fournet, p. 116.
^ " La Grece Vinizeliste," in the Rtvue de Paris, 15 Dec, 1919,
180 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
their freedom : they fell in during the day, and at night
they fled with their arms.
The assertion that these bands were organized and
maintained by the Greek Government to harass the Allies
and keep the line of communication with Albania open,
with a \dew to an eventual junction between the forces of
King Constantine and those of the German Emperor,
rested on evidence which, for some obscure reason, was
not produced.^ But it suppHed pretexts for action the
true objects of which were not obscure.
Despite his press-gangs, in six months M. Venizelos had
only succeeded in sending to the front some 10,000 men.
He explained to his Western friends that he had failed to
fulfil their expectations better because the neutral zone
barred the extension of his movement into Thessaly.^
He had respected that zone until now ; but now that the
AlHes gave him a free hand over the sea, he saw no longer
any reason why they should restrain him on land. There-
fore, while the agents from Macedonia goaded the inhabi-
tants to seek rest in apostacy and provoked incidents
supplying an excuse for intervention, the advocates of
I\I. Venizelos in Paris and London laboured to clear his
way by pubHshing reports which told how the people of
Thessaly pra^^ed for Hberation from the yoke of King
Constantine, 3 and exhausted their ingenuity in endeavours
to show the Entente pubhcs how to break faith with
honour and decency, as well as \\ith advantage.
The victualling of the Allied army in Macedonia, always
difficult, had become distressingly precarious with its own
growth and the growth of the enemy's submarine activity.
Were the Allies to go on transporting food and fodder
from distant lands across dangerous seas, with the rich
cornfields of Thessaly within short and safe reach of their
trenches ? The seizure of the Thessahan granary, besides
1 Such a project is only discussed in some of the messages ex-
changed between Athens and BerUn in December, 191 6 {White
Book, Nos. 177, 183, 186) — before the definite acceptance of the
Allies' terms by the Lambros Cabinet. But there is absolutely
nothing to show that the idea ever materialised.
2 The New Europe, 29 March, 191 7.
3 See telegrams, dated Salonica, 29 March, published in the
London Press by the Anglo-Hellenic League ; letter from The
Times correspondent, dated Syra, 23 April, 191 7, etc., etc.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 181
helping to keep the AlUes in plent)^ would help to reduce
the RoyaHsts to despair by robbing them of the harvest
to which they looked forward with strained eyes and
tightened belts. In this wise both military and pohtical
problems could be solved by one masterly stroke.
In April, General Sarrail obtained from his Government
the orders he had been soliciting since January, to go to
Thessaly and seize the crops ; only, as the offensive against
the Bulgars deprived him of adequate means for the
moment, he decided to put off the stroke until the middle
of May.i
Alarmed by these sudden, though not wholly unexpected,
developments. King Constantine dismissed Professor
Lambros, and had once more recourse to M. Zaimis ;
hoping that this statesman, the only non-Venizelist Greek
whom the slander of Germanophilism had left untouched,
might prove able to placate the Allies. M. Zaimis, as in
all previous crises, so now obeyed the call and set himself
to discover some path out of the wood (2 May). On the
one hand, he opened negotiations with the Entente
Ministers ; on the other, he tried to bring about a recon-
ciliation with M. Venizelos — the King being understood
to be wilHng to meet the Cretan half-way.
M. Venizelos, on his part, alarmed by the prospect of a
rapprochement between Athens and the Entente Powers,
set himself, as on all similar occasions, to impugn the
Hellenic Government's sincerity. At a signal from the
Conductor, all the instruments of the orchestra broke into
the familiar chorus. The whole Press of France and
England rang again with calumny and fairy-tale. Out
they came again in regular sequence and with unvarying
monotony : plots and secret letters, weird stories of
German intrigue, constant repetition of names compromised
or compromising ; all ready, cut and dried, for burking
any attempt at accommodation that did not include the
return and domination of the Great Cretan.
It was maintained that the formation of a Government
under M. Zaimis was but a new artifice of King Constantine,
adopted at the Kaiser's suggestion, to temporize by
ostensibly throwing over a few of his Germanophile favour-
ites. During more than five months he had contrived
^ Sarrail, p. 238.
182 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
to checkmate the blockade by drawing on the reserves of
food he had laid up at his depots. Now those reserves
were exhausted : he needed the Thessahan corn to replenish
his magazines, to feed and increase his army, so that in
the fullness of time he might bring it out of the Peloponnesus
against the Allies.^
Even more sinister were the motives which prompted
the King's advances to the Cretan. While holding out
the right hand to M. Venizelos, Constantine with the left
aimed a dagger at his heart : a band of eleven assassins
had just been arrested at Salonica on a charge of conspiring
to murder him — to murder him in the very midst of his
own and his alhes' mihtary forces, and under circumstances
which made detection certain and escape impossible.
Even thus : " their plan was to arrange a banquet to
which M. Venizelos would have been invited. They are
said to have confessed that they were sent from Athens
to kill the Head of the National Government and were
promised £4,000 for the murder. "^
Day by day it became increasingly clear that the question
of Thessaly formed only part of the larger question of
Greece ; that behind the campaign for the crops lurked
the conspiracy against the King. A " radical solution "
was demanded, on the ground that so long as he reigned
at Athens we could not consider Greece a friendly neutral.
The Greek organ of M. Venizelos in London now openly
described the Cretan as a man sent to heal Hellas of the
" dynastic canker," and expressed the opinion that the
healing could only be effected by " Prussian methods."^
During the whole of i\Iay this concert of sophistry and
calumny went on : now sinking into low^ deadly whispers ;
now swelling into an uproar that rolled like a mighty,
muddy river in flood through every Allied capital, minister-
ing to the inarticulate craving of the pubUc for fresh
sensations, thrilHng its nerves, and feeding its hate and
fear of King Constantine. At the end of the month the
curtain went up, and j\I. Venizelos stepped forward to
1 For details of this apocryphal scheme see a report from
Salonica, dated 16 May, disseminated by the Anglo-Hellenic
League ; The Times, 8 and 30 May ; the Daily Mail, 9 and 30
May, 191 7.
2 The Times, 14 May, 191 7, dispatch dated Salonica 11 May.
3 The Hesperia, 11, 18, 25 May, 191 7.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 183
make the declaration for which his instrumental music
had prepared our minds : " I reject all idea of reconciliation
firmly, flatly, and finally ! "
His confederates and subordinates, as usual, went
further : Admiral Coundouriotis : " Neither in this world
nor in the next will I have anything to do with King
Constantine or his djmasty."
Minister Pohtis : "No compromise is possible between
Liberal Greece and the reigning dynasty."
Minister Averoff : " The one and most important thing
is that the dynasty of Constantine should, Hke the Turks,
be turned bag and baggage out of Greece."^
So the Great Cretan and his company had given up at
last pretending that their plot was not directed against
their King, or that they intended to postpone the settlement
of their accounts with him till after the War. Their
relief must have been proportionate to the strain : it is
not hypocrisy, but the need of consistency that harasses
a hypocrite. But their outburst of candour was chiefly
interesting as an index to the attitude of the Powers from
whom they derived their significance.
France had long since made up her mind on the deposi-
tion of Constantine, if not indeed on the subversion of the
Greek throne. Apart from the hold upon Greece which
they would gain by placing her under a ruler created by
and consequently dependent on them, French politicians
did not lose sight of the popularity which the sacrifice
of a king — and that king, too, the Kaiser's brother-in-law
— would earn them among their own compatriots. Further,
a triumph of French policy over Greece was calcvilated to ob-
scure in the eyes of the French pubhc the failure of French
strategy against Bulgaria : " For me the destruction of
Athens the Germanic came second to the struggle against
Sofia," wrote General SarraiP ; and there were those who
believed that his expedition had for its primary objective
Athens rather than Sofia.
For a time French poUticians had flattered themselves
that their aim would be attained by an explosion from
within. But it was gradually borne in upon them that
the National Movement represented but a small minority
^ The Times, 30 May, 1917.
2 Sarrail, p. 234.
184 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
of the nation. That truth first became manifest in the
summer of 1916, when the demobihzation set the Reservists
loose — the Reservists upon whom M. Venizelos had
miscounted : their verdict was conclusive ; for they were
drawn from all districts and all classes of the community :
the tillers of the plains, the shepherds of the hills, the
fishermen who lived by the sea, the traders, the teachers,
the lawyers — they represented, in one word, the whole
population of military age. The disillusion was furthered
by the swift suppression of the seditious attempt on
I December, and was completed by the Blockade, which
demonstrated the sohdarity of the nation in a manner
that utterly upset the calculations and disconcerted the
plans of its authors. Instead of a people ready, after a
week or two of privation, to sue for mercy — ^to revolt
against their sovereign and succumb to his rival — the
French found in every bit of Old Greece — from Mount
Pindus to Cape Malea — a nation nerved to the highest
pitch of endurance : prepared to suffer hunger and disease
without a murmur, and when the hour should come, to
die as those die who possess things they value more than
life. This was not what the inventors of the Pacific
Blockade contemplated : this was not sport : this was
strife — strife of strength with strength.
There was nothing left but force — the danger of creating
a new front had been eliminated by the internment of the
army, and by the blockade which had succeeded, if not
in breaking the spirit of the people, in reducing it to such
a state of misery that it now offered a safe subject for
attack. M. Ribot, who had replaced M. Briand as Premier
and Minister for Foreign Affairs, adopted this " radical
solution." He proposed to dispatch to Athens a plenipo-
tentiary charged with the mission of deposing King
Constantine, raising M. Venizelos to dictatorial power, and
thus establishing the influence of France throughout
Greece.
There remained some difficulties of a diplomatic
character. Russia had never viewed her ally's uncom-
promising hostihty to King Constantine with enthusiasm.
But the French thought that this attitude w^as due to
dynastic ties and monarchic sympathies, and expected
the downfall of the Tsar to change it : they could hardly
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 185
imagine that the Russian Repubhc would withdraw even
that reluctant co-operation in the coercion of Greece which
the Russian Empire had accorded ; and, at any rate, the
voice of a country in the throes of internal disintegration
could have Uttle effect upon the march of external events.
The decision really lay between France and England.
England's, like Russia's, co-operation hitherto had been
but a concession to France. Neither the Foreign Office
nor the War Office had ever taken the Salonica Expedition
seriously ; and both departments would gladly have
washed their hands of a business barren of profit and
credit alike. But the motives which had impelled London
to keep Paris company so far were as potent as ever, and
English politicians had hitherto proved themselves so
pHant that, provided French pressure continued, the
utmost which could be apprehended from them was a
feeble show of resistance followed by abject acquiescence.
Notwithstanding the moderation England had insisted
upon at the Boulogne and Rome Conferences, France had
managed to lead her from violence to violence, till this
last iniquity, to the logical French mind, seemed inevitable.
CHAPTER XVIII
AT the end of May, M. Ribot, accompanied by
iuJ^ M. Painlev^, Minister of War, came to London and
laid before the British Government his solution.
Again our alhes found on this side of the Channel " des
scrupiiles " ; and again they set themselves to demonstrate
that " des scrupides, si legitimes soient-ils," weigh light
against interests. Even when the principle was conceded,
there still hngered some disquietude regarding the practi-
cability of bringing about the King's dethronement
without bloodshed. But the French did not share this
disquietude, and, after three days' hard talking, they
converted the English Ministers to their point of view.
It was agreed that the operation should be carried out
without war. The only measures of a military nature to
which the British Government consented were the estab-
lishment in Thessaly of outposts for the control of the
crops, and the occupation of the Isthmus of Corinth, should
King Constantine attempt to move his army out of the
Peloponnesus : unless the King committed acts of hostility,
no violence should be used. Having thus satisfied their
conscience, the British Ministers abstained from any closer
scrutiny. ^
The task was entrusted to M. Jonnart, a Senator of large
African experience, who, armed with the title of High
Commissioner of the Protecting Powers of Greece, set out
at once " to re-establish the constitutional verity" — such
was the formula. " His Majesty King Constantine, ha\ing
manifestly violated, on his own iritiative, the Constitution
of which France, Great Britain, and Russia are the guaran-
tors, has lost the confidence of the Protecting Powers,
and they consider themselves released from the obhgations
to him resulting from their rights of protection."^
With the violation of the Constitution by King Constan-
tine we have already dealt exhaustively. W'e must here
^ Jonnart, pp. 60-67. ^ Ibid, pp. 109-10.
1 86
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 187
deal as exhaustively with the three Powers' claim to act
as its " guarantors " and their " rights of protection."
The claim rested on a phrase in the Treaty of 13 July,
1863, between them and Denmark, concerning the accession
to the Hellenic throne of the late King : " Greece, under
the sovereignty of Prince William of Denmark and the
guarantee of the three Courts, forms a monarchical,
independent, and constitutional State. "^ That guarantee
was no innovation, and had no reference to the Constitution.
The Protocol of the Conference held on 26 June, 1863,
explains that " as regards the guarantee of the political
existence of the Kingdom of Greece, the three Protecting
Powers maintain simply the terms in which it is enunciated
in Article IV of the Convention of 7 May, 1832," ^ — that is,
the Convention between the three Powers and Bavaria
concerning the accession to the Hellenic throne of her
first King. Turning to that document, we find Article IV
running as follows : " Greece, under the sovereignty of
the Prince Otho of Bavaria, and under the guarantee of
the three Courts, shall form a monarchical and independent
State, according to the terms of the Protocol signed between
the said Courts on the 3rd of February, 1830, and accepted
both by Greece and by the Ottoman Porte." And above
it, in Article I, we read : " The Courts of Great Britain,
France and Russia, duly authorized for the purpose by
the Greek Nation, offer the hereditary sovereignty of Greece
to the Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria." * Nothing could
be plainer than that the guarantee referred to the " political
existence of Greece," not to her constitutional form of
government, and that the three Powers in disposing of
her throne acted, not by their own authority, but by the
authority of the Greek Nation, which alone had the right
to do so, and which exercised that right directly in choosing
its last king. But this is not all. Turning to the Protocol
of the 3rd of February, 1830, we read in its very first
article : " Greece shall form an independent State, and
shall enjoy all the rights, pohtical, administrative and
commercial, pertaining to complete independence."*
1 Nouveau Recueil G6n6ral des Traites. By Ch. Samwer, Vol.
XVII, Part ii.
2 Ibid.
■^ Papers ve Affairs of Greece, 1830-32.
* Papers r$ Affairs of Greece, 1826-30.
188 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
As to the term " protection " occeisionally employed bj'
the three Powers, and by the Greeks themselves, its true
sense can be shown beyond ambiguity. " Greece," wrote
the Duke of WeUington, " once estabUshed and her boun-
daries guaranteed as proposed, she will have the same
right to assistance and protection against foreign aggression
as any other State in Europe, of which there are many,
which exercise an independent action in all their concerns,
external as well as internal." Far from claiming to Umit
her independence in any way, the British Foreign Secretary
emphatically declared " that the permanent poHcy of this
country towards Greece must be friendly, if Greece should
be really independent and conduct herself as an independent
Power. "^
Likewise, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs,
tracing the history of events and negotiations which
culminated in the estabhshment of Greek freedom, dwelt
on France's successful desire " not only to liberate Greece
from the Ottoman yoke, but to make of Greece a real State,
a State independent in right and in fact, a State that
should not be put officially under the tutelage of anyone,
a State that should not need any perpetual semi-ofhcial
intervention." By thus making Greece " free to choose
her friends and alhes," and " not under anyone's protec-
tion," the French expected that she would " look towards
France, who can promise her, in need, her assistance
without menacing her with her protection." The Minister
concluded by boasting that " the success is complete.
Greece exists, she is independent. All Europe recognizes
her : she depends on no Power either as sovereign or as
guarantor." 2
Since the date of these documents and statements,
practice had confirmed the principles enunciated in them.
As a completely independent Power Greece had waged
wars and concluded treaties with other Powers. It is
true that on certain occasions she was prevented from
fighting by coercive measures ; but these measures were
not taken bj^ the three Powers — sometimes they were
^ Wellington to Prince Leopold, lo Feb., 1830. State Papers,
1829-30.
~ Due de Broglie's Speech, 18 May, 1833. Ecrits et Discours,
Vol. II, pp. 415 foil.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 189
taken by two alone ; sometimes by the whole Concert
of Emope — nor were they taken in virtue of any
right other than the right of the stronger. Like-
wise, Greece had framed and revised her Constitution,
dethroned and enthroned Kings without asking any-
one's permission or sanction. It is true that in her
domestic revolutions the influence of the three Powers
could be plainly detected, but it was wholly in the nature
of backstairs intrigue — carried on by each against the
others — such as even the greatest Empires experience on
the part of interested outsiders. In short, since its birth
until igi6, no one had dreamt of questioning the status
of the Hellenic Kingdom as a completely independent
Power, or attempted to give to " the guarantee of the
political existence of Greece," which aimed at securing
her against external aggression, the interpretation that it
referred to her form of government and conferred a right
of interference in her internal affairs.
The present interference, clearly, had no more legal
basis than all the other invasions to which Greece had
submitted during the War under protest. Casuistry was
merely called in to cloak the exigencies of pohcy : King
Constantine's dethronement was decreed, not because it
was lawful, but because France required it, and England,
for good reasons, could not let France bring it about alone :
what Russia thought of the transaction, she soon let the
whole world know with disconcerting bluntness. Petro-
grad not only withdrew her troops from the performance,
but made short work of the " guarantee " and " protection"
quibbles by roundly declaring that " the choice of the
form of government in Greece, as well as its administrative
organization, appertains exclusively to the Greek people."*
Meanwhile M. Jonnart sped eastward, eager and deter-
mined to serve the ImperiaHst ambitions of the French
RepubUc in the Orient. His mandate gave him unlimited
choice of means, diplomatic and military, and he fully
justified the trust placed in his tact. On the maxim that,
the more prompt the display of force, the less likely the
occasion to use it, he decided, contrary to the instructions
he had received in London, not to wait and see whether
^ Communique of the Russian Government, Reutcr, Petrograd,
7 July, 1917.
190 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
King Constantine meditated hostile acts or not ; he
arranged for the necessary naval measures with Admiral
Gauchet, whom he met off Corfu, and, after a brief stop
in the Road of Salamis, he hastened to Salonica, where he
arranged with General Sarrail for the miUtary measures :
a simultaneous invasion of Thessaly, occupation of the
Isthmus of Corinth, and a landing at Athens. At the
same time he conferred with M. Venizelos, who pronounced
all these arrangements excellent, and suggested that, after
the removal of the King, he must give the public mind time
to calm down before returning to Athens : in the interval
M. Zaimis might be left in power. The period of transition
should perhaps last several months : a prudent counsel
with which ^I. Jonnart fully concurred : both he and M.
Ribot recognized the danger of hurrying the return of
the Cretan to a city which he had been describing as ready
to embrace him. The programme settled in all its details,
M. Jonnart left Salonica with General Regnault, who was
put in command of the divisions told off for Corinth and
Athens, and in the evening of 9 June arrived in the
Road of Salamis, where he took up his abode on board the
ironclad Justice^
Here the most deUcate part of his mission, and the one
in which he displayed most of his tact, commenced. On
the following evening (10 June) he met M. Zaimis on board
the Bruix at the Piraeus. It was, as we know, essential
that M. Zaimis should be induced to remain in power for
a while, to bridge over the gap between the deposition of
the King and the elevation of M. Venizelos. But it was
most unUkely that M. Zaimis would consent to play the
part assigned to him, if he knew what he was doing. There-
fore, at this first interview M. Jonnart did not think fit to
demand anything more than the control of the Thessalian
crops and the occupation of the Isthmus of Corinth.
Agreeably surprised at demands which fell so far short of
the objects Avith which rumour had credited the High
Commissioner, the Premier raised no difficulties ; and M.
Jonnart, in order " to gain his confidence," spoke to him
with his usual " accent of loyalty and frankness " about
the magnificent future the Protecting Powers had in store
for Greece. Then, under the pretence that he was awaiting
1 Jonnart, pp. 70-95.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 191
fresh instructions that night, he made another appointment
for the following morning. ^
The Greek left, and next morning (ii June) returned to
hear more. At this second interview M. Jonnart handed
to him an Ultimatum with a twenty-four hours' limit,
demanding that the King should abdicate and go, after
naming as his successor, not the legitimate Heir, but his
second son — a young man who, having no will of his own,
was highly recommended by M. Venizelos. Thus the
re-establishment of constitutional verity was to begin with
the violation of a fundamental article of the Constitution —
the succession by order of primogeniture.'* M. Zaimis
stood aghast — " wrung with emotion." M. Jonnart
spoke eloquently and urgently : the Powers only sought
the unity and Uberty of Greece — the greatness of Greece,
now divided, partly dismembered, in a state of anarchy,
on the eve of civil war. The High Commissioner would
do all that in liim lay that the change of reign might be
accompHshed in the most pacific manner. He appealed
warmly to the Premier's patriotism.*
According to some accounts, he added two more instances
of his " loyalty and frankness " by stating that, when the
War was over, the Powers would have no objection to the
restoration of King Constantine, if such should be the wish
of the Greek people — a statement which he authorized
M. Zaimis to publish ;* and that they had no intention to
bring M. Venizelos back : as soon as the unity of Greece
was achieved, the Salonica Government would disappear ;
only later on M. Venizelos might return to office by the
legal way and after new elections. On the other hand,
if the Ultimatum was not executed, he threatened the
downfall of the whole d5masty, the forcible establishment
of a Republic, and the immediate return of M. Venizelos. ^
The interview ended with a grim declaration by M.
Jonnart that, unless his decree was obeyed to the letter,
he would do to Athens what the Germans had done to his
native Arras — reduce it to a heap of ruins. ^
^ Jonnart, pp. 102-4. ^ gge Art. 45. ^ Jonnart, pp. 109-12.
* When the Greek Premier did so, M. Jonnart repudiated it as
" a mistake of M. Zaimis." — See The Times, 11 July, 1917.
^ Le Dipart dn Roi Constantin, Geneva, 1917, pp. 13, 14.
" Jonnart, p. 113.
192 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
There could be no doubt that M. Jonnart meant business :
he was an ex-Governor of Algeria ; his mentality and his
methods had been formed in the African school of Inter-
national Law. Remonstrance was futile and resistance
would be fatal : a column was already marching into
Thessaly ; part of an army corps had landed at Corinth ;
a powerful squadron rode off Salamis with its guns trained
on Athens ; troops were in the ports of Piraeus and Phaleron
ready at a signal to land and march on the capital. Con-
fronted with the choice either to help in the pacific libera-
tion of his country or to witness its devastation, M. Zaimis
chose the lesser evil ; and M. Jonnart was able to report,
with pardonable complacency : "I persuaded him to
continue in office, to take the message demanding his
abdication to the King, and to advise the King to
accept."^
With this message the Premier hurried off to Athens
and straightway communicated it to his sovereign. Im-
mediately a Crown Council was called at the Palace.
Besides M. Zaimis, all the ex-Premiers and leaders of
parties were present : Rallis, Dragoumis, Skouloudis,
Gounaris, Lambros, Calogeropoulos, Dimitracopoulos,
Stratos. From the first the King announced that he had
decided to accept the Ultimatum and leave Greece with
the Crown Prince, in order to spare her greater calamities,
such as would result from a conflict with the Entente
Powers.
Whether Constantine would not have been better
advised to have opposed the landing of the Allies at
Salonica ; or interned their army when he had it at his
mercy ; or arrested Admiral Dartige du Fournet and his
marines and held them, together with the Entente Ministers
and subjects, as hostages : whether by any of those acts
he might not have escaped this final blow, was now of small
account : though the point provides matter for very
interesting speculation. Now, with his troops and arms
bottled up in the Peloponnesus and his people reduced
by starvation to helplessness, all chance of escape was
cut off. A pitiful situation, no doubt, but more pitiful
had he attempted resistance. In such event, the Powers
would immediately declare that a state of war existed
1 The Times, ii July, igi?-
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 193
and France might acquire a permanent footing by right
of conquest.^
Nevertheless, two only of the statesmen assembled,
M. Zaimis and M. Stratos, pronounced in favour of sub-
mission. The rest were against it. True, they argued,
Greece completely disarmed could offer no effective
resistance to the armies and fleets which hemmed her in
on every side. Yet it were better that the King should
let violence be used against him, better that he should
be made the Powers' prisoner, than yield. His hopes of
sparing Greece greater calamities by his abnegation were
vain. No calamity could be greater than that which would
be produced by an acceptance of M. Jonnart's Ultimatum.
They recalled all the encroachments upon her neutrality,
all the infringements of her sovereignty, to which Greece
had submitted unresistingly, trusting to the Allies' solemn
promises. And how had they kept those promises ?
After the violation of so many pledges, how was it possible
to put faith in M. Jonnart's assurances ? If the French
troops pursued their march into the country, imposed upon
it Venizelos by force, dragged it into the war, who could
stop them ? Better perish without dishonour.
Such, in substance, were the arguments used. The King
remained unshaken. " We have no right to doubt the good
faith of M. Jonnart," he said. Despite past experience,
the man who was perpetually accused of having no scruple
about breaking his word, was still slow to beheve that
others could break theirs. He made all present promise
that they would use their utmost endeavours to have his
decision accepted by the people, so that no disturbance
might aggravate a situation already sufficiently menacing.
They all left the Council Chamber in tears. ^
In the afternoon a Cabinet meeting took place under the
presidency of the King, who, quite unmoved by the objec-
tions and entreaties of his Ministers, persisted in his
resolution. It was then decided that M. Zaimis should
draw up the reply, and that the draft, after receiving the
^ Even as it was, General Sarrail lamented the advent of M.
Venizelos at Salonica as " a Greek master-stroke " calculated " to
keep ' the coveted city ' Greek." — Sarrail, pp. 153, 154. He
evidently preferred not to have even a portion of Greece as an ally,
that he might treat the whole of it as an enemy.
- Le Depart du Roi Constantin, pp. 14-18.
13
194 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
King's approval, should be communicated to M. Jonnart.
This was done, and M. Jonnart having declared himself
satisfied, the document was handed to him next morning.
By that reply the Greek Premier, after noting the three
Powers' demand for the abdication of King Constantine
and the designation of his successor, briefly stated that
" His Majesty, solicitous as always only for the interest of
Greece, has decided to quit the country " [not to abdicate)
" with the Crown Prince, and designates as his successor
Prince Alexander."^
Thus far the High Commissioner's enterprise had pros-
pered beyond the anticipations of the most sanguine. And
now his anxieties began. From the moment of his arrival
the populace, which two years of contact \\dth the Allies
had made suspicious, became very uneasy and excited.
Throughout the night of lo June rumours circulated that
an ultimatum of an extreme nature had been presented to
the Government. Groups were formed in the streets and
squares, discussing the situation, criticizing the Govern-
ment bitterly, and inveighing against M. Zaimis, who,
it was said, was ready to accept still more rigorous demands.
The crowds grew in numbers and vehemence as the night
advanced ; and, in the morning of the nth, while M.
Zaimis was still with M. Jonnart, the Government, to
avert disturbances, issued a communique, stating that all
the rumours of fresh demands were devoid of foundation.
The Premier in his first conversation with the representa-
tive of the three Powers had not detected any danger
whatever either to the independence of the country or to
the djmasty or to the regime. On the contrary, M.
Jonnart had expressed the will of the Powers to see Greece
great, strong, and absolutely independent. Consequently
the Greek people ought to remain quiet, certain that by its
peaceful conduct it would contribute to the success of the
King's and the Government's efforts. ^
This declaration had calmed the public for a few hours.
But after the return of M. Zaimis from his second inter-
view with the High Commissioner, the object of M. Jon-
nart 's mission began to leak out : the whisper went round
that the King's abdication was demanded. The hasty
^ Jonnart, pp. 116-7.
2 Le Ddpart du Roi Constaniin, p. 11.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 195
convocation of a Crown Council intensified the public
uneasiness. The special measures for the maintenance
of order taken by the authorities, the advice to keep calm
whatever happened, which emanated from every influential
quarter, the haggard faces of all those who came out of the
Palace, left no doubt that something very serious was afoot.
More, it became known that during the night the Isthmus
of Corinth had been occupied by large numbers of French
troops which had taken up the rails of the line joining the
Peloponnesus to the capital, that the French fleet in
Salamis Strait had been reinforced, that the three Powers'
Ministers had quitted their Legations and nobody knew
where they had slept. Hour by hour the popular distress
increased, until late in the afternoon the news spread
through the town that the King had decided to go ; and
as it spread, the shops closed, the church bells began to
toll as for a funeral, and masses of people rushed from
every side towards the Palace, to prevent the King from
going. Soon all approaches to the Palace were blocked
and the building itself was completely besieged by a crowd
of agitated men and sobbing women, all demanding to
see their sovereign, and shouting : " Don't go ! Don't
go! "
Numerous deputations appeared before the King and
implored him to change his mind— in vain. To one of
them, sent by the officers of the Athens garrison, he spoke
as follows : " You know my decision. The interest of
our country demands that all, be they civilians or soldiers,
should submit to discipHne. Keep calm and preserve
your prudence." To a delegation composed of the heads
of the city guilds he repUed : " In the interests of the State,
gentlemen, I am obliged to leave the country. The people
must have confidence in my advisers. God will always
be with us, and Greece will become happy again. I
adjure you, gentlemen, in the name of the Almighty, to
offer no opposition. Any reaction would be in the highest
degree dangerous to the State. If I, born and bred in
Athens and Greek to the marrow of my bones, decide
to go, I don't do so, you understand well, except in
order to save my people and my country. Pray go to
your corporations and our fellow-citizens and tell them
to cease from gathering : to be calm and sensible,
196 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
because the King, at this moment, is performing a sacred
duty."i
The same delegation succeeded in reaching M. Zaimis,
and on coming out it pubhshed through a special edition
of a journal the result : " The Premier, with tears in his
eyes, and the other three Ministers present at the audience,
after relating the sequence of political events which have
led to this cruel decision about our beloved King, begged
us to advise the people in his name to face the crisis with
sang-froid, and to assure it that the abdication of the King
is but temporary, since, according to M. Jonnart's declara-
tion, it rests with the people to call him back after the
War ; that all resistance on the part of the people will
result in the abolition of the dynasty and the establishment
of a Republic under Venizelos ; that the Alhes would not
recoil from a bombardment of the capital and a military
occupation ; but if the people keep quiet, there will be no
military occupation of Athens, only some soldiers may land
at the Piraeus to stretch their legs — and so on."^
Nothing, however, could allay the popular agony. As
darkness fell, Athens presented a strange sight — silent
figures marching, one after another, towards where King
Constantine was spending his last night in his capital.
They made their forlorn pilgrimage without the least
noise, and as they went they passed other groups returning
with equal noiselessness. " It was," says an eye-witness,
" as if the people of Athens were visiting a tomb or a
lying-in-state."^
A crowd remained on guard all night long. About
4.30 a.m. a motor car was seen drawing up at a side en-
trance of the Palace. The crowd recognized the King's
chauffeur and guessed that he had come for the King and
the royal family, who presently appeared at the door.
The guardsmen threw themselves on the ground as much
as to say that the vehicle must pass over their bodies.
The King and royal family withdrew, and the car went
away empty. Two other attempts to leave the Palace
proved equally unsuccessful. The crowd would not let any
door be opened. Compact and silent, it mounted guard.
^ Le Depart du Roi Constantin, pp. 28-9.
2 Le Depart du Roi Constantin, pp. 26-7.
^ The Weekly Dispatch, 17 Juue, iyi7.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 197
So passed the night ; and the morning (12 June) dawned
on the faithful men and women who watched by the
Palace. The churches again began to toll funeral peals,
and again thousands began flowing in the same direction :
the whole town through all its streets — mournful groups,
soon waxing to mournful multitudes, and other multitudes,
streamed on. From an early hour the Palace was again
entirely surrounded :
" We will not let you go," they shouted. " We want
our King ! "
This was the answer the people made to the farewell
message which the King had caused to be posted at the
street corners : " Obeying necessity, and performing my
duty towards Greece, I am departing from my beloved
country with my heir, leaving my son Alexander on the
throne. I beg you to accept my decision with serenity,
trusting to God, whose blessing I invoke on the nation.
And that this sacrifice may not be in vain, I adjure all of
you, if you love God, if you love your country, if, lastly,
you love me, not to make any disturbance, but to remain
submissive. The least disorder, even if prompted by a
lofty sentiment, may to-day lead to the most terrible
disasters. At this moment the greatest solace for the
Queen and myself lies in the affection and devotion which
you have always shown to us, in the happy days as in
the unhappy. May God protect Greece. — Constantine
R."^ Motionless and silent groups read this message ;
but the crowd outside the Palace went on crjdng, monoton-
ously : " No ! No ! " and " He mustn't go ! "
These things began to fill the emissary of the Protecting
Powers with uneasiness. He felt that a clear manifestation
of the fact that the King had been superseded must be
given to the populace. ^ A proclamation in King Alexan-
der's name was accordingly issued. Simultaneously, a
notice, the text of which, it is affirmed, had been settled
between the Government and M. Jonnart, was pubHshed.
It ran : " To-day at noon, after the administration of the
oath to King Alexander, M. Jonnart by a special messenger
announced to the Greek Government that it could send at
once authorities to Salonica, since the Provisional Govern-
^ he Depart du Roi Constantin, pp. 30-1.
^ M. Jonnart, in The Times, 11 July, 191 7.
198 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
ment is henceforward dissolved. It is equally well-known
that M. Venizelos shall not by any means come to Athens,
and that the Powers have no ulterior design to establish
him in power. Greece is nowise bound to pursue the policy
of the Triumvirate, but is free to adhere to her neutrahty."^
For all that, the people continued restive. The King's
departure had been fixed for noon ; but in face of the
popular unwilhngness to let him go, the departure seemed
impossible. It became evident that the methods of per-
suasion wliich sufficed for the Premier did not suffice for
the people. Something more effective than the march into
distant Thessaly and the landing at remote Corinth was
needed. Accordingly, the destroyers came into Phaleron
Bay, and French troops began to disembark. ^ The
Athenians, however, did not seem to be cowed even when
they saw that the French troops advanced close to Athens.
\^Tiat was to be done ? Was M. Jonnart, after all, to
succeed no better than Admiral Dartige du Foumet ?
The ex-Governor of Algeria, put on his mettle, acted
promptly. He sent word to M. Zaimis that the King's
departure should not be any longer delayed : if the Greek
police were unable to disperse the crowd, the High Com-
missioner was ready to send from the Piraeus some com-
panies of machine-guns.'
Then, at 5 p.m., a last attempt was made by the royal
family to leave the Palace. It succeeded, thanks to a
feint which decoyed the crowd to a side door, while the
fugitives escaped by the main entrance.
The day, in spite of all forebodings, ended without a
disturbance. The parade of overwhelming force by M.
Jonnart and his unmistakable determination to use it
mercilessly had, no doubt, convinced a populace quick to
grasp a situation that opposition spelt suicide. But it
was mainly the example and exhortations of their King
that compelled them to suppress their rage and resign
themselves to the inevitable. For — Greece is a land of
paradoxes — no full-blooded Greek, whether statesman or
soldier, was ever clothed with the same amplitude of
authority over his countrymen as this simple, upright,
1 Le D spar I du Roi Constantin, p. 34.
2 The Weekly Dispatch, 17 June, 191 7-
' Jonnart, p. 128.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 199
kindly son of a Danish father and a Russian mother, in
whom the subtle Hellenes found their ideal Basileus.
And so the drama which had been staged for more than
a year by French diplomacy was satisfactorily wound up ;
and the curtain fell, amid the applause of the spectators.^
^ Of all English newspapers the Weekly Dispatch (17 June, 1917)
alone gave some account of this last scene of the drama. The rest
atoned for their self-denial in narrative by proportionate self-
indulgence in comment. One of them described the coup as " a
distinct gain both to our interests in the East and to our moral
position in the world." British agents on the spot must have been
strangely blind to this aspect of the business ; for General Sarrail
complains that the coup succeeded in spite of the obstacles raised
" by our allies, the English. It was cl contre-cceur that 500 of
their men were furnished me for the descent on Thessaly. The
Chief of the British Staff, no doubt by order, sought to learn my
plans that he might telegraph them and ruin our action, etc." —
Sarrail, p. 242. Without for a moment accepting the French
General's suggestions of British double-dealing, we have every
reason to believe that he was right in the view that the disgraceful
affair did not enjoy British official sympathy.
CHAPTER XIX
MJONNART celebrated his triumph with yet
another proclamation by which he assured the
* Greek people that the " guaranteeing " Powers
were there to restore Constitutional Verity and the regular
working of constitutional institutions ; that all reprisals
against Greeks, to whatever party they might belong,
would be ruthlessly repressed ; that the liberty of every-
body would be safeguarded ; that the " protecting "
Powers, respectful of the people's sovereignty, had no
intention of imposing a mobihzation upon it.^
The sincerity of these professions was soon brought to
the test. While penning them, M. Jonnart had before
him two lists of persons marked down for reprisals. The
first contained thirty victims, foremost among them M.
Gounaris, General Dousmanis, and Colonel Metaxas —
M. Streit had anticipated his doom by accompanying his
sovereign into exile ; these were deported to Corsica.
The second Ust comprised one hundred and thirty persons
— two ex-Premiers, MM. Skouloudis and Lambros, six
ex-Ministers of State, one General, one Admiral, other
officers of high rank, lawyers, publicists — who were to be
placed under surveillance. The King's three brothers-
Princes Nicholas, Andrew, and Christopher — were banished
with their famihes to Switzerland. In addition, certain
individuals of lower class who had participated in the
events of i and 2 December, and whose culpability
was vouched for by the French Secret Service, were to be
arrested and brought to book.^
M. Jonnart, forbidden by his diplomatic art from
meddhng openly in the internal affairs of the country,
caused this epuration to be carried out through M. Zaimis.
It was hard for the poor Premier to expel fellow-citizens
1 Reuter, Athens, 16 June, 1917 ; Jonnart, pp. 137-40.
2 Jonnart, pp. 147-51, 179-80.
200
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 201
who had occupied eminent positions and with whom he
had been in close relations — not to mention the flagrant
illegaUty of such a proceeding. ^ But how could he hope
to argue successfully against a man who, under the ap-
pearances of a scrupulous conscience, recognized no law ?
So it came that, after a long interview on board the Justice
(i6 June), M. Zaimis fell in with M. Jonnart's wish.^
This rapid fulfilment of the " no reprisals " pledge was
declared necessary to make Athens safe for the AlHes.^ It
certainly was indispensable to make it safe for M. Venizelos,
whose immediate return, by a modification of the original
plan, had been resolved upon. The French, finding
things composed into tranquihty much sooner than they
anticipated, saw no cause for delay. Was it not a fact
that whenever the High Commissioner visited the capital,
he met with nothing but respect, sympathy, and cries of
" Vive la France " ?* It was : in all ages, from the time
of the Roman Consul Flamininus onwards, there have
been found Greeks loving liberators more than liberty.
But M. Venizelos knew better. Whilst at Salonica, he
used to assure his Western friends that " the great majority
at Athens remained Venizelist. If proof be desired, it is
only necessary to organize a referendum, subject, of
course, to guarantees of impartiality. Let the King and
his satelhtes be put aside for the moment, let controllers
be appointed from all countries . . . and let the people
be asked to vote freely. ... I am sure of a great majority.
Let them take me at my word ! "^ When, however, the
King and his satellites were about to be put aside, M.
Venizelos, as we have seen, had stipulated for some months
of delay ; and now that they had been put aside, he still
felt that the partial epuration did not suffice for his safety.
No doubt, the bayonets which had pulled the King down
were able to set him up. But M. Venizelos, for reasons
both personal and patriotic, shrank from leaning on foreign
bayonets more than was unavoidable. He had no desire
to justify the nickname, bestowed upon him months ago,
^ See Art. 4 of the Greek Constitution.
2 Jonnart, p. 147.
^ Ibid, p. 160.
* Ibid, p. 170.
^ The New Europe, 29 March, 191 7, p. 327.
202 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
of " Archisenegalesos " {" Chief of the Senegalese ") — an
epithet convejang the suggestion that he aimed at turning
Greece into a dependency of France. M. Jonnart seemed
to share this laudable delicacy.^
General Sarrail, however, cared nothing for appearances,
but itched to get M. Venizelos out of Salonica at the earliest
possible moment. His first favourable impression of the
Cretan as "somebody" had not survived closer acquain-
tance. He considered him wanting in courage. He had no
patience with his hesitations. He felt, in short, no more
respect for him than men usually feel for their tools ; and
since he had never learned to put any restraint on his
tongue, he expressed his opinion of this " ex-revolutionary
transformed into a Government man " freely. The Greek
was too discreet to say what he thought of the Frenchman ;
but as he was not less vain and domineering, their inter-
course at Salonica had been the reverse of harmonious.^
Thus the Leader of the Liberals found himself prodded
back to the city from wliich he had been prodded nine
months before.
He arrived on board a French warship off the Piraeus
on 21 June. But he gave out that he did not intend to
come to Athens, or to call himself to power. An agreement,
he said, had been reached between M. Jonnart and M.
Zaimis to the effect that a mixed Ministerial Commission
should be formed to negotiate the unification of the country.'
That was true. With his usual sense of propriety, the
High Commissioner would not dream of usurping the
place of the acknowledged chiefs of the Greek people. It
was for them to take the initiative. The " guaranteeing "
Powers wliich he represented respected the national will
too much to dictate the terms of the fusion between the
two sections into which Greece had been so unfortunately
divided. Therefore, he invited the heads of the two
Governments, M. Zaimis and M. Venizelos, to enter into
direct conversations : he offering to act as a simple ad-
^ Jonnart, p. 159.
2 Sarrail, pp. 102, 153, 234-5. One of their quarrels arose from
the fact that General Sarrail claimed entire jurisdiction over the
inhabitants of the country, many of whom he had deported to
France as suspects and refused to give them up to the courts
competent to deal with them.
^ Renter, Athens, 21 June, 1917.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 203
viser, mediator, at most arbitrator. Both seized on the
invitation.^
The main question had aheady been settled betv/een
M. Jonnart and M. Venizelos : the latter should return to
power at once. But, legally he could only return by a
parliamentary election, and, as he could not hope for a
majority, neither he nor M. Jonnart wanted an election.
It was accordingly decided that, since no reliance could
be placed on the popular will of the present, an appeal
should be made to the popular will of the past : the
Chamber of 13 June, 1915, in which M. Venizelos had a
majority, should be recalled to life, on the gi-ound that its
dissolution, in their opinion, was illegal. This decision —
so well calculated to preserve externals with all the rever-
ence which expediency permitted — was, on 24 June,
formally conveyed by the High Commissioner to M.
Zaimis, who, doing what was expected of him, tendered
his resignation. The High Commissioner thanked him
and promptly obtained from King Alexander a declara-
tion that he was ready to entrust the Government to M.
Venizelos, who only asked for a delay of two days to fetch
his Cabinet from Salonica.^
Meanwhile, the news that M. Venizelos was coming had
spread, and the return at that delicate moment of the
yacht Sphacteria which had carried King Constantine away
added fuel to the flame. In the evening (24 June), the
crew of the boat, joined by students and reservists, paraded
the streets with a portrait of the King and cried " Long
live Constantine ! " The column of demonstrators grew
as it went along — the police being unable or unwilling to
check it. Without a doubt, M. Venizelos was right : the
epuration of the capital had not gone far enough. To
prevent surprises, General Regnault, commander of the
landing forces, immediately took the measures which he
had carefully planned in advance. By dawn of 25 June,
French troops with artillery had occupied all the heights
round the town : they were to stay there as long as M.
Venizelos wanted them — and, perhaps, even longer.'
^ Jonnart, p. i6i. 2 Jonnart, pp. 162-73, 180-1.
' Jonnart, pp. 176-8, 199-201. The Italians, who had stepped
into Epirus, only evacuated it when they made sure that their alHes
were quitting Thcssaly and Attica.
204 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Under such conditions the People's Chosen formed his
Ministry (26 June), and nerved himself to face the people.
Every preparation for his entry into the capital had been
made. Nothing remained but to fix the hour. But tliis
he evaded doing in a manner which puzzled and exas-
perated the French General. It was the goal towards
which they had moved steadily and methodically, step
tracing step, through so many weary months — the crown
of their joint adventure. Why, then, did he not seize it ?
Why did he shrink from possession ? What did he mean
by it ? The General did not know. But he felt that it
would not do. " M. le President," he said to him, in-
cisively, " Here you are in power ; it is up to you to
assume the responsibility. I have the force in my hands,
and it is my business to secure your installation in Athens.
But I must have your instructions. Tell me what measures
you want me to take." The request was a command.
M. Venizelos thanked the General effusively, pressing his
hands. " After all," he said, "it is certain that people
will always say that I did not return to Athens but with
the support of the Allies." Finally it was arranged
that he should land in the forenoon of 27 June. An
ordeal which could not be avoided ought not to be
postponed.
At the appointed hour the French troops entered Athens
with their macliine-gims and occupied the principal points
along the route by which M. Venizelos was to proceed,
while the vicinity of the Royal Palace where he was to
take the oath of office and the interior of it were watched
by 400 Cretan gendarmes, his faithful bodyguard, come
from Salonica. Notwithstanding all these precautions,
M. Venizelos and his Ministers, modestly averse from
exposing themselves to the enthusiasm of their fellow-
citizens, motored at top speed straight to the Palace,
eschewing the central thoroughfares, and thence to the
Hotel Grande Bretagne, in the corridors of which also
Cretan stalwarts mounted guard. Thanks to this vigil-
ance, as General Regnault observes, the assassins whom the
Premier and his friends feared to see rise from everj^ street
corner, and even in the passages of the Palace and hotel,
had not materialized. But ]\I. Venizelos, where his own
hfe was concerned, took no chances : a Cretan regiment
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 205
from Salonica landed that afternoon to replace the foreign
battalions.^
Towards evening a demonstration organized in the
square before the hotel gave M. Venizelos an opportunity
of appearing on the balcony and making an eloquent
speech. He reminded his hearers how the last warning
he had addressed to King Constantine from the balcony
of his house ten months ago had been disregarded, and how,
in consequence, the part of the nation still healthy had
risen to save the rest. The cure thus begun would go on
until it had wrought out its accomplishment. In due
time a Constituent Assembly would be elected to revise
the Constitution so as to place beyond peradventure the
sovereignty of the people. Meanwhile, the national
system had been singularly enfeebled and corrupted bj/ the
late autocratic regime : the public services did not do their
work as they ought ; impurities had crept into the blood ;
the body politic needed purging. He would put all this
right. He would restore the system to vigorous activity.
Every impurity would be cleansed from it, and pure,
refreshed blood would circulate all over the body politic,
giving health to every fibre of the State. As to matters
external, he thought it needless to say that the place of
Greece was by the side of the Powers who fought for
democracy. ^
The next two days saw this programme at work.
A rupture of relations with the Central Empires, to be
followed by a mobilization, marked the end of Greek
neutrality. King Alexander, as yet a novice in statecraft,
expressed surprise at the inconsistency between these acts
and the repeated assurances given to the Greek people.
He was told that the accession of M. Venizelos could mean
nothing else but war : his Majesty knew it : having
accepted Venizelos, he must accept his foreign policy.^
Not less was the young king's shock at another act of
the new Government — the suspension, by a Royal Decree,
of the irremovability of judges which is expressly guaran-
teed by the Constitution. " They accused my father of
1 Regnault, pp. 100-2 ; Jonnart, p. 184 ; The Morning Post,
29 June, 1917.
^ Jonnart, pp. 185-90.
3 Ibid, pp. 191-3, 193-6.
206 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
violating the Constitution," he said to M. Jonnart, " and
the first thing they ask me to do is to \dolate it." So
acute an interpreter of Constitutional Law could have
small difficulty in disposing of these scruples. He ex-
plained to the young monarch that he could sign the
decree without any compunction : the Constituent
Assembly which would be elected by and by to revise the
Constitution would legitimatize everything. He went on
to give him a httle, simple lecture on the elements of
Constitutional Verity, its theory and its practice : " In a
short time," he concluded suavely, " Your Majesty will
know on this subject as much as any of your Ministers," —
whenever he experienced the need of further instruction,
he only had to call the High Commissioner, who promised
to come and solve his perplexities in a trice. ^
The soundness of the instruction might be questionable.
But the source from which it came gave it unquestionable
weight.
By the time M. Jonnart left Athens (7 July), he had
every reason to feel gratified at the complete success of his
efforts. France's protege was installed at the head of the
Hellenic Nation, ready to lead it forth by her side ; the
regular working of Constitutional institutions was assured ;
and the foundations of a democratic government were well
and truly laid. In all history it would be difficult to find
a more signal instance of brute force and bad faith triumph-
ing in the name of Law and Verity.
^ Jonnart, pp. 194-5-
CHAPTER XX
IT is not my intention to give a minute and consecu-
tive account of the abnormal state which prevailed
in Greece during a period of more than three years.
I will, for once, flatter its authors by imitating their
summary methods.
M. Venizelos, hating monarchy, yet unable to dispense
with it ; despising democracy, yet obhged to render it
Up-homage ; maintained his own unlimited power by the
same system of apparent liberty and real violence by which
he had attained it. The semblance of a free Constitution
was preserved in all its forms : Crown, ParUament, Press,
continued to figure as heretofore. But each only served
to clothe the skeleton of a dictatorship as absolute as that
of any Caesar. King Alexander, without experience or
character, weak, frivolous and plastic, obediently signed
every decree presented to him. When recourse to the
Legislature was thought necessary, the Chamber per-
functorily passed every Bill submitted to it. The news-
papers were tolerated as long as they refrained from
touching on essentials.
At the very opening of Pariiament, for so we must call
this illegitimate assembly, the King, in a Speech from the
Throne written by M. Venizelos, expounded his master's
policy, external and internal. Externally, Greece had
" spontaneously offered her feeble forces to that belUgerent
group whose war aims were to defend the rights of nationali-
ties and the Hberties of peoples."^ Internally, she would
have to be purified by the removal of the staunchest
adherents of the old regime from positions of trust and
influence. But neither of these operations could be
carried out save under the reign of terror known as martial
law. Parliament, therefore, voted martial law ; and
M. Venizelos, " irritated by the arbitrary proceedings "
^ For the full text of the Speech, see The Hesperia, lo Aug., 191 7.
207
208 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
of the Opposition, which protested against the restrictions
on pubhc opinion, " emphasised the fact that the Govern-
ment was determined to act with an iron hand and to
crush any attempt at reaction."^
Never was promise more faithfully kept. Within the
Chamber it soon became a parliamentary custom to
refute by main force. Sometimes Liberal Deputies
volunteered for this service ; sometimes it was performed
by the Captain of the Premier's Cretan Guard, who of
course had no seat in the House, but who held a revolver
in his hand.
Out of Parliament the iron hand made itself felt through
the length and breadth of the country.
With a view to " purging and uphfting the judiciary
body " and " securing Justice from political interference," ^
all the courts were swept clean of Royalist magistrates,
whose places were filled with members of the Liberal
Party. In this way the pernicious connexion between the
judicial and pohtical powers, aboHshed in 1909— perhaps
the most beneficial achievement of the Reconstruction
era — was re-established, and Venizehsm became an indis-
pensable quahfication for going to law with any chance of
obtaining justice.
An equally violent passion for purity led at the same
time, and by a process as imconstitutional as it was un-
canonical, to ecclesiastical reforms, whereby the Holy
S^mod was deposed and an extraordinary disciplinary
court was erected to deal with the clerical enemies of the
new regime, especially with the prelates who took part in
the anathematization of ]\L Venizelos. Only five bishops
were found in Old Greece competent or compHant enough
to sit on this tribunal ; the other seven came from Mace-
donia, Crete, and Mytilene, though those dioceses were
under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople,
whose sanction was neither asked nor given. With the
exception of six, five of whom belonged to the disciphnary
court, all the prelates of the Kingdom were struck by it :
some were degraded and turned out to subsist as they
might, on charity or by the sale of their holy vestments ;
others were sentenced to humiUating pmiishments ; and
1 The Morning Post, 9 Aug., 1917.
2 Speech from the Throne.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 209
where no plausible excuse for a trial could be discovered,
exile or confinement was inflicted arbitrarily. On the
other hand, as many as repented received plenary absolu-
tion. For instance, the Bishops of Demetrias and Gytheion
were deprived for having cursed M. Venizelos ; but on
promising in future to preach the gospel according to him,
they were not only pardoned, but nominated members of
the second disciplinary court created to continue the
purification of the Church. Even more instructive was the
case of the Metropohtan of Castoria who was tried, con-
victed, and confined in a monastery, but after recanting
his pohtical heresies was retried, unanimously acquitted,
and reinstated. All this, in the words of the Speech
from the Throne, " to restore the prestige of the
Church."
Side by side went on the reform of every branch of the
Administration. All the Prefects, and many lesser
functionaries, were discharged. Schoolmasters and
schoolmistresses were dismissed by the hundred. The
National University, the National Library, the National
Museum, the National Bank, underwent a careful disin-
fection. In every Department the worst traditions of the
spoils system prevalent before 1909 were revived and
reinvigorated. Other measures marked an improvement
on tradition. Some two thousand Army and Navy
officers, from generals and admirals downwards, were put
on the retired list or under arrest. And an almost hys-
terical desire manifested itself to strike terror into every
civilian whom his opinions rendered objectionable and his
position dangerous to the new order : tactics the full
brutahty of which was revealed in the treatment of M.
Venizelos 's principal adversaries.
M. Rufos, a former Cabinet Minister, languished in the
Averoff gaol from 1917 until the spring of 1920, when the
Athenian newspapers announced his release. About the
same time M. Esslin, an ex-President of the Chamber, who
had been imprisoned at the age of seventy-eight in the
Syngros gaol, was released by death.
All the members of the Skouloudis Cabinet, with the
exception of Admiral Coundouriotis, Minister of Marine*
who had afterwards proved his patriotism by enlisting
under the Cretan's banner, were arraigned for high treason,
14
210 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
referring mainly to the surrender of Fort Rupel. The
preliminary examination dragged on from year to year and
produced only evidence wliich established the innocence
of the accused.^ One of them, ex-Premier Ralhs, in April
1920, after being for years hbelled as a traitor, suddenly
found himself exempted by Royal Decree from further
persecution, because at that time M. Venizelos conceived
the hope that this statesman might be induced to under-
take the leadership of an Opposition accepting his regime.
The rest, particularly M. Skouloudis and M. Dragoumis,
one aged eighty-two and the other seventy-seven, after a
long confinement in the Evangehsmos Hospital, remained
to the end under strict surveillance, \vith gendarmes
guarding their houses and dogging their footsteps.
The Lambros Cabinet was similarly harassed, until one
of its members turned Venizelist and three others died ;
among the latter M. Lambros himself and his Minister for
Foreign Affairs, M. Zalocostas. Both these gentlemen,
though in poor health, had been confined on desolate
islets of the Archipelago, where they were kept without
proper medical attendance or any of the comforts which
their condition required, and were only brought home to
expire.
In each case — as also in that of the soldiers responsible
for the surrender of the Cavalla garrison, whose " treason-
able " conduct became Ukewise the subject of judicial
investigation — ^trial was sedulously deferred by a variety
of ingenious contrivances ; nothing being more remote
from the Government's mind than an intention to draw
the truth into the light. The motive of these proceedings
doubtless was one of pohcy chiefly — to ruin the enemies
of the regime in public esteem by branding them as traitors,
even if no conviction could be obtained. But poUcy was
not the only element . To j udge by the harshness displayed,
there was the personal factor, too. M. Venizelos had had a
feud with these men and had vanquished them. They
were men whom, all things considered, it was more a
shame to fight than an honour to vanquish — and they were
humbled : they were in his power. For a proud spirit
that would have been enough ; it was not enough for
1 It also brought to light documents of real historic value, such as
the dispatches included in the White Booh (Nos. 70 foil.).
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 211
M. Venizelos. He acted as if he wanted to enjoy their
hmnihation, and because he had them down to profit by
their helplessness.
Identical treatment could not be meted out to those
in Corsica and Switzerland, though some of them were
sentenced to death by default for conspiring against M.
Venizelos. But all that could be done from a distance to
embitter their lot was done. Whilst at home the blackest
calumnies were thrown upon them : in exile they were
pursued by the same bhght. Special attention was
directed to the " arch-traitor." He had been dethroned
and expatriated ; but this was not enough. His pension
was cut off. He and all the members of his family, with the
exception of Prince George, who stayed in Paris, were
forbidden to visit Entente coimtries, even for the purpose
of attending the death-bed of a relative. Entente subjects
visiting Switzerland were forbidden to go near them :
lest any particle of the truth should percolate. Until the
end of the War they Hved segregated, shunned, and spied
upon like malefactors. During the Liberal regime in
Greece, while Itahan and Swiss hotels flourished all the
year round on Royahst refugees, RoyaUst exiles populated
the semi-desert islands of the Archipelago : they were
gathered in batches and shipped off — persons of every
degree, from general officers whose guilt was attachment
to their King, down to poor people convicted of owning
the King's portrait. For the possession of a portrait of
Constantine supplied one of the most common proofs
of " ill-will towards the estabhshed order " {dysmeneia
kata tou kathestotos) — a new crime invented to meet a new
constitutional situation. It extended to the utmost
confines of the kingdom. As the farmers were at work in
the fields, gendarmes raided and ransacked their cottages
for such portraits ; butchers and fishmongers were haled
before courts-martial for hke indications of ill-will ; and —
matter for laughter and matter for tears are inseparable
in modern Greek history (perhaps in all history) — one met
a cabman beaten again and again for calhng his horse
" Cotso " (diminutive of " Constantine "), or a woman
dragged to the police-station because her parrot was heard
whistUng the Constantine March. Volumes would be
needed to record the petty persecutions which arose from
212 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
the use of that popular name : suffice it to say that prudent
parents refrained from giving it to their children.
If enemies had to be frightened by every exhibition of
severity, it was not less imperative to gratify friends by
every mark of generosity. As already noted, a Mixed
Commission had been appointed under the old regime to
indemnify out of the pubhc purse the Venizehsts who
suffered during the Athens disturbances of i and 2 Decem-
ber, 1916. This body, after the expulsion of the King,
was remodelled by the substitution of a Venizehst for the
Royahst Greek member ; was authorized to enlarge its
pur\dew so as to cover all losses occasioned, directly or
indirectly, by Royahst resentment throughout the King-
dom throughout the six months' blockade — including
even the cases of persons who, compelled to flee the country,
were torpedoed in the course of their voyage ; and was
invested with powers of deciding unfettered by any legisla-
tion or by any obligation to give reasons for its decisions.
Thanks to their unlimited scope and discretion, the Com-
missioners, after rejecting some 2,500 claims as fraudulent,
were still able to admit 3,350 claims and to aUot damages
representing a total sum of just under seven million
drachmas.^
The number of old adherents confirmed in the faith
through this expedient, however, was as nothing to the
legions of proselytes won by the creation of new Govern-
ment posts of every grade in every part of the Kingdom,
by the facihties afforded in the transaction of all business
over which the State had any control — which under
existing conditions meant all important business — and by
the favours of various sorts that were certain to reward
devotion to the cause. Beside the steadily growing swarm
of native parasites, profiteers, jobbers and adventurers
who throve on the spoils of the pubhc, marched a less
numerous, but not less ravenous, host of foreign financiers,
concession and contract hunters, to whom the interests of
the State were freely bartered for support to the party in
the Entente capitals.
The economic exhaustion caused by this reckless waste
of national wealth, in addition to the necessary war ex-
^ Rapport official de la Commission mixte des indeinnitis, Paris,
1919.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 213
penditure, was concealed at the time partly by credits
furnished to M. Venizelos in Paris and London, and partly
by an artificial manipulation of the exchange for his sake.
It became apparent when these poUtical influences ceased
to interfere with the normal working of financial laws.
Then the Greek exchange, which at the outbreak of the
European War stood at 26 or 27 drachmas to the pound
sterling, and later was actually against London, dropped
to 65, and by a rapid descent reached the level of 155.
Thus in the domain of finance, as in every other, the
valuable reconstructive acliievement of 1909 — which had
led to the transformation of a deficit of from ten to twelve
millions into a surplus of fifteen milHons and to the accu-
mulation of deposits that enabled the Greek exchange to
withstand the shock of several conflicts — was demolished
by its own architect.
The illusion that M. Venizelos had the nation behind
him was diligently kept up by periodical demonstrations
organized on his behalf : joy bells announced to the
Athenians his home-comings from abroad, the destitute
refugees harboured at the Piraeus were given some pocket
money and a free ticket to attend him up to the capital,
the cafes at the bidding of the poHce disgorged their
loafers into the streets, and the army of genuine partisans
thus augmented with auxiharies, accorded their Chief a
reception calculated to impress newspaper readers in
France and England. But observers on the spot knew that
the " national enthusiasm " was as hollow as a drum,
which under the manipulation of an energetic minority
could be made to emit a considerable amount of noise ;
that the demonstrators to a large extent were a stage
crowd which could be moved rapidly from place to place
and round the same place repeatedly ; that since the
schism the great Cretan had loomed small in his own
country and that he had grown less by his elevation.
Such terrorism of opponents and favouritism of ad-
herents ; such encouragement of oppression and connivance
at corruption ; such a prostitution of justice ; such a
cynical indifference to all moral principle — unparalleled
even in the history of Greece — could not but make the
Cretan's rule both odious and despicable. What made it
more hateful still in the eyes of the people was the fact
214 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
that it had been imposed upon them by foreign arms, and
what made it more contemptible still was the fact that it
fimctioned mider false pretences. As free men, the Greeks
resented the violence done to their liberty ; but as intel-
ligent men they would have resented open violence less than
a profanation of the name of liberty that added mockery
to injury and administered a daily affront to their intelli-
gence. There was yet a spirit of resistance in the country
which would not be crushed, and a fund of good sense
which could not be deceived. If they formerly anathema-
tized M. Venizelos as a traitor, the masses now execrated
him as a tyrant : a mean and crafty bully without bowels
of mercy who gave licence to his followers to commit every
species of oppression and exploitation in the interest of
party.
Such were the feelings with which the very name of
Venizelos inspired the mass of the people. And that the
mass of the people was in the main right can scarcely be
contested. It would, of course, be absurd to hold M,
Venizelos directly responsible for every individual act of
oppression and corruption, most of which occurred during
his absences from the country and of which he was not
cognizant. But it was he who had initiated both oppres-
sion and corruption. M. Jonnart's proscriptive lists were
really M. Venizelos 's, who had long since made his own
enemies pass for enemies to the Entente. The " purifica-
tion " of the public ser\aces, as well as the prosecutions,
the imprisonments and deportations of eminent personages,
some of whom died of the hardships and privations they
underwent, were his owm doing. The multipHcation of
offices and officials began with his creation, at the very
outset, of two new Ministries ; a measure to which even
King Alexander demurred when the list of M. Venizelos 's
Cabinet was presented to him.^ Nor is there upon record
a single case in which the Chief seriously attempted either
to restrain or to punish his subordinates. In truth, he was
not free to do so. He was bound to the system he had
brought into being and was irretrievably committed to
all its works.
A man who gains supreme power against the wishes of
^ Jonnajt, p. 183 : " A clean sweep in Greece." — The Daily
Chronicle, 2 July. 1917 — an outline of M. Venizelos's programme.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 215
the majority, and only with the consent of a faction, cannot
maintain himself in it except by force and bribery. He
must coerce and corrupt. Moreover, to rule without a
rival, he must surround himself with men vastly inferior
to him both in talent and in virtue : men who, in return
for their obsequious servility, must be humoured and
satisfied. Whenever such a usurpation occurs, all the
maxims upon which the welfare and freedom of a com-
munity normally rest are annihilated, and the reign of
profligacy and of tyi-anny inevitably supervenes : a regime
bom in party passion must live for purely party ends.
We may break or circumvent all laws, save the eternal
and immutable law of cause and effect.^
The best of M. Venizelos's followers sincerely regretted the
unceasing persecution of their adversaries : they saw that
stability could not be attained without conciliation and
co-operation ; but they did not see how clemency could be
combined with safety. The thousands of officers and
officials who had been turned out of their posts, and the
politicians who were kept out of office found employment,
and the private individuals who had suffered for their
"ill-will towards the estabhshed order" relief in plotting
and intriguing : there was so much unrest that the
authorities had to use severe measures.
M. Venizelos himself wished to make his administration
milder and cleaner and to broaden its basis — he was even
credited with the one joke of his life in this connexion :
" I will yet head anti-Venizelism." But the tiling was
beyond his power : he had not a sufficient following in
the country to replace armed force ; and he dared not
trust the Royalists with a share in the government for
fear lest they should use it against him. None, indeed,
was more painfully conscious of the hate for him which
every month increased in the breasts of his countrymen
than M. Venizelos himself. From the very beginning of
the schism he had assumed a prophylactic in the form of a
cuirass; 2 and since his installation he neglected none of
1 There have been usurpers, like OUver Cromwell, who managed
to temper tyranny with probity ; but their cases are exceptional
and their success only a matter of degree.
2 An article of this kind was found in his house after the fighting
of 2 Dec, 1916.
21G GREECE AND THE ALLIES
the precautions requisite for his personal security. During
his rare sojourns in Athens he always went about escorted
by his Cretan guards ; while on the roof of a building
facing his house stood two machine-guns, " for," as a
witty Athenian informed an inquisitive stranger, " the
protection of minorities."
In general, it is true, the plotting and intriguing which
permeated the country were too fatuous to be dangerous.
But every now and then they took on formidable shape.
In November, 1919, a carefully organized miUtary con-
spiracy at Athens only miscarried through the indiscretion
of a trusty but tipsy sergeant. Among the letters inter-
cepted and produced at the trial was one from a Royalist
exile in Italy to another at home. The writer, a lady,
reported her brother as wondering how anybody in Greece
could fail to understand that there no longer existed such
things as a Government and an Opposition, but only
tyrants and tyrannized over, who worked, the former to
maintain their arbitrary authority, the latter to shake it
off and recover their liberty. The work of neither could,
in the nature of things, be carried on according to any
constitutional rule or law. He went on to argue that,
under such conditions, deeds which would otherwise be
crimes were justified and even glorified by history as
unavoidable fulfilments of a patriotic duty : force must
be met by force. ^
So the national demorahzation inaugurated by foreign
pressure went on being promoted by domestic tyranny ;
and of cure there was no hope. Good men would not
associate themselves with the Venizehst regime, because
it was bad ; and even men by no means notorious for
goodness shunned it, not because it was bad, but because
they were shrewd enough to perceive it was too bad to
last.
1 The Heslia, 27 Dec. (O.S.), 1919.
CHAPTER XXI
THE Liberal regime, having few roots in the soil and
those rotten, could not but be ephemeral, unless the
external force that had planted continued to uphold
it : in which case M. Venizelos might have Uved to weep
over the triumph of his cause and the ruin of his country.
This contingency, however, was eliminated in advance by
the clashing ambitions of the Allies — the real guarantee
of Greek independence. Foreign interference, made pos-
sible by the War, had to cease with it. And that was not
all. M. Ribot, on i6 July, 1917, had declared in the French
Senate that the changes brought about in Greece would
have to be ratified by a Greek National Assembly. M.
Venizelos also had, as we saw, stated on his advent that
the 1915 Chamber was but a temporary solution : that in
due time a Constituent Assembly would be elected to settle
matters — a statement which he repeated shortly after-
wards in Parliament : " The representatives of the Nation,"
he said, " watch with perfect calmness the internal evolu-
tion of the political life of the country and wait for the
removal of the obstacles which do not permit the immediate
convocation of the National Assembly that will lay
definitely the basis of the State."
After nearly three years of " internal evolution," the
time for the redemption of these pledges seemed to the
people overdue. In vain did M. Venizelos endeavour to
put off the day of trial by arguing that it was advisable
to avoid the agitation inseparable from an election whilst
Greece was still at war with Turkey, and by promising that
the elections would follow close upon the signature of
peace. It was natural that he should adopt this course :
he could not but hope that the fruits of his foreign poUcy —
fruits never even dreamt of a few years before — would
reconcile the people to his domestic administration. It
was equally natural that the people should be impatient :
217
218 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Turkey may not sign peace for ages, they protested ;
meanwhile are we to go on Hving under martial law ?
They demanded the dissolution of the illegal and, at best,
long superannuated Chamber, and fresh elections. The
call for freedom grew louder, more insistent, more im-
perious and dangerous, until M. Venizelos took a first
tentative step towards a return to normality.
On 6 May, 1920 — the day of the pubUcation of the
Turkish Peace terms granted by the Allies at San Remo —
a Royal Decree was issued at Athens aboHshing martial
law. As at a signal, the Press turned its search-lights on
the inroads made into the Constitution. Abuses and
excesses hitherto held back by the Censorship gained
pubhcity. Pohtical groups started organizing themselves
for the electoral contest, with every grievance of the past
as an incitement to action in the future. Most disturbing
manifestation of all — ^though one that might have been
foretold — streets and taverns resounded again with the
song in which King Constantine was referred to as " The
Son of the Eagle " leading his army to glory. E\idently
the efforts to root up loyalism had not succeeded : far
from it.
While M. Venizelos grew less by his elevation. King
Constantine was raised by his humihation to a condition,
if not actually divine, half-way towards divinit3^ In
many a house his portrait stood among the holy icons,
with a fight burning before it, and the peasants worshipped
it much as their pagan ancestors would have done. It
was but the culmination of a process long at work — a
process in which the historical element was strangely
mingled with the m}i:hical.i Since the Balkan Wars,
King Constantine had been identified in the peasant mind
with the last Byzantine Basileus — his namesake, Con-
stantine Palaeologus, slain by the Turks in 1453 ; who,
according to a widely believed legend, lay in an enchanted
sleep waiting for the hour when he should wake, break
with his sword the chains of slavery, and replant the cross
1 There is always so much of mystery surrounding the peasant
mind, that its workings must often be accepted rather than under-
stood. But those who wish to understand somewhat the psycho-
logical process which led in antiquity to the deification of kings
during their life-time could not do batter than study the cult of
Constantine among the modern Greek peasantry.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 219
on the dome of Saint Sophia. This singular fancy —
whether a case of resurrection or of reincarnation, is not
clear — ^was strengthened by the fact that his fall occurred
on the very anniversary (29 May/ii June) of the day on
which that unfortunate Emperor fell in the ramparts of
Constantinople. The coincidence completed the associa-
tion between the monarch who sacrificed his life to save
his people from subjection and the monarch who, after
leading his army in two victorious campaigns and doubling
the extent of his country, did not hesitate to sacrifice his
crown to save his people from disaster. Henceforth,
even in minds not prone to superstition, the two events
were linked by the same date, the mourning for the one
rekindled the memory of the other, and King Constantine
acquired a new and imperishable title to the gratitude of
the nation. If all the efforts made in the past to blast his
glory or to belittle his services had only heightened his
popularity, all the efforts made since to blot out his image
could only engrave it still deeper on the hearts of the
people. His very exile was interpreted, symboHcally,
as the enchanted sleep whence he would arise to fulfil the
ancient prophecies.
Mysticism apart, during the sad period preceding his
departure, the affection of the masses for their sovereign,
intensified by compassion, had assumed the quahty of
veneration. Now that he was gone, they brooded over
the wrongs which had driven him, a lawful and popular
king, into exile : wrongs which suffered for their sakes
enhanced his claims on their loyalty. They remembered
wistfully the splendour of his victories, his manly courage,
his saintly patience, and perhaps most of all his unfaihng
kindness to the humble and the weak. This was the quality
which drew men most strongly to Constantine, and the
absence of which repelled them most from M. Venizelos.^
The experience of the last three years had helped to em-
phasize the contrast : when the Eagle's Son was up above,
there were few vultures in the land ; now there were
vultures only. So the name of Constantine became a
synonym for orderly government, loyalty to his person
was identified with the principle of liberty, and the people
who had never regarded Alexander as anything more than
^ See Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, in the Morning Post, 13 Dec, 1920,
220 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
a regent, who cried after the departing monarch from the
shore at Oropus : " You shall come back to us soon,"
hailed the return to normality as presaging the return of
the legitimate sovereign as well as of a legal Constitu-
tion.
This, however, was the very last thing the powers that
were contemplated even as a remote potentiality. For
them the monarch in exile was dead ; and the sooner his
memory was buried the better. Accordingly, a police
circular, issued on 26 May, prohibited conversations
favourable to the ex-king, pictures of the ex-king, songs in
honour of the ex-king, cheers for the ex-king. And,
these regulations having been found insufficient to curb
royalist fervour, five days later M. Venizelos demanded
and obtained from Parliament the re-establishment of
martial law, on the ground that " talk about the return
of the ex-king was calculated to excite public feeling ;
and then the Opposition might have cause to blame the
Government for not respecting the freedom of elections."
The question of the ex-king, he argued, was utterly irrele-
vant to the forthcoming contest : the people would not
be called upon to elect a Constituent, but merely a Re-
visionist Assembly : " Who has said there is to be a
Constituent Assembly ? " he asked.
The answer, of course, was easy : he himself had said so,
on his installation in 1917. But lapses of memory are
permissible to statesmen who mean business. M. Veni-
zelos wanted a National Assembly v/hich would have
powers to ratify the dethronement of the King, the sus-
pension of the irremovability of judges, and all other
revolutionary illegaUties, besides perhaps altering funda-
mental articles of the Constitution — such as the right of
the Crown to appoint and dismiss Ministers and to dissolve
Parhaments — powers which essentially belong to a Con-
stituent Assembly. But he wanted it to be merely
Revisionist. The paradox made havoc of his logic ; but
it no way affected his purpose ; which was that, while as
Constituent in its nature the Assembly should effect any
alterations in the government of the country that he
desired, as Revisionist in name it would not be competent
to discuss the restoration of the King, and, if it proved
recalcitrant, would be subject to dissolution by the execu-
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 221
live. Consistency and M. Venizelos had been divorced
long ago, and the decree was now to be made absolute.
While these eccentricities prevailed at home, abroad
the gamester-spirit of the Cretan scored its crowning
triumph. By the Treaty of Sevres (lo Aug., 1920), which
embodied the territorial arrangements already made at
San Remo, Greece obtained practically the whole of
Thrace outside the enclave of Constantinople, and a man-
date over Smyrna and its hinterland. No doubt, this
enormous extension of the kingdom, though still largely
problematical, appealed to that compound of idealism
and greed (mostly greed) which constitutes Hellenic, as
it does all other, Imperialism. But it did not fully com-
pensate for the suppression of popular liberties within its
frontiers. Except among the followers of M. Venizelos
the national aggrandisement evoked but little enthusiasm :
" What is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world,
and lose his own soul ? " wrote one of the Opposition
leaders, voicing a widespread sentiment — a sentiment
which, only two days after the publication of the Treaty
{12 Aug.), found sinister expression. As he was about to
leave Paris, M. Venizelos was shot at and sUghtly wounded
by two Greek ex-officers. The assailants, on being
arrested, declared that their object had been " to free
Greece from its oppressor and to ensure freedom for their
fellow-citizens."^
The Paris outrage had a sequel at Athens, as significant
and more tragic. ThefollowersofM. Venizelos, like those
of King Constantine, included a set of fanatics who preached
that the salvation of the country demanded the extirpation
of their adversaries. To these zealots the moment seemed
propitious for putting their doctrine into practice.
" Hellenes ! " cried one of their journals, " our great
Chief, our great patriot, the man who has made Greece
great and prosperous, the man who has made us proud to
be called Greeks, has been murdered by the instruments of
the ex-King. Hellenes, rise up all of you, and drive the
murderers out of the fatherland." The Hellenes in
general remained unmoved. But some gangs of hooHgans
did rise up (13 Aug.) and, under the eyes of the pohce and
the gendarmerie, wrecked a number of Royalist newspaper
^ The Daily Mail, Aug. 13, 1920,
222 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
offices, clubs, cafds, and sacked the houses of four prominent
anti-VenizeUst statesmen. The authorities, on their side,
had a dozen leaders of Opposition groups thrown into
prison and, pending their con\'iction, M. Repouhs, a
Minister who in the absence of M. Venizelos acted as his
Deputy, declared that the attempt on the Premier formed
part of a plot long-planned for the overthrow of the regime :
it had failed, but the heads of the culprits would fall without
fail. In fact, one of the Opposition leaders — Ion
Dragoumis, son of the ex-Premier of that name — was
assassinated by the Cretan guards who had arrested him.
The others, after being kept in sohtary confinement for
twenty-four days, had to be released for want of any
incriminating evidence.
M. Venizelos in Paris, when he heard of the riots, was
reported as being beside himself with righteous indignation ;
and he sent a strongly-worded telegram to the Government,
expressing the fear that part of the responsibiUty for the
disorders rested upon its organs, and assuring it that he
should exact full account from everyone concerned. ^ But
when he returned home he pubhcly embraced M. Repoulis,
who explained in the Chamber to the entire satisfaction of
his Chief that the Government had been overawed and
very nearly overthrown by the extremists in its own
ranks (8 Sept.).
Everything that could be done — short of a massacre —
to disorganize and to intimidate the Opposition having
been done, martial law was suspended (7 Sept.), and the
question of Elections began to engage M. Venizelos's atten-
tion seriously. It was a trial which involved his political
life or death, and therefore required the utmost care and
vigilance : one ill-considered step, one omission on his
part might send him to his doom.
He began with the enfranchisement of Thrace (g Sept.).
This province, still under military occupation and martial
law, was to vote : further, a pohtical frontier was erected
between it and the rest of Greece, which only those possess-
ing a special pass could cross, whilst a rigorous censorship
kept all anti-Venizelist newspapers out of it ; and, lastly,
it was enacted, for the benefit of an electorate alien in its
majority and unable to read or write Greek, that the
1 Eleutheros Typos, 5/18 Aug., 1920.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 223
Thracian votes, contrary to the general rule, should be
polled by ballot paper, instead of by a ball.
Another Bill enabled the army on active service, for the
first time in the history of Greece, to participate in elections,
the assumption being that among the soldiers VenizeUst
feehng predominated, or that, at all events, they would
be controlled by their of&cers.
As exceptional importance has always attached to the
district and city of Athens — " which," M. Venizelos said,
" symbolizes the very soul of the country, "^ — it was
incumbent upon him to pay special attention to this area.
The difficulty was that the actual population was no-
toriously unsympathetic. M. Venizelos hastened to over-
come this difficulty by three strokes of the pen : 18,000
refugees from all parts who lived on the Ministry of Public
Relief were enrolled as Athenian citizens ; to these were
added some 6,000 Cretan gendarmes and policemen ; and,
to make up the deficiency, 15,000 natives of Smj^rna,
supposed to have earned Greek citizenship by volunteering
in the war, had their names inscribed on the electoral fists
of Attica.
There followed promises and warnings. On the one
hand, the people were promised fresh labour legislation,
the conversion of the great landed estates into small
holdings, and public works on a large scale. On the
other hand, they were warned that an adverse vote from
them would have disastrous consequences for the country :
Greece had been aggrandized by the Allies for the sake of
M. Venizelos ; if she discarded him, she would forfeit their
goodwill and her territorial acquisitions. But M. Venizelos
and his partisans did not trust altogether to the practical
sense and the Imperialist sensibilities of the people.
For months past the extremists among his followers
openly threatened that, if by any mishap Venizelos did not
win the day after all, they would make a coup d'Hat and
strike terror into the hearts of their adversaries. This
threat, which primarily presented itself as an extravagance
of irresponsible fanaticism, was on 7 September officially
espoused by M. Venizelos, who declared in Parliament
that, should perchance his adversaries obtain a majority
in the new Assembly, and should that Assembly decide
^ The New Europt, 29 March, 1917, p. 327.
224 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
to convoke a Constituent Assembly, and should this
Constituent Assembly invite King Constantine back, the
" Reaction " would find itself confronted with the hostiUty
of a large poUtical party which had become the mortal
enemy of the ex-king ; and he went on to foreshadow a
fresh schism in the army : that is, ci\al war. Encouraged
by so solemn a sanction, Venizehst candidates — notably
at Tyrnavo in Thessaly and Dervenion in Argolis — told
their constituents without any circumlocution that, in the
event of a defeat at the polls, the Government would not
surrender its power, but would maintain it through the
Army of National Defence, which was pledged to a new
Revolution : the Parliamentary system would cease to
function even in name, and many a maUgnant would swing.
These appeals to the sovereign people, published in the
Royalist and not contradicted by the Venizehst Press,
\^^ll doubtless seem startUng for a Government whose
mission was to establish democratic liberties. But they
were justified by necessity. ^M. Venizelos and his partisans
could not afford to be very fastidious : their political
existence was at stake : they must make every effort, and
summon every resource at their command.' Anyone who
was in Athens at that time and saw the Cretan guards,
often with the Premier's photograph pinned on their
breasts, assault such citizens as displayed the olive-t^^^g
(emblem of the Opposition), or saw the gendarmes, who
patrolled the streets \vith fixed bayonets, protect the
excesses of Venizehst bravoes, would appreciate how far
the Government was prepared to stoop in order to survive.
In the midst of these electoral acti\'ities. King Alexander
died — of blood poisoning caused by the bite of a pet
monkey. Ahve he had neither exercised nor been wanted
to exercise any influence over the destinies of his country :
he had simply played the part required by the cast in which
a whimsical fortune had placed him. His death proved
of more importance, inasmuch as it forced the question
of the throne upon j\I. Venizelos irresistibly : the vacancy
had to be filled. Anxious to perpetuate the comedy,
M. Venizelos sought a successor in a still younger and less-
experienced scion of the dynasty : Prince Paul, a lad in
his teens, who refused the offer on the ground that, until
his father and his eldest brother renounced their rights,
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 225
he could not lawfully ascend the throne. After threatening
to change the dynasty rather than admit any discussion
on the restoration of King Constantine, M. Venizelos, by
one of those swift turns characteristic of him, suddenly
made that restoration the main issue of the Elections.
He challenged the Opposition to this test of the real wishes
of the Greek people. The Greek people, he said, should
be given the chance of deciding whether it will have
Constantine back ; and if it so decided, he himself would go.
The Opposition, which consisted of no fewer than sixteen
different groups united only by a common desire to get rid
of the Cretan Dictator, would fain dechne the challenge.
Some of the leaders were ardent Royalists ; others were
very lukewarm ones ; and others still could hardly be
described as Royalists at aU. Generally speaking, the
pohticians out of office had found in the cause of Constan-
tine a national badge for a party feud. Moreover, they
reahzed that the question of Constantine possessed an
international as well as a national aspect, and they did not
wish to compromise the future of Greece and their own ;
which would have been nothing else than stepping into
the very pit M. Venizelos had dug for them. But neither
could they repudiate Constantine without losing popular
support : to the Greek people the main issue of the fight
was indeed what M. Venizelos made it.
At length the day of trial arrived : a Sunday (14 Nov.) —
a day of leisure in a land of universal suffrage. From an
early hour people of all classes thronged the polhng-
stations quietly. They had clamoured for a chance of
expressing their sentiments ; yet now that the chance
had come, they took it with an extraordinary composure.
Even to the most expert eye the electors' demeanour
gave no indication of their sentiments : the oUve-twig had
very curiously withered out of sight. Nor did the be-
haviour of the voters in the last three years afford any clue
to the use they would make of their present opportunity.
Greeks are past masters of simulation and dissimulation.
Openly some might have pretended friendship to the
Venizelist regime from hopes of favour, others again
dissembled hostility through fear ; but the voting was
secret.
Both Government and Opposition shared the suspense,
15
226 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
though the Goveinment anticipated an overwhelming
majority ;i which was natural enough, since all the
advantage seemed on its side.
Presently the votes were coimted — and " it was ofhcially
announced that the Government had been mistaken in
its anticipations." The magnitude of the mistake appeared
on the pubhcation of the figures : 250 seats to 118 : the
Royalists had swept the polls, to the astonishment of all
parties, including their own.^ The very men who had
fought at the bidding of M. Venizelos had pronounced
themselves against him : having fulfilled their duty as
soldiers, they vindicated their right to live as free citizens.
His own constituency had rejected him. And would the
rout stop there ? Among the millions who had submitted
to his rule with sullen irritation there were many whose
hearts swelled with rage, in whom old wounds rankled
and festered : might not these men now have recourse to
other weapons than the vot^ in order to get even with the
bully ?
For a moment M. Venizelos felt stupefied : the edifice
that had seemed so soHd was collapsing about him, and he
was in danger of being buried under the ruins. Then he
wisely stole out of the country he had done his best to
aggrandize and to disintegrate.^
The result of the elections was virtually an invitation
to King Constantine to return and resume his crown.
But the King, not content with an indirect verdict, wanted
an explicit plebiscite ad hoc, clear of all other issues. The
Alhes, after a conference in London, telegraphed (2 Dec.)
^ " Even if the Opposition sweeps the Peloponnese and gains a
majority in Acarnania and Corfu, it is still doubtful whether it will
have 120 seats in the new Chamber, which will contain 369
Deputies ; and the Venizelists anticipate that their opponents will
emerge from the struggle with less than 100 Deputies." — The Times,
15 Nov., 1920.
^ The Daily Mail; The Evening News, 16 Nov, 1920 ; Reuter,
Athens, 15 Nov. : " Not a single Venizelist was returned for Mace-
donia and Old Greece, except in Epirus and Mgean Islands."
^ We learn that his followers " urged upon him the advisability
of a coup d'etat. It would have been the easiest thing in the world
to carry out, and with so much at stake for Greece and for demo-
cratic principles generally, it seemed justifiable." — " M. Venizelos
at Nice," in The Times, 29 Nov., 1920. But, " fears are enter-
tained, it is said, that the regular Army — which is strongly anti-
Venizelist — may get out of hand." — The Daily Mail, 17 Nov.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 227
to M, Rallis, the new Greek Premier, that they " had no
wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece, but they
felt bound to declare publicly that the restoration of the
throne to a king whose disloyal attitude and conduct
towards the Allies during the War caused them great
embarrassment and loss could only be regarded by them
as a ratification by Greece of his hostile acts."^ This
message — yet another fruit of Franco-British compromise
— ^was followed up (6 Dec.) by a second Note, enumerating
the consequences, political and financial, of the Powers'
displeasure. But it produced Httle effect : out of the
1,013,724 electors who took part in the plebiscite (7 Dec),
only 10,383 voted against the King.^ M. Rallis, in ac-
quainting him with the result, stated that he considered
it tantamount to a formal request from the country to the
Sovereign to come into his own again, and invited him to
respond to the clearly expressed wish of the nation. Which
King Constantine did, nothing loth.
Few of those who witnessed the event will ever forget it.
On the eve of the King's return (18 Dec.) Athens could
scarcely contain her emotion. All day long her beflagged
streets rang with the cry : " Erchetai ! Erchetai I " (" He
is coming ! He is coming ! ") — hardly anybody failed to
utter it, and nobody dared to say " Then erchetai " {" He
is not coming "), even if referring to an unpunctual friend.
At night the song in which Constantine was alluded to as
" The Son of the Eagle " echoed from one end of the
illuminated city to the other. But this was only a
preparation for next morning's welcome.
Owing to stress of weather the cruiser carrying the
King and Queen of the Hellenes was compelled to put
in at Corinth, where the exiles landed. From that point
to the capital their journey was a triumphal progress.
The train moved slowly between lines of peasants who,
their hands linked, accompanied it, shouting : " We have
wanted him! We have brought him back!"" When
^ The terms of the Note were communicated to the House of
Commons by Mr. Bonar Law the same night.
2 Reuter, Athens, 9 Dec, 1920.
^ Another version of this refrain, which might be seen in crude
lettering over a cafe at Phaleron, is : "So we willed it, and we
brought him back " {Etsi to ethelame, kai ton epherame) — a distinct
expression of the feeling that the people, by bringing back its
i6
228 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
the King stepped out at the station, officers fought a way
to the carriage with blue and silver dressed postillions
which waited for him and the Queen. He had to keep
tossing from one hand to the other his baton, as men and
women pressed upon him for a handshake. The carriage
struggled forward, men and women clinging to its steps
and running with it, trying to kiss the hands and feet of
the royal pair, and baulked of this, kissing even the horses
and the carriage itself. All the way dense masses of people
pressed round the carriage, shouting : " He has come ! "
or singing the chorus, " Again our King will draw the
sword." An eye-witness had a vision of a soldier who,
amid cries of " We will die for you, Godfather ! " clambered
into the carriage head first and fell to kissing the knees of
the King and Queen, while around people fainted and
stretchers pressed through the crowd. ^
And so the fight for the soul of Greece ended in a
victory for Constantine.
The character of this prince has been painted in the
most opposite colours, as must always be the case when
a man becomes the object of fervent worship and bitter
enmity. But the bare record of what he did and endured
reveals liim sufficiently. His quahties speak through
his actions, so that he who runs may read. His most
conspicuous defect was a want of suppleness — a certain
rigidity of spirit which, when he succeeded, was called
firmness, and when he failed, obstinacy. Yet the charge
so often brought against him, that he allowed himself to
be misled by evil counsellors, shows that this persistence
in his own opinion did not spring from egoism nor was
incompatible with deference to the opinions of others.
It arose from a deep sense of responsibihty : he stubbornly
refused to deviate from his course when he believed that
his duty to his country forbade deviation, and he readily
laid down his crown when duty to his country dictated
renunciation. For the rest, a man who never posed to his
contemporaries may confidently leave his character to
the judgment of posterity.
As for M. Venizelos, history will probably say of him
sovereign in the face of foreign opposition, asserted its own sove-
reignty.
^ See Tne Times, 20 Dec; The Daily Mail, 21 Dec, 1920.
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 229
what it has said of Themistocles : Though he sincerely
aimed at the aggrandizement of his country, and proved
on some most critical occasions of great value to it, yet on
the whole his intelUgence was higher than his morahty —
a man of many talents and few principles, ready to employ
the most tortuous and unscrupulous means, sometimes
indeed for ends in themselves patriotic, but often merely
for aggrandizing himself. By nature he was more fitted
to rule in a despotic than to lead in a constitutional State.
Had he been bom an emperor, his fertile genius
might, unless betrayed by his restless ambition, have
rendered his reign prosperous and his memory precious.
As it is, in his career, with all its brilliance, posterity will
find not so much a pattern to imitate as an example to
deter.
AFTERWORD
IN default of a Providence whose intervention in
human affairs is no longer recognized, there still is a
Nemesis of history whose operations can scarcely be
denied. International morahty, strange as the juxta-
position of the two words may seem, exists no less than the
law of gravity ; and a statesman who offends against the
one must expect much the same catastrophe as an engineer
who ignores the other. But it is not often that this law
of retribution asserts itself so s\vaftly as it has done in the
drama for which Greece supplied the stage to French
statesmen during the last few years ; for it is not often that
a Government in the pursuit of practical interests over-
looks so completely moral principles, flouts so openly
national sentiments, and, while priding itself on reahsm,
shuts its eyes so consistently to reahties.
The logic of French action is as above reproach, as its
motives are beyond dispute.
Nine decades ago the Due de Broghe clearly explained
that the aim of France in assisting to liberate Greece from
the Turkish yoke was to have in the Eastern Mediterranean
an instrument of her own ambition : "a State disposed
to turn her eyes constantly towards that Power who has
made her free — to watch for us over the ports of the Levant,
to guard with us the mouth of the Black Sea and the keys
of the Bosphorus " ; — it followed that the greater the
chent, the better for the patron's purpose. After under-
going many fluctuations and modifications, this idea was
revived at the time of the Balkan wars, when France,
together with Germany, supported the Greek claim to
Cavalla, and it was fostered to an unhealthy growth
during the European War. Hence the identification of
France with M. Venizelos, who stood for a pohcy of expan-
sion at all hazards, and her hostility to King Constantine
who, preferring safety to hazardous ventures, stood for
Greece's right to shape her course without dictation from
Paris any more than from Berhn.
230
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 231
By the methods which she employed, France succeeded
in gaining Greece and losing the Greeks. Nothing else
could have been expected : friends are sometimes to be
won by good offices ; sometimes by the promise of good
offices ; and sometimes by good words. They are seldom
won by injuries, and by insults never. It is curious that
so elementary a lesson in human nature should have been
unknown to the able men who guided the policy and
diplomacy of France during the War, who raised her
miUtary prestige and re-established her position in the
first rank of the European Powers. Yet it is a fact —
a fact which can be easily verified by a reference to their
utterances : they are upon record. Brute force, and
brute force, and again brute force : such is the burden
that runs through them all ; and it embodies a doctrine :
the Greeks are Orientals and must be wooed with terror :
on the notion, enunciated by an EngUsh humorist as a
paradox, and adopted by French statesmen as an axiom,
that terror sown in the Oriental heart will yield a harvest
of esteem — even of affection. With this mad dogma
nailed to her mast, France set out upon her voyage for the
conquest of the Hellenic heart. It was the first of her
mistakes — ^and it was accompanied by another.
Even if Greece were willing to play the part of a French
satelhte, she could not do so ; for her geographical situa-
tion exposes her to the influence of more than one Power.
Italy, who has her own ambitions in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, opposed during the War a pohcy the object of
which was Greek expansion over territories coveted by
herself and a readjustment of the balance of forces in
favour of France ; and it was partly in order not to alienate
Italy during the War that French statesmen wanted
Greece to come in without any specified conditions, leaving
the matter of territorial compensations for the time of
settlement. Russia showed herself not less suspicious of
French diplomacy for similar reasons. But it was with
England chiefly that France had to reckon. In the past
the rivalry between France and England in the Eastern
Mediterranean, though often overshadowed by their
common antagonism, first to Russia and subsequently to
Germany, was a perennial cause of discord which kept
Greece oscillating between the two Powers,
282 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
During the War England, of necessity, lent France her
acquiescence and even assistance in a work which she
would rather not have seen done. But, once done, she
endeavoured to secure such profit as was to be derived
therefrom. The Greeks in Asia Minor — it was thought —
could serve to check the Turks from troubling us in Meso-
potamia and other parts of the Near and Middle East.
Hence the Treaty of Sevres, which provided for the
aggrandizement of Greece at the expense of the Ottoman
Empire in Asia as well as in Europe, to the seeming satis-
faction of both French and British interests. But the
adjustment — even if it had been forced upon Turkey —
could, by the nature of things, be only temporary. Owing
to her geographical situation, Greece must inevitably
move within the orbit of the Power who dominates the
sea.
Psychology accelerated a movement imposed by
geography. While France based her action upon an
Enghsh humorist's paradox, England based hers upon a
French thinker's maxim : Lorsqu'on veut redouhler de
force, il faut redouhler de grace. Although her diplomatic,
military, and naval representatives did participate in
every measure of coercion and intimidation as a matter
of pohc3'', they (if we except the Secret Service gentry)
never forgot the dictates of decency : they never, figura-
tively, kicked the person whom they deemed it necessary
to knock down. The ordinary British soldiers, too, for
all the relaxation of moral rules natural in war, maintained
throughout the campaign a standard of behaviour which
contrasted so favourably with their comrades' that it
earned them among the inhabitants of Macedonia the
honourable nickname of " the maids." It was particu-
larly noted during the fire which devastated Salonica that,
while others took advantage of the turmoil to loot, the
British soldier devoted himself wholly to rescuing. Some
of these things were perhaps resented by our allies as
weak, and some were ridiculed as naive ; but they must
be judged by their effect. At the end of the War one
nation was respected by the Greeks as much as the other
was hated and despised. British prestige rose exactly
in proportion as French prestige sank. And the object
which France elected to seek, and sought in vain, by
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 233
means of violence and terror, England attained by a con-
duct which, if not more lawful, was much more graceful.
Still, French statesmen counted on M. Venizelos —
" I'honime politique qui incarne I'idee de la solidaritc des
inter its fr unguis et grecs " — to keep his country on their
side. And as in the first instance they had made the
alliance conditional on his being placed in control, so now
they made the benefits accruing from it to Greece dependent
on his remaining in control. That M. Venizelos could not
always remain in control does not seem to have occurred
to them. Nor that he might not always be content to be
a mere puppet in their hands. Murmurs at his pro-
British leanings were indeed heard occasionally. But on
the whole the Cretan possessed in an adequate measure the
faculty of adapting himself to rival points of view, of
making each Power feel that her interests were supreme
in his regard, and of using the ambitions of both to promote
his own. As long as he remained in control, France, with
whatever reservations, felt sure of her share of influence.
The collapse of M. Venizelos and the demand of the
Greek people for King Constantine's return, came to French
statesmen as a painful surprise. That they had for several
years been laboriously building on illusions could not be
disguised, and being made to look absurd before those of
their own compatriots who had all along advocated a
poUcy based on the preservation and exploitation of
Turkey, rendered the situation doubly awkward. Unable
to rise above personal pique, they would fain veto the
return of a prince whom they hated and whom they had
wronged beyond hope of concihation. England, however,
free from petty animosities, and sensible that, under what-
ever ruler, Greece would be with her, refused to sanction
lawlessness in the midst of peace ; and her view that, if
the Greeks wanted Constantine, it was their business and
not ours, prevailed. But, on the other hand, by way of
compromise, France obtained that he should return to an
empty treasury, with foreign credits cut off, and the loans
made by the AlHes to the Venizelist Government, to
facilitate the waging of a common war against Turkey,
revoked.
It was an impossible position which King Constantine
was called upon to face : a position none of his own making,
234 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
yet one from which there was no retreat. The Greek
people's imperiahsm had been roused. The leaders who
once criticized M. Vcnizelos's Asiatic policy as a dangerous
dream, opposed to economic, strategic, and ethnic realities,
might still hold those views and mutter in secret that
Smyrna would prove the grave of Greece ; but they no
longer dared express them, out of deference to pubhc
opinion. To the masses M. Venizelos's wild game of
chance seemed vindicated by its results, and while they
rejected the man they clung to his work.
The Greek Government had no choice but to carry on the
conflict under enormous disadvantages. As France antici-
pated, with foreign credits cut off and a progressive fall
in the exchange, the expense of maintaining a large army
on a war footing proved too heavy for the National Ex-
chequer. And that was not the worst. France, who
since the Armistice had betrayed a keen jealousy of
England's place in a part of the world in which she claims
special rights, presently concluded a separate agreement
with Turkey — an example in which she was followed by
Italy — and gave the Turks her moral and material support
in their struggle with the Greeks ; while England, though
refusing to reverse her policy in favour of their enemies,
contented herself with giving the Greeks only a platonic
encouragement, which they were unwise enough to take for
more than it was worth.
Everyone knows the melanchol}^ sequel : our unhappy
" allies," left to their own exhausted resources, were
driven from the Asiatic territories which in common
prudence they should never have entered ; and the over-
seas Empire which M. Venizelos had conjured up vanished
in smoke.
The rout in Asia Minor had its repercussion in Greece.
For nearly two years the people, though war-worn and
on the edge of bankruptcy, bore the financial as they had
borne the famine blockade, trusting that England would
at any moment come forth to counter the vindictiveness
of France, and sturdily resisted all the efforts of the
Venizehst party to shake the stability of the Royahst
regime : Constantine again appeared in their eyes as a
victim of the Cretan's intrigues. But the loss of Ionia
and the danger of the loss of Thrace ; the horror and
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 235
despair arising from the sack of Smyrna, whence shiploads
of broken refugees fied to the Greek ports ; all this, re-
inforced by an idea that the maintenance of the King on
the throne prevented the effective expression of British
friendship and his fall would remove French hostility,
created conditions before which questions of personalities
for once faded into insignificance, and put into the hands
of M. Venizelos's partisans an irresistible lever.
On 26 September an army of 15,000 insurgent soldiers
landed near Athens and demanded the abdication of the
King. The loyal troops were ready to meet force by force.
But the King, in order to avert a fratricidal struggle which
would have dealt Greece the finishing stroke, forbade
opposition and immediately abdicated, " happy," as he
said, " that another opportunity has been given me to
sacrifice myself once more for Greece." In fact, once more
Constantine was made the scape-goat for disasters for which
he was in no way responsible — disasters from which he
would undoubtedly have saved his country, had he been
allowed to pursue his own sober course.
M. Venizelos would not go back to Athens until the
excitement subsided, lest people should think, he said,
that he had had any part in the revolution : but under-
took the defence of the national interests in the Entente
capitals. His mission was to obtain such support as would
enable him to save Greece something out of the ruin which
his insane imperialism had brought upon her, so that he
might be in a position to point out to his countrymen that
he alone, after the disastrous failure of Constantine, had
been able to secure their partial rehabihtation. That
accompUshed, he might then hope to become a perpetual
Prime Minister or President.
France made it quite clear that no changes in Greece
could alter her policy : however satisfied she might be at
the second disappearance of the antipathetic monarch, it
should not be supposed that, even were a Repubhc to be
set up, presided over by the Great Cretan, her attitude
on territorial questions would be transformed : Thrace,
after Ionia, must revert to Turkey. French statesmen
longed for the complete demolition of their own handi-
work. M. Poincar6, in 1922, was proud to do what the
Due de BrogHe ninety years before scoffed at as an
236 GREECE AND THE ALLIES
unthinkable folly: " Abandonncr la Grece aujourd'hui,
dctruire de nos propres mains I'onvrage que nos propres
mains ont presque acheve I "
England's expressed attitude was not characterized by
a like precision. It is true that after the Greek debacle
she dispatched ships and troops to prevent the Straits
from falhng into the hands of the Turks ; but in the matter
of Thrace she had already yielded to France : and how the
restoration of Turkish rule in Europe can be reconciled
with the freedom of the Straits remains to be seen.
What the future may have in store for Greece and
Turkey is a matter of comparatively small account.
What is of great and permanent importance is the diver-
gence between the paths of France and England revealed
by the preceding analysis of events.
From this anal3'sis have been carefully excluded such
superficial dissensions as always arise between alhes after
a war, and were especially to be expected after a war in
which every national susceptibihty was quickened to a
morbid degree : they belong to a different category from
the profound antagonisms under consideration. These —
whatever the philosopher may think of a struggle for
domination — present a problem which British statesmen
must face frankly. It is not a new problem ; but it now
appears under a new form and in a more acute phase than
it has ever possessed in the past — thanks to the success of
the " knock-out blow " pohcy which governed the latter
stages of the War.
With the German power replaced by the French, the
Russian for the moment in abeyance, French and ItaHan
influences competing in Turkey, French and British aims
clashing in the Arab regions wrested from Turkey — while
indignation at Occidental interference surges in the minds
of all the peoples of the Orient — the Eastern Mediterranean
offers a situation which tempts one to ask \\hether the
authors of that policy have not succeeded too well ?
Whether in pursuing the success of the day — to which
their personal reputations were attached — they did not
lose sight of the morrow ? Whether they have not
scattered the seed without sufficiently heeding the crop ?
However that may be, unless this situation was clearly
foreseen by its creators and provided for — a hypothesis
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 237
which, with the utmost goodwill towards them, does not
appear very probable—they have an anxious task — a
task that, under these conditions, demands from British
statesmanship more thinking about the Near Eastern
question and the Greek factor in it than was necessary
before 1914.
As a first aid to an appreciation of the problem by the
public — which the present crisis found utterly unprepared
— it would have been well if the fundamental differences
between the respective attitudes of France and England
towards each other and towards the peoples concerned
had been candidly acknowledged, and all pretence of
Franco-British co-operation in the Near East abandoned.
Lasting co-operation cannot be where there is neither
community of interests nor consonance of ideas : where the
loss of one party is welcomed as gain by the other, and the
wisdom of the one in the eyes of the other is folly. Pious
talk of a common Allied mission in the Near East has
only served to obscure issues and to render confusion in
the pubhc mind worse confounded. It was idle to make
a mystery of the support given by France to the Turks
and of her insistence on the revision of the Sevres Treaty —
prehminary steps to her demand for the evacuation of
Chanak and the consequent elimination of British sea-
power. The object of these tactics was evident to every
serious student of history : France pursues now the plan
laid down by Louis XIV, continued by Napoleon, fitfully
carried on throughout the nineteenth century, and facili-
tated by her installation in Syria — the equivalent of the
German Drang nach Osten : a plan incompatible with the
safety of the British Empire in the East. This is the
truth of the matter, and nothing has been gained by
hiding it.
The people who fought a ruinous war without quite
knowing the ends aimed at, had a right to know at least
the results obtained ; and after France's separate agree-
ment with Turkey, the denial to them of any part of that
knowledge could not be justified on any principle of honour
or plea of expediency.
INDEX
ACHILLEION, 91
Albania, Suggested partition of,
19
Alexander, King, 197, 203,
205-7, 219, 224
Andrew, Prince, 123, 200
Asia Minor, Concessions to
Greece in, 19, 22-26, 32,
34. 35. 37. 221, 232.
, Greeks driven from,
234
Athens, Naval demonstrations
against, 82, 102, no, in
, Fighting at, 159-161
, Bombardment of, 160
- — — , Occupation of, 204
, Conspiracy at, 216
, Riots at, 221, 222
electorate, 223
Austria and Greece, 9
and Servia, 7, 17, 22
Averoff, M., 183
gaol, 209
Balkan League, 4, 19, 20, 24,
27
Benazet, M., Negotiation of,
146, 147, 150-152
Blockades, 82, loi, 164, 172-
176, 184
Boulogne, Conference at, 140,
185
Bratiano, M., 22
Briand, M., 76, 86, 89, 100-103,
105, 116, 131, 132, 146
Broglie, Due de, 188, 230, 235
Bucharest Treaty, 7-9, 18
, Conference at, 18
Bulgaria and Greece, 7, 8, 21,
23, 67
Servia, 7, 17, 21, 62
Turkey, 21, 52
Central Powers, 27, 40
Entente, 21, 28, 38,
40. 43. 57. 60, 66, 144
Btilow, Prince von, 47
Callimassiotis, M., 92
Calogeropoulos, M., Premier,
124-132, 140, 192
239
Canea, 92, 128, 130, 132
Castellorizo, 85, 86
Castoria, Metropolitan of, 209
Cavalla allotted to Greece, 10,
230
, Proposed cession of, to
Bulgaria, 20, 23-25, 39,
41-42
surrendered to Germano-
Bulgars, 11 8-21
Cephalonia, 86, 177
Cerigo, 177
Chanak, 237
Chios, 130
Church, Greek, 175, 176, 208,
209
Churchill, Mr. Winston, 13
Cochin, M. Denys, 8i
Constantine, King : his popu-
larity, I, 2. 75, 131. 175,
198, 218-220
policy, 5, 8-12,
13, 14, 15, 19, 34, 35, 38,
55, 81, 114, 124, 144, 146,
150, 156, 181, 230
defeat in 1897, i, 74
-, and M. Venizelos,
5. 14. 15. 53-57. 115. 133.
145. 181
-, , and the Kaiser, 9,
10, 56, 69, 95, 96, 170
-, , Agitation against,
70, 121, 127, 143, 145, 167,
181, 182
-, : dethronement, 186,
191-199
restoration, 227,
228
-, : character, 198, 199,
228
: abdication, 235
Constantinople, Russia and, 31,
32
Constitution, Greek, 70-74, 191,
201, 205, 220
Corfu, 85, 86, 91, 177
Corinth, 186, 190, 192, 195, 227
Coundouriotis, Admiral, 103,
131, 133, 183, 209
240
GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Crete, 2, 86, 128, 130, 133-136,
208
Crewe, Lord, 41, 42
Crimean War, 103
Crown Councils, 29, 68, 170, 192
Cuninghame, Sir Thomas, 82
Cyprus, 66, 75
Danglis, General, 133
Dardanelles, 14, 15, 27-31, 34,
59, 72. See also " Galli-
poli"
Dartige du Fournet, Admiral,
91, 92, no, 112, 129, 130,
131, 139, 141, 143, 147, 148,
149, 152, 153-160, 163-164
Delcass^, M., 32, 37, 38, 39, 41,
42, 46, 76
Delyannis, M., 74
Demidotf, Prince, Russian
Minister at Athens, 32, 35,
104, 112
Demir-Hissar, Bridge of, 85
Deville, M., quoted, 13, 28, 40,
51. 57
Dimitracopoulos, M., 123, 192
Dousmanis, General, 81, 112, 200
Dova-tep6, Fort, 99
Dragoumis, Ex-Premier, 192, 210
, Ion, 222
Drama, 109, 118, 121
Elections of June, 1915, 33, 50
December, 1915, 75
demanded and eluded
(June-September, 1916),
102, 106-108, 114, 115, 123
of November, 1920, 222-226
Eleusis, III, 174
Elliot, Sir Francis, British
Minister at Athens, 35, 88,
104, 114, 117, 123, 125, 128,
142, 145, 149, 156, 165
England, Policy of, 13, 20, 22,
31, 42, 56, 77, 102, 104, 106,
128, 144, 185, 186, 232-234,
236
Esslin, M., 209
Evangelismos hospital, 210
Falkenhayn, General von, 95-
97
Fleet, Greek, 131, 141, 148, 149
Fiorina, 85
France, Policy of, 13, 31, 4O,
77. 87, 103, 129, 144, 153,
^55, 183-185, 230, 231,
233-235. 237
Gallipoli, 14, 30, 31, 36, 43, 50,
63. 73- S^^ ^^•so " Dar-
danelles "
Gauchet, Admiral, 164, 190
George, King of Greece, 71
, Prince, 35, 38-40, 134-
137, 156, 211
Gerakini, 91
Germany and Greece, 11, 87, 89,
95-98, 121, 122
Goerlitz, Greek troops interned
at, 121
Gounaris, M., Premier, 33-46,
200
Grey, Sir Edward, 22, 23, 25,
35. 56. 59. 60, 66, loi,
102
" Guarantee " of Greek Con-
stitution, 187-189
Guillemin, M., French Minister
at Athens, 37, 56, 61, 82,
88, 102, 104, 106, no, 117,
118, 129, 146, 152, 164
Hamilton, General, 59
Hatzopoulos, Colonel, 108, 118-
121
Hautefeuille, M., 172
Hindenburg, Field-Marshal von,
118, 119, 121, 170
Holy Synod, Appeals from, 176
deposed, 208
Ionia, 234, 235
Italian troops in Macedonia, 108
Epirus, 203
policy, 231, 234
Jagow, Von, 97
Jonnart, M., his mission to
Greece, 186, 189-206
Kaiser, The, and King Con-
stantine, 9, 10, 117, 180, 181
, , Queen Sophie,
169, 170
Kara-Burnu, 85
INDEX
241
Katerini, 96, 147
Kerr, Admiral Mark, 10, 14, 15,
219
Kitchener, Lord, 13
, , on French policy, 76
, , in Greece, 81
Krivolak, 79, 95
Lambros, Prof., Premier, 141,
143. 149. 154. 158, 181, 200,
210
Larissa, 118
Lemnos, 58, 130
Leucas, 178
London, Treaties of (1863 and
1864), 86
, Conference in, 186
Macedonia, Allies in, 76-80,
82-85, 108
, Germano-Bulgarian in-
vasion of, 94, 97, 98, 108,
109
, Elections in, 94, 109
, British soldiers' conduct
in, 232
Mercati, M., 55, 56
Metaxas, Colonel, 29, 81, 112,
200
Milne, General, loi
Milo, 82, III
Monastir, 67, 77, 95, 145
Moschopoulos, General, 59, 82
Moudros, 58
Mytilene, 58, 94, 130, 133, 208
Near East, Franco-British
rivalry in, 231, 237
Neutral zone, 147, 148, 168, 178,
180
Nicholas, Prince, 123, 200
Oropus, 220
Otho, King, 103, 125, 187
Painlev6, M., 186
Palaeologus, Emperor Constan-
tine. Legend of, 218
Passitch, M., 18, 40, 42, 51
Paul, Prince, 224
Peloponnesus, 146, 167, 169,
171, 192, 195
Phaleron, 198
Pirseus, 103, no, 120, 127, 141,
143. 159. 165, 176, 190, 202,
213
Poincar6, M., 38, 40, 235
Politis, M., 47, 183
Rallis, M., 30, 80, 210, 227
Regnault, General, 190, 203, 204
Repoulis, M., 222
Reservists, 107, 117, 127, 171,
184, 203
Ribot, M., 184, 186, 190, 217
Rome, Conference at, 169, 185
Roques, General, 147, 152
Rufos, M., 209
Rumania, 9, 10, 18, 21-24, i^3>
116
Rupel, 97, 98, 99, 210
Russia and Greece, 31, 32, 43,
104, 126, 157, 184, 185, 189
Bulgaria, 62
Servia, 18
Turkey, 19, 27
Salamis, III, 149, 190, 195
Salisbury, Lord, on Greek policy
in 1897, 74
Salonica, Allies' landing at, 56,
58-62, 64, 74
in state of siege, 100
, Revolt at, no
, Fire at, 232
Samos, 130, 133
San Remo, 218
Sarrail, General, 79, 82, 99, 100,
102, 106, 107, 108, no, 164,
178, 179, 181, 183, 202
Sazonow, M., 18, 19, 31
Schenck, Baron, 140
Secret Services, French and
British, 90-93, 107, 112,
117, 127-130, 179
Serres, 109, 118, 120
Servia, Greek alliance with, 7,
8. 17. 33. 51. 52. 55. 58.
65, 66
, Entente and, 18, 22, 23,
40, 41, 42, 51
Sevres, Treaty of, 221, 232, 237
Skouloudis, M., Premier, 69
and Entente, 77-79, 81-
84, 88, 89, 99, 100
■ Germany, 87, 89, 95-
242
GREECE AND THE ALLIES
Skouloudis, M., Premier, placed
under surveillance, 200
impeached, 209, 210
Smyrna, 35, 36, 221, 223, 234,
235
Sophie, Queen, 160, 169, 170,
173
Staff, Greek General ; Dar-
danelles, Plans of, 15, 16
, , and Servia, 17,
40, 41, 49, 52
Constantine, 13, 31, 35, 72,
73
, , M. Veni-
zelos, 25, 28, 29. 45, 55, 62,
73. 81
, , Lord
Kitchener, 81
, , on Gallipoli
enterprise, 28, 29, 31, 36, 47
, , opposed to
Asiatic expansion, 25, 26
Straits, Russia and the, 31
, France and the, 230
, England and the, 236
Stratos, M., 192, 193
Streit, M., 8. 12, 13, 15, 34, 45,
112, 200
Struma, 85, 97
Submarines, German, Alleged
fuelling of, 90-92
Suda Bay, 86, 128, 133
Syngros gaol, 209
Syra, 177
Syria, 237
Talaat Bey, 18
Tatoi, 53, 55
Thasos, 120, 130
Therisos movement, 134, 136
Thessaly, 145, 147, 168, 178,
180, 181, 186, 190, 192
Thrace, 19, 221, 222, 234, 235,
236
Turkey and Entente, 4, 13, 19,
232, 233, 235, 236
Turkey and Germany, 10, 13,
18, 19
Bulgaria, 19, 52
Greece, 13, 18, iq,
217, 218, 232, 233, 234
Venizelos, Eleutherios : early
career, 2-5, 133-136
, and King Constantine,
5, 14, 15, 29, 50, 53-57,
109, 110, 136, 137, 183,
220, 225.
: policy, 7, 8, 12-14, 20,
21-27, 28-32, 51, 53, 55, 61,
68, 127, 205, 207, 221, 230
: first resignation, 31
: return to power, 50
: popularity, 5, 50
: second resignation, 63
: unpopularity, 75, 94, 107,
108, 175, 176
: agitation, 44-48, 70-74,
92-94, 99, 127
: rebellion, 106, no, 128-
131. 133. 136-138
: Salonica Government,
133, 140, 147, 148, 168.
169, 174, 177, 178
: anathematization, 175
: elevation, 202-206
: rule, 207-216
: attempt on his life, 221
: fall, 226
: character, 229
: representative of Greece
in Entente capitals, 235
Vlachopoulos, Colonel, 52, 53
Volo, 120
Wellington, Duke of, 188
Zaimis, M., Premier, 65-69, 102,
108, 114-119, 181, 190-203
Zalocostas, M., 210
Zante, 177
Zappeion, 143, 159, 160
Zographos, M., 33, 37, 41
Frinted in Great Britain ty JarroLi ^ ^ons, Ltd., Norwich
TURKEY
IN TRANSITION
By G. F. ABBOTT
" Very few writers of our time know better how to combine a
sense of humour with a shrewd capacity for observation. . . . Mr.
Abbott's vivacity is unfaiUng, but it is of the kind which never
rehnquishes its self-respect. . . . IndividuaUty, aUke of observa-
tion and of judgment, is the keynote of his work, and he never
touches a theme without enduing it with a suggestive personahty."
— The Daily Telegraph.
" There is no vital political factor in the government of Turkey
of to-day that Mr. Abbott leaves untouched and undescribed.
The educated new Turkish woman, the old Turkish gentleman, the
young Turkish bounder, the Christian, the liberal, the committee-
man, the general, the editor, Abdul Hamid and Mohammed V,
are each laid bare, discussed, described, and judged with a know-
ledge, impartiality and precision that should excite the envy of
anyone who has vainly endeavoured to accomplish a similar
task. . . . He gives us a study of the ex-SuItan which should live
as an historic document. This author alone, it may be confidently
asserted, has given a truthful and graphic account of the character
and personality of the man whose complexity, craft, simpleness,
sagacity and folly have baffled pressmen and diplomatists for over
thirty years. . . . With masterly directness he traces for the first
time the whole sequence of events extending from the first revolu-
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LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD. 12s 6d.net
TURKEY, GREECE, AND
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By G. F. ABBOTT
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